Think again – supplying war: reappraising military logistics and its centrality to strategy and war

This article argues that logistics constrains strategic opportunity while itself being heavily circumscribed by strategic and operational planning. With the academic literature all but ignoring the centrality of logistics to strategy and war, this article argues for a reappraisal of the critical role of military logistics, and posits that the study and conduct of war and strategy are incomplete at best or false at worst when they ignore this crucial component of the art of war. The article conceptualises the logistics–strategy nexus in a novel way, explores its contemporary manifestation in an age of uncertainty, and applies it to a detailed case study of UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.     

Strategic outsourcing under technology spillovers

We study a supply chain in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) compete in the finished goods market. The OEM can decide whether to outsource the intermediate good, a critical component for producing the finished good, from the CM or make in‐house production. Technology transition improves the CM's production efficiency, and it can take two different forms: a direct technology transfer from the OEM to the CM or technology spillovers through outsourcing from the OEM to the CM. We document the possibility of strategic outsourcing, that is, the CM supplies the intermediate good to the OEM when she is less efficient than the OEM's in‐house production. We find that technology spillovers can strengthen the incentive for strategic outsourcing. Furthermore, compared with direct technology transfers, outsourcing coupled with technology spillovers may generate more technology transition. Outsourcing is a particularly appropriate channel for implicit collusion when the OEM is not very efficient with the production of the intermediate good. Our results suggest that ex post competition on the finished goods can create room for ex ante collaboration and provide some implications on the OEM's outsourcing strategies when facing a competitive CM.© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 501–514, 2014     

Outsourcing warranty repairs: Dynamic allocation

In this paper we consider the problem of minimizing the costs of outsourcing warranty repairs when failed items are dynamically routed to one of several service vendors. In our model, the manufacturer incurs a repair cost each time an item needs repair and also incurs a goodwill cost while an item is awaiting and undergoing repair. For a large manufacturer with annual warranty costs in the tens of millions of dollars, even a small relative cost reduction from the use of dynamic (rather than static) allocation may be practically significant. However, due to the size of the state space, the resulting dynamic programming problem is not exactly solvable in practice. Furthermore, standard routing heuristics, such as join‐the‐shortest‐queue, are simply not good enough to identify potential cost savings of any significance. We use two different approaches to develop effective, simply structured index policies for the dynamic allocation problem. The first uses dynamic programming policy improvement while the second deploys Whittle's proposal for restless bandits. The closed form indices concerned are new and the policies sufficiently close to optimal to provide cost savings over static allocation. All results of this paper are demonstrated using a simulation study. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This article studies a firm that procures a product from a supplier. The quality of each product unit is measured by a continuous variable that follows a normal distribution and is correlated within a batch. The firm conducts an inspection and pays the supplier only if the product batch passes the inspection. The inspection not only serves the purpose of preventing a bad batch from reaching customers but also offers the supplier an incentive to improve product quality. The firm determines the acceptance sampling plan, and the supplier determines the quality effort level in either a simultaneous game or a Stackelberg leadership game, in which both parties share inspection cost and recall loss caused by low product quality. In the simultaneous game, we identify the Nash equilibrium form, provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and find parameter settings under which the decentralized and centralized supply chains achieve the same outcome. By numerical experiments, we show that the firm's acceptance sampling plan and the supplier's quality effort level are sensitive to both the recall loss sharing ratio and the game format (i.e., the precommitment assumption of the inspection policy). © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

A note on combined job selection and sequencing problems

We investigate the solvability of two single‐machine scheduling problems when the objective is to identify among all job subsets with cardinality k,1≤k≤n, the one that has the minimum objective function value. For the single‐machine minimum maximum lateness problem, we conclude that the problem is solvable in O(n²) time using the proposed REMOVE algorithm. This algorithm can also be used as an alternative to Moore's algorithm to solve the minimum number of tardy jobs problem by actually solving the hierarchical problem in which the objective is to minimize the maximum lateness subject to the minimum number of tardy jobs. We then show that the REMOVE algorithm cannot be used to solve the general case of the single‐machine total‐weighted completion time problem; we derive sufficient conditions among the job parameters so that the total weighted completion time problem becomes solvable in O(n²) time. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 449–453, 2013     

Outsourcing the prosecution of Somali pirates to Kenya

There has been a failure by the international community to establish an effective system of prosecution for the trial of captured Somali pirates. This failure is in part due to the inability of the United States and by developed countries in Europe to carry out their responsibility as prescribed under international laws dealing with the prosecution of captured pirates. Owing to domestic political pressures, it has become politically expedient to outsource the trial of captured Somali pirates to Kenya and other developing countries in the East African region. By the end of 2009, Kenya had signed six memoranda of understanding with Canada, China, Demark, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Kenya has become the single largest destination for the trial of captured Somali pirates whose victims are not Kenyans; the attacked vessels do not fly the Kenyan flag, the attacked ships are not managed by Kenyans and the crimes did not occur in Kenya's territorial waters. Outsourcing as constructed, conceived and implemented at present is morally and legally wrong. It has left a weak and poor country to shoulder the responsibility of the international community. This paper examines the reasons for outsourcing and its implications for Kenya.     

Dynamic routing of prioritized warranty repairs

Recent years have seen a strong trend toward outsourcing warranty repair services to outside vendors. In this article we consider the problem of dynamically routing warranty repairs to service vendors when warranties have priority levels. Each time an item under warranty fails, it is sent to one of the vendors for repair. Items covered by higher priority warranty receive higher priority in repair service. The manufacturer pays a fixed fee per repair and incurs a linear holding cost while an item is undergoing or waiting for repair. The objective is to minimize the manufacturer's long‐run average cost. Because of the complexity of the problem, it is very unlikely that there exist tractable ways to find the optimal routing strategies. Therefore, we propose five heuristic routing procedures that are applicable to real‐life problems. We evaluate the heuristics using simulation. The simulation results show that the index‐based “generalized join the shortest queue” policy, which applies a single policy improvement step to an initial state‐independent policy, performs the best among all five heuristics. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Supplier certification and quality investment in supply chains

Global sourcing has made quality management a more challenging task, and supplier certification has emerged as a solution to overcome suppliers' informational advantage about their product quality. This article analyzes the impact of certification standards on the supplier's investment in quality, when a buyer outsources the production process. Based on our results, deterministic certification may lead to under‐investment in quality improvement technology for efficient suppliers, thereby leading to potential supply chain inefficiency. The introduction of noisy certification may alleviate this under‐investment problem, when the cost of information asymmetry is high. While allowing noisy certification always empowers the buyer to offer a menu to screen among heterogeneous suppliers, the buyer may optimally choose only a limited number of certification standards. Our analysis provides a clear‐cut prediction of the types of certifiers the buyer should use for heterogeneous suppliers, and we identify the conditions under which the supplier benefits from noisy certification. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information

This article addresses the concept of quality risk in outsourcing. Recent trends in outsourcing extend a contract manufacturer's (CM's) responsibility to several functional areas, such as research and development and design in addition to manufacturing. This trend enables an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to focus on sales and pricing of its product. However, increasing CM responsibilities also suggest that the OEM's product quality is mainly determined by its CM. We identify two factors that cause quality risk in this outsourcing relationship. First, the CM and the OEM may not be able to contract on quality; second, the OEM may not know the cost of quality to the CM. We characterize the effects of these two quality risk factors on the firms' profits and on the resulting product quality. We determine how the OEM's pricing strategy affects quality risk. We show, for example, that the effect of noncontractible quality is higher than the effect of private quality cost information when the OEM sets the sales price after observing the product's quality. We also show that committing to a sales price mitigates the adverse effect of quality risk. To obtain these results, we develop and analyze a three‐stage decision model. This model is also used to understand the impact of recent information technologies on profits and product quality. For example, we provide a decision tree that an OEM can use in deciding whether to invest in an enterprise‐wide quality management system that enables accounting of quality‐related activities across the supply chain. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

United States defence contractors and the future of military operations

ABSTRACT

The United States’ global strategic outlook has shifted markedly since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States’ strategic posture shifts, the nature of military operations is simultaneously changing rapidly. Many analysts predict that cyber-operations, autonomous weapons systems, artificial intelligence, and clandestine special forces operations will be central features in future conflicts. Although often overlooked by scholars and policy analysts, defence contractors are integral to the development and implementation of these emerging categories of warfare. This inquiry examines the evolving nature of the American defence industry and the roles corporations play in current theatres of conflict. Surprisingly, rather than becoming less reliant on defence contractors after their much-maligned performance in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American military and intelligence agencies have become more dependent on the private sector as technology becomes increasingly central to warfare.