The rhetoric and practice of the international responsibility to prevent mass atrocities: Reflections on South Africa’s peacebuilding role in South Sudan (2005–2013)

While global consensus on the meaning and application of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle remains tenuous, there is little contention among major actors that the development of the norm should prioritise the prevention of mass atrocities. In particular, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) – which have a role to play that is vital to the future development of R2P as a global norm but which continue to express reservations about the intent and application of the doctrine – have been strong advocates of the preventive aspects of the principle. This rhetorical consensus, however, belies the conceptual and practical challenges that are associated with the prevention of mass atrocities. In this paper, the example of South Africa’s post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) interventions in South Sudan from 2005 to 2013 is used to reflect on the role of external actors in supporting conflict-affected states to implement the preventive aspects of R2P. It is argued that while South Africa, like other BRICS countries, has used the rhetoric that atrocity prevention should be at the core of R2P to legitimise its opposition to military intervention for humanitarian purposes, it has struggled to back this rhetoric with coherent strategies and concrete actions to prevent mass atrocity crimes within its sphere of influence. The gap between rhetoric and practice in the preventive aspects of R2P is not unique to South Africa, but highlights fundamental difficulties inherent to global efforts to prevent mass atrocities.     

Forced displacement and behavioral change: an empirical study of returnee households in the Nuba Mountains

We use a unique data-set gathered during a short-lived interwar period in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan to compare characteristics of the households returning after the conflict with those that stayed in their communities of origin. We found that returning households seemed to face worse economic conditions, particularly in the case of female-headed returnee households. Nevertheless, our results show that returnees tend to perform better on different health indicators. Using a detailed set of variables about hygiene and sanitary habits, we explore the hypothesis that the latter result may be related to changes in attitudes given the distinct experiences during displacement. We show that returnees are indeed more likely to adopt these measures.     

From combat to non-combat action

This paper examines the rationale and centrality of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan, asking why PMSCs are involved in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan and what the principles underlying their activities are. To answer this question, the paper draws attention to the link between humanitarian crises and PMSC interventions. Where there is no meaningful alternative intervention, undergirded by humanitarian concerns that are also profit driven, PMSCs come in to provide the needed services. The protracted and complicated internal armed conflicts in Sudan, which have lasted for over two decades, have produced as many as 4,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the single largest number in the world. The kind of humanitarian assistance operations provided by PMSCs in Sudan have become critical to the provision of much-needed services which were inadequately provided by governmental authorities at both unilateral and multilateral levels. This paper argues that the humanitarian crises in Sudan created a regime that permits humanitarian assistance operations by both state and non-state actors.     

UNAMID: an African solution to a complex case of geopolitical dynamics

This article examines the geopolitical dynamics associated with the African Union (AU) and United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) from the start of the Darfur conflict in 2003 until the time when UNAMID became fully operational in 2011. It provides an overview of the complex forces and geopolitical dynamics that affected the deployment of UNAMID and shaped its unique hybrid character. It mainly highlights those primary geopolitical factors that hindered the full deployment of UNAMID. It is concluded that this period was a showcase for the newly established AU and its support for its member states, as well as a new approach for the international community to maintain international peace and security in alliance with regional organisations.     

A Muslim by any other name

Abstract

A crisis is emerging in the Nile Basin, where some 300 million people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi rely on the Nile directly or indirectly. Egypt and Sudan wish to preserve a regime based on treaties drawn up during the colonial era that allocated the vast majority of the Nile's water to them. Countries upstream are determined to challenge this. In 1999 the countries using the river formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try to resolve these differences. More than a decade of negotiations failed to break the impasse. In May Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda decided to wait no longer and signed a new treaty, without the consent of Egypt and Sudan. The signatories have given the other Nile Basin countries one year to join the pact. For Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water, this is a question of life or death. Egypt has, in the past, indicated it will go to war if its share of the Nile is reduced. Talks continue, but the impasse is driving the region towards a crisis to which there is no easy resolution.     

Low-intensity conflict in Eastern Sudan: A comparative approach to the development of rebel groups

This article discusses the development of a low-intensity conflict in Sudan's eastern region between 1994 and 2006. Drawing on data collected in the region in 2009, recruitment processes within three different insurgent groups are analysed and compared, paying attention to the impact of these processes on insurgents' organisational development and military capacity. The peace process in Eastern Sudan is further discussed, focusing specifically on the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former insurgents. The article finally discusses current developments and draws conclusions regarding the risk of renewed rebellion in Eastern Sudan.     

Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

A ‘transparent gold’ rush?

Abstract

The signing of a new treaty on the equitable sharing of the Nile waters – signed last May in Kampala by Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania – has the potential of derailing relations with Sudan and Egypt. According to the latter countries, this new agreement replaces the 1959 Nile agreement – that awarded them with 90 per cent control over the Nile water – giving other Nile Basin countries the possibility to implement water-related projects in agriculture and energy. This new development, according to Egypt and Sudan, places their water level security in jeopardy. Furthermore, the use of land grabs and water consumption for food security by wealthy foreign countries contributes to the sensitive situation the nine Nile Basin countries are now facing. Water is a red line when it comes to Egypt and Sudan and the future of the whole region depends on whether this line will be crossed.     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

After the Split: Partition,Successor States,and the Dynamics of War in the Horn of Africa

Why do partitioned successor states engage one another in armed conflict? We explore the drivers of war between successor states by comparing two border crises that followed the partitions of Ethiopia (1993) and Sudan (2011). We argue that the politico-military struggles that give way to partition create important historical memories that shape what successor states think about the utility of military force. While the partition of Ethiopia yielded successor states led by regimes that were victors of the preceding war of partition, the war of partition in Sudan produced successor states that emerged out of military stalemate. This distinction explains why Ethiopia and Eritrea waged a costly border war that Sudan and South Sudan were able to avoid.