Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in NATO

ABSTRACT

Recent nuclear-weapons-related consultation in NATO within the framework of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review sheds light on historical experiences with nuclear consultation in NATO. In the early years of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which became the main forum for multilateral nuclear consultation in the alliance, developing a nuclear weapons first use doctrine was of particular importance. This process led to the adoption of the Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) on the threat to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. With a focus on West Germany as the primary addressee of the NPG, it will be postulated that nuclear consultation functioned and may still be seen as an essential tool to manage the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in the framework of NATO.     

用坐标空间重正化群(PSRG)方法求解二维正方格子铁磁系统的临界指数

本文采用坐标空间重正化群方法(PSRG),对二维正方形点阵最近邻伊辛模型铁磁系统,求解了五个自旋组成块体的临界指数,在块体哈密顿量中保留到的量级。将本文结果与伊辛模型严格计算的理论值、各种临界指数的实验值、以及二维三角点阵三个自旋组成块体的临界指数计算值相比较,可以看到,本文的计算结果均比三角点阵三自旋组成块体的计算值有所改进。     

Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”

ABSTRACT

I argue in this article that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically confused. The fact of the matter is that wars need not necessarily be authorized by some higher authority (such as a king, president, or parliament) in order to be justified, and this moral fact does not need to lead to chaos and anarchy. Accordingly, the criterion of legitimate authority cannot be relied on to delegitimate individual war, private war, guerrilla war, or even terrorism. Finally, I consider some other defenses of authorization and demonstrate that the “authorization” these accounts defend is either not needed for justification or already provided by other just war criteria or, indeed, entirely fictitious.     

一种安全的组签字方案

基于离散对数给出了一种组签字方案。该方案保留了已有方案的主要优点 ,并且解决了“匿名”性问题。在该方案中 ,既使组权威公布了一些附加信息以供验证者确认签字者的身份 ,但可确保签字者其它的组签字的“匿名”性 ,组权威也不必更新签字者的任何密钥。因为组权威公布的信息只是为了识别指定的组签字。     

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY CROSSROADS:

On October 1, 2008, Congress enacted a proposal that originated with President George W. Bush in 2005 to approve an unprecedented nuclear trade pact with India by removing a central pillar of US nonproliferation policy. Despite the numerous political challenges confronting the Bush administration, the initiative won strong bipartisan support, including votes from Democratic Senators Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama. The four-year struggle to pass the controversial US-India nuclear trade agreement offers an exceptionally valuable case study. It demonstrates a classic tradeoff between the pursuit of broad multilateral goals such as nuclear nonproliferation and advancement of a specific bilateral relationship. It reveals enduring fault lines in executive branch relations with Congress. It vividly portrays challenges confronting proponents of a strong nonproliferation regime. This article is based on an analysis of the negotiating record and congressional deliberations, including interviews with key participants. It assesses the lessons learned and focuses on three principal questions: how did the agreement seek to advance US national security interests?; what were the essential elements of the prolonged state-of-the-art lobbying campaign to win approval from skeptics in Congress?; and what are the agreement's actual benefits—and costs—to future US nonproliferation efforts?     

THE AUSTRALIA GROUP

The Australia Group's (AG's) contributions toward stemming global proliferation of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction over the last 20 years are noted, in addition to the group's complementary role in effectively supporting the purpose and objectives of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This report also outlines the organizational and operational means that help accomplish the AG mission and notes the U.S. Congress’ recognition of the role of the AG in countering chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Addressing criticism by some CWC states parties that question the AG's role in nonproliferation, the author also highlights the AG's expanded reach since September 2001 over terrorist activity. Finally,the article identifies a challenge the AG now faces in furthering its objectives and offers a possible solution.     

Civilian Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with Non-State Armed Groups: The Centrality of Obedience and Resistance

Abstract

Terms like ‘support’ and ‘collaboration’ are often used interchangeably to denote a loose set of acts or attitudes that benefit non-state armed groups (NSAGs). However, these terms are seldom defined, and the alternatives available to civilians are rarely identified. Moreover, existing approaches overlook that the interaction between civilians and NSAGs is often one between ruler and ruled, which makes obedience and resistance central. This paper proposes to conceptualize the choices available to civilians as forms of cooperation and non-cooperation, offers a typology, and discusses the implications for theory building on civilian and NSAG behavior, and on the functioning of armed social orders.     

直觉模糊物元及其在权重信息未知多属性群决策中的应用

针对传统物元分析理论无法应用于决策信息为直觉模糊数的多属性决策问题,提出直觉模糊物元分析模型以及用相对相似度代替传统方法中的关联函数来解决直觉模糊物元分析问题,进而完整阐述了直觉模糊物元多属性决策的方法步骤,并通过实例验证了该方法的有效性。特别是针对权重信息未知这一类较为复杂的多属性群决策问题,采用投影法和直觉模糊熵确定权重信息,并运用直觉模糊物元多属性决策方法进行了实例分析,证明了方法的实用性,为直觉模糊多属性群决策提供了一种新的思路。     

军用发动机控制系统技术分析及改进研究

控制系统是航空发动机的重要组成部分。文章对国外航空技术强国,特别是美国和俄罗斯的航空发动机控制系统技术的发展历程进行了分析,着重介绍了某发动机控制系统的技术特点。针对该发动机控制系统提出了数字化改进方案,可以有效减轻控制系统重量,挖掘发动机潜力,并提升发动机性能。从航空发动机控制系统的发展历程可以看出,全权限数字电子控制技术(FADEC)是航空发动机控制系统发展的必然趋势,会对航空技术的发展产生巨大的推动作用。     

INTRODUCTION: THE DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Decisionmaking processes leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by democratic states have served as the basis for theories about nuclear proliferation. In contrast, less is known about how a totalitarian regime responds to immense external pressure to abolish unconventional weapons it considers crucial for its security and survival. This article will analyze how we can explain Iraq's behavior after the passing of Resolution 1441 and during the United Nations inspections in 2002–2003.