The Battle of Mirbat: turning point in the Omani Dhofar rebellion

On 19 July 1972, the pivotal battle of the Dhofar rebellion occurred when over 250 communist guerillas, called adoos,1 ?1. ‘Enemy’ in Arabic. attacked the coastal garrison town of Mirbat2 ?2. Sometimes spelled Marbat. where nine men of the British 22nd Special Air Service Regiment were stationed. Their decisive defense of Mirbat led to decorations three years after the battle, the beginning of the end of the rebellion, and calls for the awarding of Britain's highest honor, the Victoria Cross. The Battle of Mirbat, let alone the Dhofar rebellion are little known outside the UK due3 ?3. Other than papers written for military staff colleges, there is no American written account of the battle. to the covert nature of the SAS deployment, the then Labour government's obsession with secrecy, and the remoteness of the area of operations. Nonetheless, of all the proxy wars of the Cold War this one had the most significance, because had the communist adoos won, Oman and its Musandam Peninsula, which sticks out like a dagger into the Straits of Hormuz and abuts the United Arab Emirates, would have fallen into the communist orbit; threatening the West's oil supply. This is the story of the pivotal battle that was won by Britain and Oman against a communist insurgency.     

利用SAS软件分析鼻炎患者生存质量的影响因素

应用SAS软件的因子分析、多元回归分析功能以及对异常点的诊断分析,结合线性结构方程式模型中的结构模型,探讨鼻炎患者生存质量的影响因素,结果表明对患者的生存质量有影响的因素有情绪、治疗疾病的信心及治愈时间.在回归分析中所得0.0001＜001,表明回归显著,模型拟合效果较好.     

基于Radon变换的合成孔径声纳多普勒中心估计

不准确的多普勒中心估计会显著降低合成孔径声纳图像质量。基于多普勒中心与斜视角直接相关的事实,提出了一种使用Radon变换估计多普勒中心的方法。仿真结果说明,此方法是有效的,可用于低信噪比、大斜视角情况下的多普勒中心估计。     

基于稀疏A*算法的微小卫星飞行姿态静环境规划

提高微小卫星的低可观测特性能够有效提升微小卫星的使用效率和生存能力,因此,设计了一种以稀疏A*算法(SAS)为基础的微小卫星低可观测飞行姿态静环境规划算法。通过对微小卫星的俯仰角,方位角和横滚角等姿态角进行调整,从而可以有效降低微小卫星在威胁雷达方向上的RCS值,提高微小卫星的低可观测特性。通过对工作频率在S波段和VHF波段的威胁雷达对微小卫星的威胁性进行仿真,结果显示规划后微小卫星的低可观测性能明显改善,满足飞行姿态规划的需求。     

The limits of covert action: SAS operations during ‘Confrontation’, 1964–66

This article evaluates the performance of the Special Air Service (SAS) during secret cross-border raids conducted as part of Britain’s undeclared war against Indonesia from 1963–1966. The analysis reviews the existing debate on the SAS’ performance during this campaign; it looks more closely at how military effectiveness might be defined; and it then examines, using the SAS’ own operations reports, the nature of their activities and their success or failure. This article concludes that critics of the SAS’ effectiveness during Confrontation are right; but for the wrong reasons. SAS operations did indeed have less effect than orthodox accounts would have it. But the reasons for this lay not in their misuse but in the exigencies of British strategy. This article demonstrates an enduring truth – no matter how ‘special’ a military force might be, tactical excellence cannot compensate reliably for problems in strategy.