A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.     

Countering Insurgent-terrorism: Why Nato Chose The Wrong Historical Foundation For Cimic

History teaches that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns have never been won through purely military action. Defeating an opponent who avoids open battle, but who uses force to reach his goals, including terrorist action, requires a combination of police, administrative, economic and military measures. As a counterinsurgency campaign should pursue a comprehensive political objective, it requires high levels of civil–military cooperation. However, current NATO doctrine for Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as it emerged from the 1990s is founded in conventional war-fighting and outdated peacekeeping doctrine. CIMIC's focus is on supporting military objectives rather than enabling the military to make a coherent contribution to political objectives. This makes CIMIC unfit for the Alliance's main operational challenges that have expanded from peace operations on the Balkans to countering insurgent terrorism in Afghanistan. When developing CIMIC, the Alliance obviously neglected the historical lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Operation Messiah: Did Christianity Start as a Roman Psychological Counterinsurgency Operation?

Through examining the life and work of the man who is generally known as the Apostle Paul, I hope to challenge the idea that the founder of Christianity was a saint and replace it with the possibility that he really was an agent-provocateur working for the Roman administration in Palestine and various other parts of the Empire. Paul's biography and his own letters, both of which were taken up in the New Testament, hold numerous clues to the effect that this former persecutor, originally named Saul of Tarsus, never left the ranks of the government, but instead went undercover after his famous ‘conversion’ en route to Damascus. The self-proclaimed successor-to-Jesus was not only treated dramatically differently from Jesus by the Romans, but they were his friends and allowed him to live and work for 20 years instead of crucifying him. Jesus' original followers distrusted Paul, and made various attempts to kill him throughout his life. I will conclude by arguing that Paul's claim that Jesus, this candidate-king of the Jews, was the Messiah and had been crucified as the will of God (the prime assumption upon which Christianity is based) should be read as a sadistic mockery of Jewish faith, meant to divide a Jewish resistance organisation and pacify it.     

The Pitfalls of Cross-National Comparison in Conflict Research

Professor Joseph Soeters shows admirable ambition in comparing national styles of conflict resolution and is extremely eager to draw historical lessons from such comparative exercises. However, he gets entangled in national mythmaking as he underestimates the complexity of comparative history of this kind. Particularly the establishment of true causal links between national (strategic) cultures and actual tactical behaviour on the ground is far more difficult than he suggests in his recent book chapter and his reply to my article in this journal.