Dynamic order acceptance and capacity planning on a single bottleneck resource

We present a tactical decision model for order acceptance and capacity planning that maximizes the expected profits from accepted orders, allowing for aggregate regular as well as nonregular capacity. The stream of incoming order arrivals is the main source of uncertainty in dynamic order acceptance and the company only has forecasts of the main properties of the future incoming projects. Project proposals arrive sequentially with deterministic interarrival times and a decision on order acceptance and capacity planning needs to be made each time a proposal arrives and its project characteristics are revealed. We apply stochastic dynamic programming to determine a profit threshold for the accept/reject decision as well as to deterministically allocate a single bottleneck resource to the accepted projects, both with an eye on maximizing the expected revenues within the problem horizon. We derive a number of managerial insights based on an analysis of the influence of project and environmental characteristics on optimal project selection and aggregate capacity usage. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.