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Technical and proliferation‐related aspects of the dismantlement of Russian Alfa‐Class nuclear submarines
Authors:Mohini Rawool‐Sullivan  Paul D Moskowitz  Ludmila N Shelenkova
Institution:1. Technical staff member at the Los Alamos National Laboratory;2. Manager of the Environmental Threat Reduction Program in the Nonproliferation and National Security Department , Brookhaven National Laboratory;3. Assistant biophysicist at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Nonproliferation and National Security Department
Abstract:When does a state become a “nuclear weapon state”? How we choose to answer this question has significant implications for proliferation assessment, analysis, and policy. Traditionally, the standard demarcation line has been a state's first nuclear test, but in recent years analysts have increasingly focused instead on the accumulation of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material. The article argues that although the test/no-test indicator clearly has problems, its replacement by the SQ/no-SQ indicator would be highly counterproductive. The article instead proposes supplementing the traditional test/no-test indicator with a theory-driven approach that focuses on the incentives and disincentives to test.
Keywords:Nuclear weapon states  non-nuclear weapon states  nuclear testing  fissile material
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