A Territorial Conflict: Trade-offs and Strategies |
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Authors: | Kerim Keskin Çağrı Sağlam |
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Institution: | 1. School of Business, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan.kkeskin@ada.edu.az;3. Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. |
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Abstract: | We study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict. |
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Keywords: | Contest war territorial conflict endogenous reward |
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