Ireland's Ho Chi Minh trail? The Republic of Ireland's role in the Provisional IRA's bombing campaign, 1970–1976

A common criticism levelled at successive governments of the Republic of Ireland during the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ was their alleged inactivity in the face of a ferocious Provisional IRA campaign. Such criticisms were based in large part on the perception of the southern state as a supply base for militant republicanism. The Republic was undoubtedly a formidable logistics hinterland for such militants. However, criticisms of the reactions of authorities in the south are unfair. This article considers the explosives capabilities of the IRA during the first six years of their campaign. It does so with reference to their attempts to obtain commercial explosives as well as measures employed by them to obtain homemade explosives. The article also considers countermeasures employed by the southern government and reveals the extent to which they sought to shut down IRA capabilities in the south. It is argued that, ultimately, the IRA's campaign in this regard could only be contained and never unilaterally halted.     

UN-Consistent: A Comparison of Australia's Military Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda

This article seeks to compare Australia's involvement in two key 1990s peace missions: those to Somalia in 1992–93 and Rwanda in 1994–95. While there are many similarities between the two missions in terms of time, scale and theatre, the differences are more important. Both missions are usually recalled as failures despite the Australian troops having been extremely successful in their roles during both deployments. Moreover the experiences with intervention in Africa seem to have forever blighted Australian participation in peace missions on that continent.     

IRA operational intelligence: the heartbeat of the war

This article will seek to provide a detailed examination of the IRA's operational intelligence methodologies. Providing not only a lengthy discussion on the organization's intelligence collection protocols, it will also examine the interplay between intelligence and IRA decision-making. It will be contended that intelligence's influence resided in its ability to introduce a strong element of predictability into the IRA's decision-making process. This depended on an ability to construct a detailed intelligence picture of the target and its geographical milieu so as to minimize the likelihood of volunteers encountering unforeseen circumstances that could adversely affect planned or anticipated outcomes.     

The Provisional IRA,the Irish border,and Anglo-Irish relations during the Troubles

Using hitherto largely unexplored governmental archives from London and Dublin, this article focuses on the security challenges arising from the existence of the land frontier between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the significance of issues of cross-border security cooperation for Anglo-Irish relations from the beginning of the Troubles until the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. It argues that the relatively safe haven of the Republic was essential to the longevity of the IRA's campaign and that successive Irish governments exploited British security concerns to expand their political influence on Northern Ireland.     

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.     

Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence

This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland.     

Selling the end of terrorism: a framing approach to the IRA’s disengagement from armed violence

Experiences from the end of the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s campaign of armed violence have informed broader debates on how terrorism ends, yet this research has underplayed the internal dynamics which made the IRA’s disengagement successful. The article utilises a framing approach to explain how a network within the IRA managed to ensure the majority of the movement supported an end to violence. A disengagement frame was constructed by this network within the IRA which maintained narrative fidelity, it utilised the credibility of mid-ranking commanders, and there were sufficient linkages to diffuse the frame due to generational hegemony, the structure of the IRA, and the unique structure of the prisons system. Finally, the article challenges the utility of decapitation strategies because organisational stability can maintain the components which ensure a disengagement frame will resonate.