A rent‐seeking model of international competition and alliances? |
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Authors: | Bruce G Linster |
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Institution: | Department of Economics and Geography , United States Air Force Academy , Colorado Springs, CO, 80840-5701 |
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Abstract: | This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent‐seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two‐country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three‐country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent‐seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies’ interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium is computed. |
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Keywords: | Rent seeking alliances defense spending military competition |
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