Strategic differences: Al Qaeda's Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

As part of the next phase of the Global Jihad, al Qaeda has been committed to winning popular support among Muslims. Ayman al-Zawahiri and the al Qaeda inner circle recognise that a global terror movement and civil conflicts in the Middle East, brought about by the Arab revolutions, necessitate different operational methods. As such, they have disavowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham for their insubordination and unconstrained tactics, a move that has implications for the Middle East, international relations, the legitimacy of the al Qaeda leadership, and the future of the Global Jihad.     

Leaderless Global Jihadism: The Paradox of Discriminate Violence

Jihadist violence is typically associated with being particularly indiscriminate. Often, as in variations of the ‘new terrorism’ thesis, this characteristic is proposed to correspond in some way to its other attributes such as its globalised, decentralised and ‘postmodern’ religious nature. Recent work appears to give more substance to such claims, by claiming to show a relationship between indiscriminate violence and decentralised group organisation. However, in this paper we show, based on an analysis of jihadist targeting in Western Europe and America from 2001 to 2013, that targeting choices by jihadists unconnected to organised militant groups have in fact been consistently more, rather than less discriminate in their targeting choices than their better-integrated peers. Drawing on this finding, as well as a broader reading of jihadist targeting discourses, we argue for a more complex understanding of the relationship between radicalisation, extremist ideology, decentralisation, and targeting choice.     

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.