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基于激励机制的装备采办风险总量控制
引用本文:白焱,张志峰,沈威.基于激励机制的装备采办风险总量控制[J].火力与指挥控制,2016(5).
作者姓名:白焱  张志峰  沈威
作者单位:1. 空军工程大学防空反导学院,西安,710051;2. 沈阳飞机 工业 集团有限公司,沈阳,110850
基金项目:航空科学重点基金资助项目(20120469801)
摘    要:针对装备采办中的风险总量控制,提出一种激励方式来提高承包商的积极性。在单目标风险控制模型的基础上,建立了多目标风险控制模型,推导出了激励机制下风险控制的最优合同公式。对激励机制中存在的两类错误进行了理论分析和实例验证,得出了两类错误对收益的影响,并在成本控制中得到了应用,有效地提高了装备采办的质量和效率,为军方决策者在装备采办中提供了合理的参考依据。

关 键 词:激励机制  装备采办  两类错误  风险控制  多目标

Total Risk Control of Equipment Acquisition Based on Incentive Mechanism
Abstract:Aiming at the total risk control of the equipment acquisition,this paper puts forward an incentive method to improve the positivity of the contractor. Set up a model of multi-objective risk control based on the model of single-objective. And then the best incentive bargain formula of the risk control under incentive mechanism is in infered. Through theory analyzing and validating the two kinds of error,the paper gets the income which influenced by the two kinds of error. We put this theory into the cost control and improve the quality and efficiency of equipment acquisition effectively. It provides a logical reference for the decision-maker in army during the equipment acquisition.
Keywords:incentive mechanism  equipment acquisition  two kinds of error  risk control  multi-objective
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