Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India

How do countries transition from single service to joint operations? This article engages with the discussion on military innovation to argue that civil–military relations are the most important driver for jointness. In doing so it examines jointness in the Indian military. Relying on archival research and primary interviews this article sheds new light on the operations of the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka from 1987–1990, the 1999 Kargil War and the Post-Kargil defence reforms. The main argument is that the Indian military’s transition to jointness has been ‘incomplete’ primarily because of its prevailing model of civil-military relations. This model prevents civilians from interfering in the operational issues of the military, including on matters pertaining to jointness. It therefore recommends more forceful civilian intervention to overcome the prevailing single service approach.     

What Is Known About Defence Research And Development Spill-Overs?

This article surveys the body of available evidence regarding the spill-over effects of defence R&D. It reviews the routes through which defence R&D spills over to the economy with positive externalities – in terms of new products, technologies or processes; the barriers that impede or block such a process; potential negative repercussions, and the measure of such effects. The main conclusion is that the uncertainty of these effects, and the inaccurate appraisal of their value, hardly supports informed decisions concerning defence R&D policies.     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

液体火箭发动机基于模型的故障检测算法

针对泵压式供应系统液体火箭发动机的故障监控问题,建立了用于发动机故障检测的非线性动态数学模型,设计并实现了发动机系统的广义卡尔曼滤波器。利用新息序列的统计特性,进行了发动机故障新息检测算法的仿真研究,讨论了降低滤波器计算费用的方法以及置信度、自由度对检测算法性能的影响。本文的工作为进一步研究发动机故障在线实时检测算法奠定了重要基础。     

A survey of performance issues in defence innovation

This article reviews innovation processes in defence. It analyses the way and the context under which these processes are carried out. The article covers the features of defence goods with impact on innovation, the development of a new good, the institutional arrangements that support these processes and the effect of innovation on industrial market. The analysis helps to identify the causes of facts observed in practice, such as poor performance in terms of product quality, cost or delivery time, as well as to assess potential remedies. Some policy implications, which can be derived from this analysis, are finally outlined.     

‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing Counter-Insurgency Adaptation in the British Army

This article reassesses the extent to which the British Army has been able to adapt to the counter-insurgency campaign in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. While adopting Farrell's definition of bottom-up military adaptation, this article contends that the task force/brigade level of analysis adopted by Farrell and Farrell and Gordon has led them to overstate the degree to which innovation arising from processes of bottom-up adaptation has actually ensued. Drawing on lower level tactical unit interviews and other data, this article demonstrates how units have been unable or unwilling to execute non-kinetic population-centric operations due to their lack of understanding of the principles of counter-insurgency warfare.     

How to rethink war: Conceptual Innovation and AirLand Battle Doctrine1

This article examines the role of ideas in US Army innovation after the Vietnam War. It challenges the view that failure, changes in the strategic environment or technology are the sole drivers of military innovation and analyses the role of ideas and identity in the army's development of AirLand battle doctrine. It highlights how the reform in ideas led to a ‘re-conception’ of the strategic environment, the nature and dynamics of warfare and a change in self-understanding. The organisational reforms embodied these ideas and led to a new way of war practised in the first Gulf War.     

Military Innovation Under Authoritarian Government – the Case of Russian Special Operations Forces

Russian Special Forces saw significant changes to both organization and doctrine in the years after 2008. The special forces of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate were reduced in number, the organization’s institutional autonomy and rationale were changed, and an entirely new Special Operations Command was established in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the nature, scope and purpose of these changes, and to explain them by drawing on scholarship on military innovation. In particular, the article looks at military innovation in the context of a non-democratic political regime.     

Military Innovation Studies: Multidisciplinary or Lacking Discipline?1

This article explores the evolution of the field of military innovation studies, critiquing its theoretical foundations and setting out a number of challenges that must be overcome if the field is to fulfil its potential and enhance its contribution to wider disciplinary debates as well as to the practitioner community. Tensions between the main theoretical approaches to military innovation are examined as are the challenges inherent in its increasingly multidisciplinary character. The issue of whether military innovation studies constitutes a field in its own right is addressed before recommendations are made to expand the field’s research agenda, broaden its theoretical base and strengthen its multidisciplinary credibility.     

Learning to Fight and Fighting to Learn: Practitioners and the Role of Unit Publications in VIII Fighter Command 1943–1944

A military cannot hope to improve in wartime if it cannot learn. Ideally, in wartime, formal learning ceases and the application of knowledge begins. But this is optimistic. In 1942, USAAF Eighth Air Force assumed it had the means necessary for victory. In reality, its technique and technology were only potentially – rather than actually – effective. What remained was to create the practice of daylight bombing – to learn. This article (1) recovers a wartime learning process that created new knowledge, (2) tests existing tacit hypotheses in military adaptation research, and (3) offers additional theoretical foundation to explain how knowledge is created in wartime