Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy

The Pakistani security forces have won their fight against the insurgency of the Pakistani Taliban, though terrorism will remain a serious problem for the foreseeable future. Victory was won not chiefly on the basis of new tactics, but of the recovery of legitimacy for the campaign among the population and the armed forces. This occurred when the war came to be seen as one waged not in the interests of the USA, but for the defence of Pakistan. In Balochistan, the nationalist insurgency has been different from and weaker than that of the Taliban—but may prove longer lasting. Military tactics in Balochistan have closely resembled those of the British Raj, and have been based with some success on fomenting tribal divisions and co-opting tribal elites.     

Notes on contributors

In 1897 and 1898, Winston Churchill participated in what late Victorian Britain termed ‘small wars’, first on India's northwest frontier and then in the vast wasteland of the Sudan. Churchill chronicled his experiences in these conflicts in personal letters, dispatches to newspapers, and in his first two books, The Story of the Malakand Field Force and The River War. These writings provide a snapshot of a particular period in the formative years of the great statesman, demonstrating through Churchill's eloquent analyses many of the contradictions concerning the conduct of small wars that have emerged in the present era.     

一种基于两级均衡的超Nyquist码元速率接收方案

1975年MAZO提出超Nyquist码元速率(FTN)理论,通过理论推导证明,信号在加性高斯白噪声信道下,以超过Nyquist码元速率25%以内的速率进行传输,误码性能可以不下降。但MAZO以及至今都没人能完成FTN的接收,因为当信号以超Nyquist码元速率进行传输所引起的码间串扰长度无限长,若要完全消除码间串扰,使用最大似然检测(MLSE)方法,其复杂度无穷大,是不可实现的。基于MMSE均衡和WCE均衡级联的两级均衡已证明在长码间串扰信道下其误码性能接近于MLSE。文章将两级均衡运用于FTN接收,仿真证明在加性高斯白噪声信道下,信号以超过Nyquist码元速率25%以内的速率进行传输,误码性能不下降。成功实现FTN的接收,验证了MAZO的理论。     

Countering the Quetta Shura: a viable strategy to US policy in Afghanistan

The US strategy in Afghanistan has fallen short of neutralizing the insurgency that threatens the future stability. The primary insurgency's leadership council, the Quetta Shura, has effectively managed influence through a shadow government and superior tactics in recruiting marginalized tribal leaders, leading to a questionable outcome once Coalition forces withdraw in 2014. This article summarizes the threat posed by the Quetta Shura, coinciding with the deficiencies in the current US policy, and recommends a more viable strategy conducive to the current circumstances, based on historical and cultural precedence. Coalition forces have put a great amount of time, money, and effort into establishing a more stable Afghanistan. The USA needs a more aggressive strategy to counter the aspirations of the insurgency, thereby giving the Afghans the opportunity to further progress in the future. Under the current circumstances and policies, a peaceful transition after the Coalition withdrawal is becoming more unlikely.