Unraveling the violence in Kazakhstan

There were several high-profile violent incidents in 2011 in Kazakhstan, including several bombings, shootings that targeted police, and a protest turned clash that resulted in a number of deaths. Some of the perpetrators reportedly had links with radical religious groups. An overlooked aspect of the violence is how it is reported in Kazakhstan. There are active, competent media in Kazakhstan, which are largely unknown in the West. An examination of these incidents using the media in Kazakhstan can provide a unique insight into what took place. While Western sources quickly blamed radical religious groups with international connections, media in Kazakhstan have found that there are other reasons for the violence.     

The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq

Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question.     

Dying to prove a point: The methodology of Dying to Win

Dying to Win is one of the most important works on suicide terrorism. It purports to unravel the strategic, social, and individual logic that gives suicide terrorism its coercive value. The methodology that Pape uses to support his various assertions is problematic for three reasons. First, he defines his key terms in such a way as to artificially set suicide terrorism apart from other forms of political violence. Second, in a number of cases Pape selects data from single sources to support particular assertions when other sources of data, used together, could provide more rigorous and useful insights into the phenomenon of suicide bombing. Finally, Pape codes his data on suicide attacks according to a loose set of criteria which, if recoded, calls into question some of his broader conclusions about the strategic utility of suicide terrorism campaigns.     

Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State

Bangladesh is currently facing an incremental growth of radicalization. This radicalization can be traced back to the country’s early post-Independence years. Over time, political violence, ideological clashes between secular and right-wing ideologies, and weak governance have created conditions for the growth of radical Islam. The public rhetoric on corruption, weakening of democratic institutions, inadequate law enforcement agencies, fragile justice delivery system, fledgling educational and social institutions and growing unemployment provides further space for alternative narratives by extremist ideologues. Home-grown extremist outfits have received ideological and tactical supports from transnational terrorist network such as Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), but only in a limited manner. The supply and demand side of radicalization in Bangladesh has not yet been addressed by actors such as the government, private sector, civil society and media. The failures in multiple sectors in the state governance have led to a situation where IS and AQIS now see Bangladesh as a potential ground for exerting their supremacy as flag bearers of radical forms of Islam.     

Underselling Islamist extremism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Islamist extremism as an ideology has seemingly spread in influence in the past few years. The violent Islamist threat may have a singular religious dogma, but that does not mean that it will interact in the same fashion within the various cultures it infests. The Sub-Saharan region is one general context where Islamist extremism is both vividly active and misunderstood. Africa's reaction to: Arabization; the adjustment to post-colonial rule; the perception of secular government institutions; the extent of cultural and religious pluralism; and the local character of Muslim leadership and institutions are all very different from that of the Middle East. Scores of terrorism analysts and even Arab populations only too familiar with the Middle East context superimpose Middle East threats over the Sub-Saharan African cultural landscape. Instead of generalizing the Islamist threats, it might be better to ask why it is that violent Islamist groups have traditionally been challenged to expand their influence in Muslim Sub-Saharan Africa. The underestimated Islamist is using ignorance to its advantage, recruiting through channels unnoticed by its Arab counterparts while creatively catering its message by region.