Educate or Adjudicate? Socioeconomic Heterogeneity and Welfare

I present a formal framework to explore the welfare and distributional effects of a government’s optimal choice over two types of public spending in a closed economy: domestic security (DS) and investment in social capital (SC). Production is characterized as a function of social and physical capital stocks that both vary across the regions. DS stands for total factor productivity, while SC stands for human capital and civic cooperativeness combined. SC accumulates via public spending on universal primary education, cultural, and civic events and such, and is exposed to regional spillover effects. Numerical simulations of the static solution of the government’s welfare maximization problem reveal that the optimal rate of spending on SC (m^*) is negatively related with the income share of physical capital, SC spillovers and fiscal decentralization. Simulations also show that SC homogeneity is positively associated with both the level and equitability of aggregate income. The maximum attainable levels of income, welfare and social cohesion and the most equitable incomes are all observed to realize at some intermediate range of m^* values. In case DS augments SC, however, social cohesion improves and welfare declines monotonously in m^*.     

Military Expenditure,Economic Growth and Heterogeneity

This paper examines the impact of military expenditure on economic growth on a large balanced panel, using an exogenous growth model and dynamic panel data methods for 106 countries over the period 1988–2010. A major focus of the paper is to consider the possibility group heterogeneity and non-linearity. Having estimated the model for all of the countries in the panel and finding that military burden has a negative effect on growth in the short and long run, the panel is broken down into various groupings based upon a range of potentially relevant factors, and the robustness of the results is evaluated. The factors considered are different levels of income, conflict experience, natural resources abundance, openness and aid. The estimates for the different groups are remarkably consistent with those for the whole panel, providing strong support for the argument that military spending has adverse effects on growth. There are, however, some intriguing results that suggest that for certain types of countries military spending has no significant effect on growth.     

Resource rents,institutions, and violent civil conflicts

Natural resources have been blamed for inducing slow growth and sparking civil conflicts and violence. This paper first develops a model to account for the hazard of armed civil conflicts as a manifestation of the natural resource curse, which is mediated by the quality of both economic and political institutions. We then use recently published data on institutional quality and natural resource rents to measure the potential impact of the resource curse on violent civil conflicts using a panel of data for over 100 countries in the period 1970–2010. Our model explicitly accounts for the role of good economic and political institutions in deterring the recourse to violence as well as the extent to which they might weaken the resource rents effect.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: 1875–1999

This paper extends the joint product model of military alliances to apply to the new strategic doctrine adopted by NATO in the 1990s. In particular, a choice must be made between protecting one's own territory and pooling forces for an alliancewide rapid reaction force. This new model accounts for a host of externalities and their implications for burden sharing, full financing, and allocative efficiency. The Pigouvian taxes that adjust for force thinning and attack deflection are shown to finance optimal border‐protecting forces under a variety of circumstances. Second‐best considerations arise owing to the pure publicness of rapid reaction forces. The ideal toll arrangement does not currently characterize NATO financing, nor is it likely to do so.     

Defence spending and growth in turkey 1954–1993: A causal analysis

This paper investigates the causality issue between military expenditure and growth in the case of Turkey, a strategically located developing country, for the period 1954–1993. Results reported herein reveal the absence of any causal ordering between the variables in question.     

Country survey X: Defence spending in Turkey

This paper provides a country survey of the Turkish defence economy. Turkey is a member of NATO alliance and is strategically located between Europe and Middle East. Moreover, Turkey has a high defence burden and high economic growth. The first part of the survey presents a brief economic background of Turkey, its armed forces, the defence industry, its modernisation and trends in Turkish defence expenditure. The rest of the paper focuses on the relationships between defence spending and economic growth. The effect of defence spending on economic growth is econometrically estimated using a supply side model. Both externality effects and the size effect of defence spending are estimated for Turkey. The study concludes that defence expenditure stimulates economic growth while externalities from the defence sector to the rest of economy are negative for Turkey.     

Civil wars and economic growth: A regional comparison

The paper examines the impact of civil wars on income per-capita growth at home and in neighbors for four regional groupings of countries: Africa, Asia, Latin America, and a pooled Asian and Latin American sample. Both macroeconomic and civil-war influences on growth differ by region. With the use of a distance measure, we demonstrate that the spatial reach from the negative consequences of a civil war are region and time period specific. Generally, there was less dispersion in Africa than in Asia and Latin America. Moreover, Africa demonstrates a greater ability to recover from the adverse effects of civil wars than the other regions tested.     

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GRANGER CAUSALITY: A CRITICAL REVIEW

A large literature has used tests for Granger (1969) non‐causality, GNC, to examine the interaction of military spending with the economy. Such tests answer a specific although quite limited question: can one reject the null hypothesis that one variable does not help predict another? If one can reject, there is said to be Granger causality, GC. Although the limitations of GNC tests are well known, they are often not emphasised in the applied literature and so may be forgotten. This paper considers the econometric and methodological issues involved and illustrates them with data for the US and other countries. There are three main issues. First, the tests may not be informative about the substantive issue, the interaction of military expenditure and the economy, since Granger causality does not correspond to the usual notion of economic causality. To determine the relationship of the two notions of causality requires an identified structural model. Second, the tests are very sensitive to specification. GNC testing is usually done in the context of a vector autoregression, VAR, and the test results are sensitive to the variables and deterministic terms included in the VAR, lag length, sample or observation window used, treatment of integration and cointegration and level of significance. Statistical criteria may not be very informative about these choices. Third, since the parameters are not structural, the test results may not be stable over different time periods or different countries.     

When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature

ABSTRACT

There is growing policy consensus in Washington and other Western capitals that economic sanctions are powerful tools to cope with major foreign policy crises. Are sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, really the potent instruments optimists suggest? Under what circumstances do punitive economic measures induce policy change in sanctioned countries? To probe these queries, in this article I outline the conditions that have been identified as more likely to lead to successful sanctions outcomes in the literature. I also discuss four major shortcomings of existing scholarship. First, the sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness renders the treatment of the ‘ineffective’ cases with negative outcomes the same as those cases that induce no discernable change in target behavior. Second, the prevalent use of static data from existing sanctions databases reduces the ability of researchers to study various time-specific factors affecting the probability of sanctions success. Third, the dominant state-centric bargaining model in the literature offers limited insight into contemporary coercive measures directed at non-state actors. Fourth, the study of sanctions in isolation of other instruments that frequently accompany them, such as incentives and diplomatic pressure, leads to a partial understanding of the specific role sanctions play in shaping the outcome of key foreign policy initiatives.     

DEFENSE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TURKEY: A LINEAR AND NON‐LINEAR GRANGER CAUSALITY APPROACH

This paper uses linear and non‐linear Granger causality methods to determine the causal relationship between defense spending and economic growth in Turkey for the period 1949–2004. The innovative feature of this paper is that it provides evidence regarding the nonlinear causal dependence between military spending and economic growth in Turkey. The empirical results contribute to the empirical literature by indicating support for both linear and non‐linear causality between military expenditures and economic development and they may prove useful in theoretical and empirical research by regulators and policy makers.