Strategic differences: Al Qaeda's Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

As part of the next phase of the Global Jihad, al Qaeda has been committed to winning popular support among Muslims. Ayman al-Zawahiri and the al Qaeda inner circle recognise that a global terror movement and civil conflicts in the Middle East, brought about by the Arab revolutions, necessitate different operational methods. As such, they have disavowed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham for their insubordination and unconstrained tactics, a move that has implications for the Middle East, international relations, the legitimacy of the al Qaeda leadership, and the future of the Global Jihad.     

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.     

How and why Boko Haram blossomed: examining the fatal consequences of treating a purposive terrorist organisation as less so

Boko Haram (BH) is an insurgent group that operates mainly in northeastern Nigeria. Its stated aim is to establish an Islamic state, and it employs terrorism as its strategy. Earlier interests of security analysts centred on the drivers of BH uprising and the possibility of its internationalisation. Today's concerns relate more to why the rebellion has lasted this long. In toeing the same line, this article demonstrates that BH is a purposive terror group against which the government has evolved no viable strategy. It examines some gains of BH over the past six years and how it benefitted from the government's underestimation of its capacity and determination. It concludes that to effectively engage BH, the Nigerian government must revaluate its threat and sincerely pursue an expanded strategy beyond the current military-centric approach. To be effective, government's response must be packaged in such a way as to enhance human security in the region.