Violence and the state: Lessons from Colombia

Whether or not Colombia has improved is a controversial topic. If improvement has occurred, what, if any, lessons from the Colombian model can be learned? The first lesson is that Colombia's problems were caused more by a weak state than by drugs. The second lesson is that improving state capacity requires more than just increased security. The state must also provide the basic social services that citizens require to gain and maintain their support. Additionally, government institutions need to improve their professionalism, protect human rights, and root out impunity and corruption. The alternative is to suffer from new cycles of violence as old foes are vanquished, but new ones emerge.     

Schlieffen and the Avoidance of Tactics: A Reinvestigation

This article challenges the view that Schlieffen tried to evade the tactical conundrum of the modern battlefield by resorting to the operational level of war. On that view, the outflanking strategy of the Schlieffen Plan, with its supposed avoidance of frontal attack, betokened a failure to come to terms with the firepower revolution that had so enormously strengthened the tactical defensive. But Schlieffen did in fact engage directly with this problem by creating a mobile heavy artillery to improve the offensive tactical capability of the German army. Moreover, the Schlieffen Plan was not based exclusively on the outflanking principle. Schlieffen reckoned that the envelopment of Paris could succeed only in conjunction with a frontal assault on the whole line between Paris and Verdun, an immense tactical undertaking crucially supported by the mobile heavy artillery.     

Unmasking silence and impunity: the Zimbabwe Peace Project’s e-activism in a polarised political dispensation

This study is an exploration of the use of technology-mediated interventions by the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) in checkmating the country’s insidious culture of political violence and impunity. It disentangles the ZPP’s strategies and the composite reactions they triggered from state functionaries and the aligned security apparatus. The ZPP exploited and deployed an Internet-circulated monthly newsletter, bulk short message service (SMS) alerts, smartphones, radio and Facebook to shine a spotlight on injustice. It is argued that the ZPP’s whistle-blowing strategies used against human rights violators were not necessarily intended to secure immediate perpetrator conviction; rather, they were a partial but exigent attempt at using perpetrator exposure to reveal extralegal activities and checkmate the country’s culture of impunity. The ZPP’s cybernetic naming and shaming strategies embarrassed some offenders, as evidenced by the intelligence operatives and the police’s constant harassment and arrests of ZPP-affiliated activists. The state-controlled media compounded this pressure by casting aspersions on the ZPP’s bona fides, labelling it a foreign-funded organisation that was attempting to destabilise the country. Finally, this study is informed by a broad evidentiary base that includes ZPP reports on its e-archive, oral interviews, policy documents and newspaper accounts.     

China's Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean

This article argues that an increasingly sea-power-minded China will neither shelter passively in coastal waters, nor throw itself into competition with the United States in the Pacific Ocean. Rather, Beijing will direct its energies toward South and Southeast Asia, where supplies of oil, natural gas, and other commodities critical to China's economic development must pass. There China will encounter an equally sea-power-minded India that enjoys marked geostrategic advantages. Beijing will likely content itself with ‘soft power’ diplomacy in these regions until it can settle the dispute with Taiwan, freeing up resources for maritime endeavors farther from China's coasts.     

Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz's On War

Clausewitz laid great emphasis on the planned construction of war, but this idea has received little attention from his commentators, who generally attach far greater importance to what he said about the chaotic elements of war, in particular its interactive nature and the friction inseparable from its conduct. This article gives long-overdue recognition to planning as a dominant theme of On War. The essential point Clausewitz makes concerning interaction is not that the enemy's responses are bound to disrupt our plans, but that our plans must aim to predict and incorporate his responses. Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, but it is precisely in respect of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius, whose capabilities are seen above all as the executive arm of planning.