分层任务网络在UCAV规划中的应用

无人战斗机任务规划对提高它的生存能力、突防能力、作战效能具有重要意义.分层任务网络规划是一个有效的规划方法,HTNP的最大好处在于,搜索受控于细心设计的方法.在某种意义上讲,一个HTN规划器只描述了如何使用操作,给实际使用带来了困难.在HTNP中引入目标协调机制、禁忌表等,将原有"离线"式方法变为"在线"式方法,提高了方法的适应性能.可以根据情况的变化,随时生成新的规划,降低了预先设计方法的数量,从而降低工程实施的难度.     

三机协同无源时差定位最优编队构型分析

针对未来空战中航空集群协同无源时差定位编队构型确定问题,提出了一种确定三机协同无源时差定位最优编队构型的方法。分析了确定集群编队构型的基本原理;归纳了4个三机编队构型决定因素:主辅机相对位置、基线夹角、基线距离以及主辅机高度差;将定位区域范围和定位距离作为衡量集群无源定位编队构型优劣的指标,并进行了仿真计算。仿真结果表明:在火控引导阶段,当采用主机在后、辅机在前,基线夹角为150°,基线距离为60 km~80 km,主机与目标同高度且主辅机之间高度差为±(1-2)km的编队构型时,三机协同无源时差定位编队构型为最优。     

基于同心筒结构的共架发射系统武器发射空域协调方法

为保证舰艇和武器系统安全,针对多武器共架发射时的发射协调问题,提出了空域协调的方法。首先,定义了空域协调的概念,分析了燃气排导、初始飞行弹道交叉对空域协调的影响;然后,通过判断发射活动、隔舱距离排序、隔舱属性赋值、判断隔舱相邻及弹道交叉等影响因素提出了空域协调的具体步骤;最后,对空域协调方法进行了算例验证。结果表明:通过空域上合理地选择武器(弹位)可以有效避免共架武器发射时产生干涉,保证系统安全。该方法对解决多类型舰载武器发射协调问题有借鉴意义。     

改进的TOPSIS法在雷达干扰资源分配中的应用

对雷达进行侦查是干扰雷达的前提,由于侦查无法得到精确的实际雷达工作参数,而只能得到一个工作参数区间,因此属性值为确定值的多属性决策方法是不适用的.从多个属性出发,提出改进的基于逼近理想解排序的TOPSIS法,针对属性权重信息不完全且属性值为区间数的特征,将多属性决策问题运用到雷达干扰资源分配中来,对雷达干扰资源进行优选配置,通过多个无线传感器干扰节点协同干扰,使其达到最佳的干扰效果.     

Attrition through a partially coordinated area defense

An area defense consists of several groups that act independently, i.e., do not communicate with each other. Each group has a fixed number of defenders and a controller that allocates these defenders optimally against the individual attackers comprising an attack. We analyze the effectiveness of this partially coordinated defense against a simultaneous attack of known size in which all attackers are considered to be equally lethal. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005.     

智能化电子对抗装备发展

当前,智能化武器装备成为世界各国发展的重点,而电子对抗作为新型作战力量将直接影响战争的胜负。文章分析当前电子对抗装备存在的显著不足,论证发展智能化电子对抗装备的迫切性和必要性,明确提出发展智能化电子对抗装备的若干关键技术,阐述智能化电子对抗装备对未来信息化战争的直接影响,以及智能化电子对抗装备未来的发展方向。     

用科学发展观引领高校建设发展的几点思考

科学发展观是中国特色社会主义建设和党的建设的根本指导方针。高校落实科学发展观,涉及到办学的各个领域。概括地讲：在思想认识和宏观战略层面,包括办学理念、办学定位、发展规划、舆论导向等;在工作实践和微观操作层面,包括正确处理学校内部各个业务领域的关系、优化工作系统,如何使得学校各方面工作协调、全面、和谐发展等。     

Supply chain coordination with shelf‐space and retail price dependent demand and heterogeneous retailers

We consider supply chain coordination in which a manufacturer supplies some product to multiple heterogeneous retailers and wishes to coordinate the supply chain via wholesale price and holding cost subsidy. The retail price is either exogenous or endogenous. The market demand is described by the market share attraction model based on all retailers'shelf‐spaces and retail prices. We obtain optimal solutions for the centralized supply chain, where the optimal retail pricing is a modified version of the well‐known cost plus pricing strategy. We further get feasible contracts for the manufacturer to coordinate the hybrid and decentralized supply chains. The manufacturer can allocate the total profit free to himself and the retail market via the wholesale price when the retail price is exogenous, but otherwise he cannot. Finally, we point out that different characteristics of the retail market are due to different powers of the manufacturer, and the more power the manufacturer has, the simpler the contract to coordinate the chain will be. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

基于证据理论的自适应协同方法在打击目标排序中的应用

针对指挥员在选择及对打击目标排序时会产生不同结果,采用证据理论进行了协同。以各指挥员的判断作为证据理论的识别框架,采用证据加权法及对各证据的合成,确定了证据的基本可信度分配,降低了各证据间的冲突,筛选出肯定的证据,达成指挥员决策的自适应协同,实现对打击目标更为合理的排序。     

Supply chain coordination with product line design and a revenue sharing scheme

Many manufacturers sell their products through retailers and share the revenue with those retailers. Given this phenomenon, we build a stylized model to investigate the role of revenue sharing schemes in supply chain coordination and product variety decisions. In our model, a monopolistic manufacturer serves two segments of consumers, which are distinguished by their willingness to pay for quality. In the scenario with exogenous revenue sharing ratios, when the potential gain from serving the low segment is substantial (e.g., the low‐segment consumers' willingness to pay is high enough or the low segment takes a large enough proportion of the market), the retailer is better off abandoning the revenue sharing scheme. Moreover, when the potential gain from serving the low (high) segment is substantial enough, the manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a single product. Furthermore, when revenue sharing ratios are endogenous, we divide our analysis into two cases, depending on the methods of cooperation. When revenue sharing ratios are negotiated at the very beginning, the decentralized supply chain causes further distortion. This suggests that the central premise of revenue sharing—the coordination of supply chains—may be undermined if supply chain parties meticulously bargain over it.