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Jon Strandquist 《Defense & Security Analysis》2017,33(2):79-93
Assumed in the long-standing debate over which agency, CIA or the Department of Defense, should conduct US paramilitary operations is the idea that these organizations’ paramilitary programs are fundamentally the same kinds of things. This article questions that assumption by investigating the organizational forms underlying these agencies’ paramilitary programs in four empirical cases drawn from South Vietnam and post-9/11 Afghanistan. A typology is constructed around two identified organizational forms: “franchising” for CIA vs. “company ownership” for the US Army Special Forces. Different paramilitary organizational forms are found to have significant operational implications that should inform the paramilitary transfer debate. 相似文献
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Charles Cogan 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):937-954
Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy. 相似文献
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Brian Glyn Williams 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(4):610-632
This report sheds new light on the CIA and US Special Forces' covert campaign alongside Afghan Northern Alliance leader General Dostum's horse-mounted Uzbeks during 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003 and 2005 the author traveled over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the plains of Northern Afghanistan and lived with the legendary Northern Alliance opposition leader General Dostum. His aim was to recreate Dostum's campaign alongside the CIA and Special Forces to seize the holy city of Mazar i Sharif from the Taliban in November 2001. Based on interviews with Dostum and his Uzbek commanders, this article recreates this proxy offensive that saw the Northern Alliance opposition break out of the mountains, seize this shrine town and bring the Taliban house of cards falling down in a matter of weeks. Up until now the indigenous Afghan Uzbeks, who played a crucial role as a ‘boots on the ground’ fighting force for Centcom, have been cast as a mere backdrop for American heroics. Now their side of the story and their links to the mysterious shrine of Mazar i Sharif are for the first time revealed. 相似文献
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Paul B. Rich 《Defense & Security Analysis》2018,34(2):144-160
The study of the cinematic representation is extremely useful in framing of counter-terrorism policies, whether in the US or elsewhere. This paper examines cinema’s interest in drone warfare as well as the lives and personalities of drone pilots. It argues that drone warfare suffers a considerable image problem that has been brought out in several recent features and it is unlikely that any major cinematic myth of drone warfare will easily develop, certainly in comparison to myths concerning special forces and special operations. 相似文献
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Jon Strandquist 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2017,28(2):337-360
Foreign policy program transfer, the shifting of implementation responsibility for a foreign policy program from one organization to another, is a ubiquitous, yet under-studied, counterinsurgency phenomenon. This article conceptually develops program transfer as an important object of study; analyzes, using archival sources, an empirical case of program transfer, Operation Switchback, drawn from US counterinsurgency practice in South Vietnam; and formulates two preliminary theoretical claims related to program transfer: (1) transferred programs will tend to be altered in accordance with the characteristics of the gaining organization, and (2) program transfer may act as a signal or early-warning indicator of foreign policy change. 相似文献
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C. Christine Fair 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(1):205-235
This essay reviews seven recent books and reports that focus upon the use of US armed drones in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This essay synthesizes a historical account of the program, critically interrogates key arguments and evidence advanced by the authors, and draws attention the particular problems that confront those who live in the FATA and the second-class citizenship that the Pakistani state has bestowed upon them for reasons of domestic and foreign policy concerns. This review essay does not intend to be the final word on any of the ongoing policy debates. But it does hope to enable a wider audience to take part in these important deliberations. 相似文献
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David P. Oakley 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2019,30(1):62-80
ABSTRACTDespite its portrayal as something new, the concept of the ‘gray zone’ is not novel. It was the Cold War battleground in which the USA and the Soviet Union waged rival unconventional campaigns, and it was there that the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given responsibility for operating. This was not the organization’s original purpose, but Cold War exigencies forced Washington to improvise and build an organization with unique capabilities. These early years shaped the CIA’s operations directorate, creating two distinct cultures within the larger agency, one focused on intelligence collection and the other focused on covert action. 相似文献
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