Globalisation in the defence industry: An exploration of the paradigm for us and European defence firms and the implications for being global players

This paper explores some of the key issues associated with the restructuring of the defence industry. A comparison is made between the US and the European Defence Industrial Bases in terms of the drivers for change and the paradigms within which change has taken place. Having shown that some very important differences exist, the paper then explores the approaches that have been adopted for industry consolidation and references them to the academic literature on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and strategic alliances (SAs). Given that most of the key defence players recognise the need to be global players, the paper presents an argument that the European firms’ experience of operating with a wide range of forms of corporate alliance will serve them in good stead for operating on a global defence scale. US firms, in contrast, have focused largely on M&A activity.     

The European Union: Just an alliance or a military alliance?

Over centuries there have been different definitions and criteria for alliances. Within this, however, there are categories entitled ‘military alliances’. The article arrives at 11 different criteria for categorisation of alliances and applies them to the different facets of the European Union. It concludes that, on the broadest terms, the EU does meet the criteria for an alliance but that the jury is still out on some aspect of the European Union being a military alliance. This conclusion has consequences for the foreign, security and defence policies of several member states and, indeed, for the future of the European Union itself.     

Conflict,technology, and the impact of industrialization: The Great War 1914–18

In major respects, World War I appeared markedly unlike even quite recent wars. What, by and large, caused the difference was not quality of command or changing morale. It was industrial mobilisation and technological advancement. The emergence of new weapons, and of new methods of producing them in volume and at speed, played a crucial role in changing the nature of war.

Certainly, the peculiar qualities of the Great War of 1914–18 were not determined solely by technology. Quite other factors, such as the profundity of the issues at stake ('This war is life and death'), and the relative equality in resources and determination between the principal rivals, also profoundly influenced the nature of the conflict. Yet in delineating the dominant aspects of that struggle, the contribution made by industrialization and technology and a culture of inventiveness must loom large.

Admittedly, in some respects, the transformation of weaponry under the impact of industrialisation did not necessarily produce a new kind of war. The battleship of 1914 was hugely unlike the battleship of 1805, yet the Great War at sea was not strikingly different from the naval war against Napoleon. War in the air was an entirely new phenomenon, yet the aircraft had not reached a state of development where it could fundamentally alter the face of battle.

But in the case of the land war, new weapons and new volumes of weaponry did indeed make a vast difference to the nature and consequence of military operations. In large measure they generated the features by which this struggle is best remembered: stalemate, immobility, great battles of attrition, and ‘futility’.     

Stochastic duels with displacements (suppression)

The stochastic duel is extended to include the possibility of a near-miss on each round fired, which causes the opponent to displace. During displacement, the displacing contestant cannot return the fire but is still a target for his opponent. An alternative interpretation of this model is to consider the displacement time as the time a contestant's fire is suppressed by his opponent's fire and that he does not move, but merely ceases fire temporarily. All times are exponentially distributed.