Qmp/USP: A modern alternative to MIL-STD-105D

The Quality Measurement Plan (QMP) and the Universal Sampling Plan (USP) are the data analysis and sampling plans for the AT&T Technologies quality audit. This article describes QMP/USP, an acceptance sampling plan based on QMP and USP principles. QMPIUSP is a complete acceptance sampling system. It combines the elements of classical rectification inspection plans with those of MIL-STD-IOSD. There is no switching between plans, no tables of numbers to look through, and no discontinue state. QMP/USP is a computerized, self-contained system that features:

• Acceptance decisions based on the QMP Bayes empirical Bayes analysis of current and past sampling result
• Sample size selection based on USP, i.e., lot size, AQL, a cost ratio, the QMP analysis, and a budget constraint
• Guaranteed AOQ
• A complete statistical analysis of the quality process.

In this article, we describe the operation of QMP/USP and compare its performance with that of MIL-STD-IOSD. The comparison is made under many different quality environments with many metrics. Our results show that QMP/USP and MIL/STD/IOSD perform similarly for the environments where quality could be described as “in control”; and that QMPlUSP is superior in the environments where quality is “out of control”.     

A problem in network interdiction

Suppose we are given a network G=(V,E) with arc distances and a linear cost function for lengthening arcs. In this note, we consider a network-interdiction problem in which the shortest path from source node s to sink node t is to be increased to at least τ units via a least-cost investment strategy. This problem is shown to reduce to a simple minimum-cost-flow problem. Applications and generalizations are discussed, including the multiple-destination case.     

Interval estimation of a global optimum for large combinatorial problems

Consider an “intractable” optimization problem for which no efficient solution technique exists. Given a systematic procedure for generating independent heuristic solutions, we seek to obtain interval estimates for the globally optimal solution using statistical inference. In previous work, accurate point estimates have been derived. Determining interval estimates, however, is a considerably more difficult task. In this paper, we develop straightforward procedures which compute confidence intervals efficiently in order to evaluate heuristic solutions and assess deviations from optimality. The strategy presented is applicable to a host of combinatorial optimization problems. The assumptions of our model, along with computational experience, are discussed.     

What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?

US national security guidance, as well as the US Army’s operational experiences since 2001, emphasizes the importance of working closely with partner countries to achieve US strategic objectives. The US Army has introduced the global landpower network (GLN) concept as a means to integrate, sustain and advance the Army’s considerable ongoing efforts to meet US national security guidance. This study develops the GLN concept further, and addresses three questions. What benefits can the GLN provide the Army? What are the essential components of the GLN? What options exist for implementing the GLN concept? By developing the GLN concept, the Army has the opportunity to transition the GLN from an often ad hoc and reactive set of relationships to one that the Army more self-consciously prioritizes and leverages as a resource to meet US strategic objectives.     

‘What Kind of War is This?’

This article explores the nature of the American war in Vietnam in an effort to determine whether it was a response to an indigenous uprising or an external effort by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to use a wide array of policies and programs to unite North Vietnam and South Vietnam under the party’s leadership. It argues that, although there initially were elements of the South Vietnamese population that rose against the southern leadership, the CPV gained control of their resistance and relegated it to a secondary role in the CPV war effort.     

Waging the inchoate war: Defining,fighting, and second-guessing the ‘Long War’

Abstract

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 – 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of ‘selective identification’ (versus pure ‘disaggregation’) as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.