UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Much has changed since the United Nations was established in 1945. New challenges confront the organization including global warming, global diseases and global terrorism. Responding to these challenges requires continual change, adaptation and learning—a hallmark of the stewardship of current UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. In 1997 Annan announced major structural changes to streamline the organization, follow up five years later by another initiative to clarify, simplify and rationalize the organization and subsequent efforts to streamline UN peacekeeping. The UN has also forged new partnerships with civil society and the private sector. Important as these changes are, reform of the General Assembly and the Security Council hold the organization hostage to the vested interests of key member states. There are a number of options to make the Council more representative including regionalism, population distribution, economic weight, culture/religion/civilization and democracy. Clearly the largest challenge is the absence of representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America. Currently Germany, Japan, India and Brazil have strong claims—plus at least one candidate from Africa. Should these four countries decide to act in unison, they could force reform of the Security Council     

Security sector stabilisation in counterinsurgency operations: the case of Afghanistan

This article argues that the debate on security sector reform (SSR) needs to be taken further by taking into consideration the fact that, even though the SSR concept was not originally developed as an element in stabilising states undergoing an insurgency, it is very much being used for exactly that. When conducting counterinsurgency with a focus on the creation of stability, the baseline will ultimately have to be security sector stabilisation (SSS) as a precondition for complete SSR implementation. However, the two must be connected to avoid them undermining each other. This is important if a comprehensive approach to programme implementation and especially sustainability is to guide the programme, and not just isolated ‘train and equip’ stand-alone projects that do not solve either the initial need for stabilisation or the long-term need for accountable security forces. Currently, in Afghanistan the surge for security by the international military is in danger of overtaking the other elements of the SSR, thereby undermining the primary end state and thus risking laying the wrong foundation for the long-term process of SSR.     

Upstream engagement and downstream entanglements: The assumptions,opportunities, and threats of partnering

This article addresses Western recruitment and management of personnel from non-Western countries in armed forces as part of a strategy of state stabilisation, examining its risks and benefits. ‘SFA’ (Security Forces Assistance) to indigenous forces has long been practised by the West and seems to have returned in recent years in a new form with the creation of armies in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, while providing cheap, proxy substitutes for the West and offering opportunities for state-building, the policy creates its own problems and can have significant, negative consequences.     

Building Stability Overseas: Three case studies in British defence diplomacy – Uganda,Rhodesia–Zimbabwe,and Sierra Leone

In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as it related to conflict and security so as to ‘take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating and spreading’. At the heart of the strategy was the recognition that addressing instability and conflict overseas was morally right and in the UK's national interests. This confluence of foreign policy realism and ethical outlook most clearly found harmony in the acknowledgement that it was cheaper for the international community to avoid conflict than it was to try to manage it. Through an examination of three historical case studies (Uganda 1964–1972, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe 1979–1981, and Sierra Leone 2000–2007), this article seeks to demonstrate just how difficult this seemingly sensible strategic outlook is. In particular, the article shows there are historical parallels in British postcolonial history that very closely resemble contemporary policy choices; that these can be used to define what is different about past and present practice; and, which in turn, can be used to – at least tentatively – mark out the potential strengths and weaknesses in BSOS.     

Goodbye to all that: On small wars and big choices

This article reflects on a decade of British counterinsurgency operations. Questioning the idea that lessons have been learnt, the paper challenges the assumptions that are being used to frame future strategic choice. Suggesting that defence engagement is primarily focused on optimising overseas interventions while avoiding a deeper strategic reassessment about whether the UK should be undertaking these sorts of activities, the article calls for a proper debate on Britain's national security interests.     

Influence without power? Reframing British concepts of military intervention after 10 years of counterinsurgency

British attitudes towards military intervention following the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone what appears to be considerable change. Parliament has voted against the use of Britain's armed forces in Syria and the public are unenthused by overseas engagement. Conscious of the costs and the challenges posed by the use of British military power the government has been busy revamping the way it approaches crises overseas. The result is a set of policies that apparently heralds a new direction in foreign policy. This new direction is encapsulated in the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the more recent International Defence Engagement Strategy (IDES). Both BSOS and IDES set out the basis for avoiding major deployments to overseas conflict and instead refocuses effort on defence diplomacy, working with and through overseas governments and partners, early warning, pre-conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. Developing a number of themes that reach from across the Cold War to more contemporary discussions of British strategy, the goal of this special edition is to take into account a number of perspectives that place BSOS and IDES in their historical and strategic context. These papers suggest that using defence diplomacy is and will remain an extremely imprecise lever that needs to be carefully managed if it is to remain a democratically accountable tool of foreign policy.