Conditions for Successful Multiparty Mediation in Separatist Armed Conflicts: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis

Contemporary international mediation is often multiparty and involves a number of states and multilateral organisations. What are the conditions that account for successful multiparty mediation in conflict resolution? To address this question, I use qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and focus on individual dimensions of mediation, namely internal cohesion of the mediating coalition, the use of reward and coercive power, and the presence of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS). I posit that the presence of a cohesive mediating coalition is a necessary condition for conflict resolution, whereas the provision of security guarantees, the imposition of sanctions and the presence of an MHS play a causal role in conflict resolution only in conjunction with other conditions. I test these conditions using a fuzzy-set approach and data from 20 mediated agreements over separatist conflicts in the post-cold war era. Empirical findings provide support for some of these propositions and challenge relevant theories of international mediation. More specifically, this research shows that a high convergence of interests among mediators is the only necessary – albeit not sufficient condition – for conflict resolution. Second, the analysis highlights the presence of two main sufficient paths for mediation success.