The case for Azawad

Since Mali achieved independence from France, the marginalised Tuareg population of Mali has sought independence and the right to form their own nation, ‘Azawad’. These efforts have continuously been frustrated by the Tuaregs' neighbours, due to competing nationalist pride and interests in the mineral resources believed to lie under the northern Malian soil. Thus far, the Tuaregs of northern Mali have been largely neglected and denied both inclusive and effective governance by the various Malian governments from the southern Malian capital of Bamako. When negotiations have failed, Tuareg attempts to seize their own independence through violence have been brutally crushed by the Malian government. The Malian government will neither advance the interests of the Tuaregs nor allow them the freedom to pursue their own path in the world. The advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya provided another opportunity for the Tuaregs to pursue their dreams of an independent Azawad. Tuareg fighters returning from Libya carried with them both considerable combat experience and stockpiles of arms that they used to temporarily free their homeland. Unfortunately, the Tuaregs' whirlwind conquest of northern Mali was undone by the emergence of a new transnational threat in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) supplanted the previously victorious Tuaregs and attempted to turn Azawad into a Taliban-esque caliphate. French intervention defeated AQIM, but set the stage for a continuation of the cycle of violence and instability borne from the unwillingness of the international community to support the Tuaregs' legitimate right to self-determination.     

The multidimensional nature of the Boko Haram conflict

ABSTRACT

The debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime.     

Terrorism,insurgency, kidnapping,and security in Africa's energy sector

Energy continues to serve as the bedrock of modern economies and the main driver of modern society. For Africa, the production and supply of energy resources such as crude oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, biomass, biofuels and other renewables are an important source of employment, rents, taxes, royalties and profits. This sector brings in several tens of billions of dollars of revenue annually. The production and delivery of such resources, however, depend on critical infrastructures such as pipelines, refineries, processing plants, terminals, rigs, electrical energy pylons, substations, pump stations, vessels, and tankers. These infrastructures have been attacked by terrorists, insurgents, vandals and saboteurs, all of whom see them as targets against which to register their grievances and extract concessions from the state. This paper is a chronological account of some of the documented incidents of terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, destruction, sabotage, and human casualties suffered in the oil and gas sectors in Africa between 1999 and 2012. It is based on data extracted from the databases of the RAND Database of World Terrorism Incidents and the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD).