A gentle occupation: unravelling the Dutch approach in Iraq, 2003–2005

This article examines the so-called ‘Dutch approach’ to conducting stabilisation operations. The term is mostly used in relation to the mission carried out by the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan's Uruzgan province from 2006 to 2010, but actually originates in the Iraqi province of Al Muthanna. Here, a 1350-strong battle group operated from July 2003 until March 2005 as part of the US-led coalition, after which the Dutch forces left Iraq relatively unscathed and self-confident of their ability in dealing with this type of conflict. On the basis of archival research and interviews, the authors unravel the ‘Dutch approach’ in southern Iraq by tracing its roots and by examining the Dutch operation in the context of the American and British experiences. They argue that despite predominantly effective tactical reflexes and an overall adequately broad interpretation by battle group commanders of a too narrowly defined political mandate, stability in Al Muthanna was conditions-driven rather than the result of a unique and effective approach. The term ‘Dutch approach’ turned out to be a convenient fabrication which, after the relatively successful mission in Al Muthanna, became increasingly politicised in the run-up to a dangerous new operation in southern Afghanistan.     

The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency

This article argues that there is little evidence supporting the existence of the often praised, and allegedly subtle and successful ‘Dutch approach’ to stabilisation and counter-insurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. It denounces the uncritical use of the term and refutes suggestions of historical and cultural roots to such an approach, for instance in Dutch colonial warfare in the Indonesian archipelago. It concludes by explaining the true conditions that gave rise to this notion, which seems to feed into a gratifying national self-image of the Dutch as non-martial, conflict averse and tolerant, rather than offering an original and successful formula for countering insurgencies.     

The Dutch COIN approach: three years in Uruzgan, 2006–2009

Rarely has a military commitment led to such intense discussion in the Netherlands as the Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) mission in Afghanistan. In February 2010, the Netherlands' coalition government even collapsed after the two largest parties failed to agree on the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan later this year. This article deals first of all with the difficult discussion over the Afghanistan mission of the TFU. The authors then subject three ISAF operations to close scrutiny. The authors provide some suggestions to help understand better this pivotal point in the execution of the whole operation and thus give a fuller picture of the Dutch counterinsurgency approach in Uruzgan.     

Turkish commanders discuss counterterrorism strategies and lessons learned from 25 years of fighting the PKK

This article is an extended book review of the Turkish book Commanders' Front (Komutanlar Cephesi, Istanbul: Detay Publishing, 2007), written by prominent Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who compiled a series of interviews with retired Turkish military commanders and two former presidents. It provides a foreign perspective on counterinsurgency/terrorism strategies and lessons learned from Turkey's small war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The interviews reveal the generals' views on Turkey's long-standing fight with the PKK, discussing topics ranging from the social aspect of the PKK problem to mistakes made in arming local militia. In addition, it presents the Turkish perspective on US policy in Iraq.     

Resistance through Islamic clerics against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria

Islamic clerics and scholars constitute one of the community actors affected by the Boko Haram crisis in northern Nigeria. This group is also one that is most familiar with the essential doctrinal elements required to deconstruct the narrative pushed by Boko Haram in a crisis where ideology represents a vital aspect. While not undermining the bearing which socio-economic and political issues have on the crisis, this paper frames the focus to emphasise the long-term battle where Islamic clerics are involved in winning hearts and minds. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted in Sokoto State and Borno State, this paper highlights the influential role of clerics in communal mobilisation and resistance against Boko Haram. It is suggested that a deeper integration of this community actor into the broader counter-insurgency struggle in northern Nigeria would be beneficial.     

Lessons learned: The Dutch ‘Stay-Behind’ organization 1945–1992

Right after World War II, two separate initiatives were taken in the Netherlands to establish a stay-behind organization – or, rather, two stay-behind organizations. Both initiatives were purely Dutch, and both groups, remnants from wartime Dutch intelligence and sabotage organizations, wanted to liaise exclusively with the British. Only later did the Americans become members of what then came to be known as the Tripartite Committee. After a period of about 15 years, during which the Chief of the General Staff loosely coordinated both organizations, known as O (for Operations) and I (for Intelligence), a crisis broke out. The question was whether the two organizations should be amalgamated or not. After much discussion it was decided to keep them separate, but more closely coordinated. The first coordinator of this new type, a non-military man, was appointed in 1967. From that moment on the Dutch stay-behind organization, under supervision of highly respected civilian authorities, was able to perfect its organizational structure. The introduction, during the 1980s, of new specially designed radio equipment made special wireless operators superfluous. This development made for a leaner and more efficient organization.

After the Berlin Wall had come down, and in the wake of the ‘Gladio’ affair in Italy, the Dutch stay-behind organization was dissolved.     

Close Encounters of the Tribal Kind: the Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation of Conflict – The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan's Uruzgan Province

Abstract

In contemporary counter-insurgency campaigns de-escalation is typically achieved by obtaining the local population's collaboration. The rationale underlying this approach is that such collaboration spawns control over the population and therefore weakens the insurgent's position. This article seeks to understand how this approach is practised in the reality of contemporary counter-insurgency warfare. In Iraq as well as Afghanistan counter-insurgents were confronted with fragmented indigenous societies in which the various local segments were dominated by local power-holders. Consequently, obtaining the local population's collaboration required co-option of these agents. As such a strategy of co-option is a highly localized approach, this article focuses on Afghanistan's Uruzgan province and analyzes the implementation of co-option by the Netherlands' Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), which operated there from 2006 to 2010. The analysis discusses how the counter-insurgents obtained a profound understanding of Uruzgan's societal landscape and how co-option of local power-holders became part of the counter-insurgency routine. In the end, co-option was successfully implemented as TFU even succeeded in obtaining the collaboration of previously marginalized elements of the population. However, as the methods employed for co-option were mainly of a persuasive nature, the TFU co-option strategy was less effective in containing the influence of notorious spoilers. Thus this case study provides an insight into the dynamics and limitations of co-option as a tool for de-escalation in contemporary counter-insurgency warfare.     

A Portrait of a Helmet: A Funerary Helmet from the Northern Netherlands

This paper describes a seventeeth-century helmet, which was found in a church in the Frisian village of Schettens. Not only the type, but also the context in which this helmet was found, made the find exceptional. The presence of tombstones in the church made it possible to trace the object to a Frisian colonel from the Dutch States Army. What makes the helmet even more special, is the fact that it was prominently depicted on the tombstone of the deceased Frisian colonel. The find of the helmet and its ‘portrait’ on the tombstone are unique for the northern Netherlands. It gives cause for further study of the Dutch funeral tradition, in which elements of armour played an important role. In this regard, it is very interesting to draw a comparison with the same tradition in England.     

Comprehensive approaches,diverse coherences: the different levels of policy coherence in the Dutch 3D approach in Afghanistan

Since 2000, international organisations such as the UN, NATO and the EU, but also countries, have started to apply what has been called the comprehensive approach to crisis management. This article unpacks this comprehensive approach implemented by the Dutch in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. It first borrows and expands a conceptual framework developed by De Coning and Friis. Subsequently, it maps the different sorts of coherence in the mission by applying the framework. It shows how in practice there was not one single comprehensive approach, but many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. The level of coherence differed depending on the level at which the interaction took place – strategic at headquarters level versus operational at field level – and at what point in the mission it happened – in most cases it moved towards more cohesion.