军队工程招标激励模型研究

运用激励理论研究了军队工程招标采购过程中军方与承包商之间的关系,建立了军队工程招标激励模型。在不完全信息和竞争性招标中,投标人的行为是追求最大的效用,军方则需要建立一种机制诱使投标人按真实成本信息报价,以达到预期支付最小的目的。这种招标博弈的结果是军方与投标人之间达成贝叶斯纳什均衡(Bayesian Nash equilib- rium),即军方利用激励合同诱使投标人报出其真实成本,而投标人为达到中标目的则必须采取讲真话的占优策略,最终在双方均可接受的条件下达成协议。在此基础上,结合实际研究提出了改进的综合评标模型。

Study on Auctioning Incentive Model in Military Engineering

According to the theory of incentives, this paper studies the relationships between the army and the contractors and sets up the auctioning incentive model in military engineering. The bidders'behavior depends on his maximum of utility, and the army looks for mechanisms that induce the bidden to quote true cost information in order to minimize the expected transfers. The result of the auctioning game is Bayesian Nash equilibrium between the army and contractors. In other words, the army makes use of the incentive contract to entice the bidden to announce their true cost, and the bidden must adopt the dominant strategy of telling the truth for obtaining the contract, finally they come to an agreement under the conditions both sides accept . Based on this, the model of the compositive bid evaluations is put forward in relation to the practices.