INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Decisionmaking processes leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by democratic states have served as the basis for theories about nuclear proliferation. In contrast, less is known about how a totalitarian regime responds to immense external pressure to abolish unconventional weapons it considers crucial for its security and survival. This article will analyze how we can explain Iraq's behavior after the passing of Resolution 1441 and during the United Nations inspections in 2002–2003.     

A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

Influences on threat assessment in a military context

The anchoring effect is a well-studied subject. This article connects the effect with the rules-in-use within a military intelligence institution. Particularly the rules-in-use that dictate that an analyst takes his or hers starting point from recently conducted assessments of the specific area or threat. The threat assessment as well as the written assessment were affected. The results show that officers have an aversion to lower a previous given threat assessment. This gives that to understand risk assessment we not only need to understand the methods used, we also need to understand the institutions in which they are used. This is especially relevant for military intelligence as the assessments are conducted in an environment of high uncertainty.     

Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009

During their 60 years within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Denmark and Norway have experienced both high and low standings within the alliance, which can be attributed to both external and internal factors influencing their alliance strategies. During the ‘first’ Cold War and Détente, 1949–79, Danish and Norwegian alliance strategy aimed to simultaneously deter and reassure the Soviet Union. During the ‘second’ Cold War, 1979–89, Danish alliance policy became driven by domestic politics, and the Danish government was forced to formally dissociate the country from NATO's policies. Norway was not uncritical, but held a much lower profile. After the Cold War this situation shifted. Denmark successfully rehabilitated itself as a loyal and dependable ally by responding to the call for focusing on out-of-area operations. Meanwhile, Norway's continued focus on the lingering Russian Threat made the country seem out-of-touch with priorities in the post-Cold War alliance, and domestic politics prevented a more active out-of-area engagement.     

British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept

At NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit, the UK and Germany unveiled two new initiatives for European defence cooperation, known, respectively, as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Framework Nations Concept (FNC). Both were the result of economic pressures and the need to exercise intra-alliance leadership, but they represented very different approaches to cooperation. The JEF was to be a UK-led contingency force for short-notice operations, selectively incorporating forces from allies and partners. The FNC sought to coordinate capability development between groups of allies, centred on larger framework nations, to develop coherent capability-clusters available to meet NATO’s force requirements. The common denominator and novelty of the initiatives was the building of forces and capabilities multinationally by having major states act as framework nations for groups of smaller allies. The UK and Germany have ownership and continue to provide leadership to these initiatives. This is one key reason why they continue to evolve to accommodate changing circumstances and are likely to endure.     

Risk communication within military decision-making: pedagogic considerations

Risk management is a decision-support process and a vital tool for military planning and decision-making. Today, several nations utilize risk-based approaches to analyze the level of security in military operations. There are both strengths and challenges in applying risk-based approaches to support military decisions. In this article, the challenges related to risk communication are investigated with the aim of describing how a military organization should train to create a good environment for effective risk communication. The analysis finds that it is important for the organization to define and consistently use a shared risk understanding. Such a shared risk understanding will need a systematic development process that focuses on the future decision makers’ and analysts’ education and training. To reach understanding, all involved parties must have the chance to identify the problem, reflect on its implications, test different solutions and develop a solution.     

Understanding armed groups and party politics

Abstract

Political parties with an armed history are not unusual, yet how these groups function in politics after the transition has largely been ignored. This special issue examines armed groups in party politics, using single and comparative case studies. The introduction forwards five recommendations for future research: (1) We need to see more comparisons across taken for granted boundaries; (2) the consequences for democracy should figure more prominently in our analysis of armed groups; (3) think more critically about standards and conceptual tools; (4) critically examine the interaction between levels of analysis; and (5) methodological pluralism would enrich the field.