| 装备采购委托代理关系分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 孙胜祥,刘宝平,刘佳.装备采购委托代理关系分析[J].海军工程大学学报,2005,17(2):112-116. |
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| 作者姓名： | 孙胜祥 刘宝平 刘佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 海军工程大学,装备经济管理系,湖北,武汉,430033 |
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| 摘 要： | 针对目前采用的委托方对代理方的激励与约束机制设计,利用博弈论方法分析了监督策略成本会引起最优解迁移,并以实例予以了说明.同时,给出了军事经济效能观测指标的选择原则和多行动代理方的激励机制设计原则.
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 委托代理关系 激励机制 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-3486(2005)02-0112-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年10月19 |
Analysis of relationship between equipment principal and agent |
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| SUN Sheng-xiang,LIU Bao-ping,LIU Jia.Analysis of relationship between equipment principal and agent[J].Journal of Naval University of Engineering,2005,17(2):112-116. |
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| Authors: | SUN Sheng-xiang LIU Bao-ping LIU Jia |
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| Abstract: | Based on the current mechanism of encouraging and control from principal to agent, it is (analyzed) that supervision cost may lead to migration of superior solution by the method of game theory and examples are given to prove it. Meanwhile the principle to choose the observation index of military economic efficacy and the encouraging mechanism of several actions agent designed by the principal are given. |
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| Keywords: | game theory relationship between principal and agent encouraging mechanism moral risk |
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