Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.     

烟幕--信息战的"坚盾"

针对信息成为重要战争资源及信息对抗贯穿始终的特点,介绍了烟幕干扰激光、红外、雷达、卫星以及复合干扰、扰乱心理等作用,阐述了点目标防护、野战防空和攻势迷盲等战术应用,展望了烟幕技术的发展趋势.