Unrestricted warfare: Review essay I

During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred.     

Tilting at windmills: The flawed U.S. policy toward the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

ABSTRACT

This article examines decision-making mistakes made by U.S. President Nixon and national security advisor Kissinger during the 1971 India-Pakistan crisis and war. It shows that Nixon and Kissinger routinely demonstrated psychological biases that led them to overestimate the likelihood of West Pakistani victory against Bengali rebels as well as the importance of the crisis to broader U.S. policy. The evidence fails to support Nixon and Kissinger’s own framing of the 1971 crisis as a contest between cool-headed realpolitik and idealistic humanitarianism, and instead shows that Kissinger and Nixon’s policy decisions harmed their stated goals because of repeated decision-making errors.     

The politics of renewed quest for a Biafra Republic in Nigeria

The quest for a Biafran Republic by the Igbo ethnic group has become a recurring demand in Nigeria since the late 1960s. The agitation has been premised on claims of marginalisation and exclusion of the Igbo people in the Nigerian body politic. In spite of the consistency of the agitation through various Administrations, there was a noticeable lull in such demands during the time of President Goodluck Jonathan, only to assume a frightening proportion since the advent of the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. This article locates the factors in the outcomes of the 2015 general elections: the question of inclusion and representation; the unfinished nature of the Nigerian civil war; economic challenges, miscalculation both on the part of the Igbo people and indiscretion in the initial appointments made by President Muhammadu Buhari. The article recommends political restructuring of Nigeria as one of the ways to address secessionist tendencies.