Conceptualizing caveats for political research: Defining and measuring national reservations on the use of force during multinational military operations

The upsurge in post-Cold War coalition operations has stimulated research on caveats: national reservations on the use of force in multinational military operations. However, because the concept of caveats has no agreed-upon definition, it is used inconsistently. This in turn impedes comparing research findings across academic and policy studies and therefore systematic research. This article is a contribution to the scholarly debate on how the analytical concept of caveats are to be delimited. Crucially, we argue that caveats result from some calculated political decision, and should not be confused with reserved behavior due to financial and technical limitations, or lack of coordination. We suggest that caveats are empirically observed and measured in two ways: First, we argue that coalition rules of engagement should be used as a yardstick for measuring direct reservations on the use of force. Second, we suggest reservations on task-assignment and geographical mobility should be used to register indirect reservations.