The Demand for Military Spending in Egypt

Egypt plays a pivotal role in the security of the Middle East as the doorway to Europe and its military expenditure reflects its involvement in the machinations of such an unstable region, showing considerable variation over the last 40?years. These characteristics make it a particularly interesting case study of the determinants of military spending. This paper specifies and estimates an econometric model of the Egyptian demand for military spending, taking into account important strategic and political factors. Both economic and strategic factors are found to play a role in determining military burden/spending, with clear positive effects of lagged military burden, suggesting some sort of institutional inertia, plus negative output and net exports effects. The strategic effect as a result of the impact of Israel’s military burden is mostly positive and significant, though its impact is reduced when the impact of important strategic events are taken into account. The military spending of Egypt’s allies Jordan and Syria generally seems to have had no effect on Egypt’s spending. These results are consistent over a range of econometric techniques.     

Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From Cold Peace to Strategic Peace

This article is the first academic study of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel under Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011). It challenges a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that Egypt pursued a cold-peace foreign policy towards Israel throughout this period. We demonstrate that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was dynamic – comprising cold peace (1981–91), a hybrid foreign policy of cold peace and strategic peace (1991–2003), and a pure strategic peace posture (2003–11). We also use the case of Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel as a heuristic to develop a conception of a new type of peace, strategic peace, as an intermediary analytical category between cold and stable peace.     

Operational aspects of a future war between Egypt and Israel

The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt has survived since 1979. Even so, following the events in Egypt, there is a growing tension between the two states, particularly surrounding the Sinai, which could cause a crisis and even a war. In such a case, the main battlefield would be in Sinai, and there would be several dominant aspects. Some of them would appear for the first time, compared with previous wars, such as a collision between Israeli and Egyptian units of around corps size. Other aspects would be more familiar, such as the ratio between the size of the forces to that of the battlefield, the “fog of war,” night fighting, “friendly fire” and deception.     

Chief of staff in quest of a war: Moshe Dayan leads Israel into war

That Dayan was a central figure in Israel's formative years during the 1950s is beyond dispute. His star blazed particularly bright in the Sinai War of October‐November 1956. However, the roots of Dayan's extraordinary influence are to found in the period leading up to the Sinai War rather than in the war itself.

It is impossible to understand the Sinai War, particularly its Israeli aspect, without understanding the central role played by the army and its chief in the preparations and in lobbying for its execution. For the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the idea of an Israeli‐initiated war was neither a theoretical or a practical surprise. The IDF was prepared to launch an offensive against Egypt, and that fact was of major importance far beyond the Israeli government's decision to launch a war against Egypt.

It was Dayan who ensured full coordination between progress in the military preparations and progress in the diplomatic process (the negotiations with France and Britain), as he himself was at the center of events in both spheres of activity.     

‘It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings’: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s

Based on newly declassified archival documents, the aim of this study is to contribute to an improved understanding of the evolution of the non-proliferation regime through an examination of US and French nuclear cooperation agreements in the latter half of the 1970s. The four pledges of nuclear assistance examined – US assistance to Egypt and Israel, and French assistance to Pakistan and South Korea – failed to materialise by the end of the decade. Why did that happen? What caused the four pledges to fail? We find that the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion and the emergence of opposing domestic factions on the nuclear front in the supplier states generated major changes in US and French nuclear export policies, and also contributed to the development of a collaborative partnership between the two competing nuclear exporters, on the other.     

Military Spending and Economic Growth in the Middle East Countries: Bootstrap Panel Causality Test

This study revisits the causal relationship between military spending and economic growth in 10 Middle East countries via a panel causality analysis that accounts for cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity across countries. Our results indicate unidirectional causality from military spending to growth for Turkey; one-way causality from economic growth to military spending for Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria; bidirectional causality for Israel; and no causality in either direction for Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The empirical evidence does not provide consistent results regarding the causal relationship between defense expenditure and economic growth in these countries.     

NUCLEAR POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

With the exception of Iran, no Middle Eastern state has an operating nuclear power reactor. Several states, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt are considering constructing such reactors; some have even taken steps towards commencing nuclear power projects. There exist, however, considerable economic, technical, safety, and security challenges to achieving these goals, many of which are acute in the Middle East region. Regional and international cooperation on nuclear technology could not only help regional states meet their energy objectives, but it could also help to build trust among states as a basic step towards a future Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.     

Assessing regional security dialogue through the agent/structure lens: reflections on ACRS

Using insights from agent/structure dynamics, the authors highlight the interplay between social/ideational elements drawn from the international experience with arms control, and those that prevailed at the state/agent level, among participants in ACRS. At the agent level, they focus on Egypt and Israel, the major protagonists in the talks. Their analysis reveals implicit clashes that occurred among these different ideational dimensions, and their constraining impact on the ability of states to achieve agreement on cooperative security arrangements. They suggest that attention must be directed to these constraints in any attempt to reconvene the ACRS talks.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE WORLD DEFENSE INDUSTRY AND US MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL ON THE ISRAELI DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MODEL

This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs.     

US technological collaboration for nonproliferation: key evidence from the Cold War

ABSTRACT

Although the existing international-relations scholarship argues that technological assistance in the nuclear domain increases the probability of nuclear proliferation, the historical account indicates otherwise. Congressional legislation for nonproliferation, economic sanctions, and poor state capacity—specifically, inept managerial capabilities of the recipient state—explain merely part of the puzzle, but overlook the role of positive inducements offered to impede nuclear proliferation. Historical evidence shows that the United States often provided technological assistance with the deliberate intent to inhibit proliferation. In other words, Washington employed its technological leverage to attain nonproliferation goals. American technological preponderance since the end of World War II made such an approach feasible. This study examines key Cold War cases—Israel/Egypt, India, and West Germany—where the United States offered technological assistance with the deliberate intent to stall nuclear proliferation, thereby underscoring the role of assistance for inhibitive ends.     

The Israel Defense Forces as an epistemic authority: An intellectual challenge in the reality of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict

The changes in the nature of warfare and its transformation toward Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) intrastate conflict have challenged the patterns of interaction between the political and the military echelons in Israel. It seems that the political echelon's superiority is maintained at the institutional and formal levels, but on the substantive level, which demands relying on knowledge and systematic staff work, the political echelon's position is weakened and loses its validity.

Introducing the military echelon in Israel as an epistemic authority regarding the violent confrontation and the main outlines of the military knowledge development process might clarify why the absence of the required dialogue between the echelons and the weakness of the intellectual effort increased the military's influence over the shaping of Israeli conflict-management strategy. The argument's validity and its explanatory power can be found relevant for other countries whose militaries are deeply involved in the management of LIC.     

A Muslim by any other name

Abstract

A crisis is emerging in the Nile Basin, where some 300 million people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi rely on the Nile directly or indirectly. Egypt and Sudan wish to preserve a regime based on treaties drawn up during the colonial era that allocated the vast majority of the Nile's water to them. Countries upstream are determined to challenge this. In 1999 the countries using the river formed the Nile Basin Initiative to try to resolve these differences. More than a decade of negotiations failed to break the impasse. In May Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda decided to wait no longer and signed a new treaty, without the consent of Egypt and Sudan. The signatories have given the other Nile Basin countries one year to join the pact. For Egypt, which relies on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water, this is a question of life or death. Egypt has, in the past, indicated it will go to war if its share of the Nile is reduced. Talks continue, but the impasse is driving the region towards a crisis to which there is no easy resolution.     

‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’sStrategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.     

Prologue to Suez: Anglo-American planning for military intervention in a Middle East war, 1955–1956

This article contributes yet another perspective to the Suez War – the strategic and military planning carried out since the end of the Second World War by the Western Allies for the contingency of a new world conflict against the Soviet bloc. The Middle East was of vital strategic significance. Colonel Nasser's announcement of the Czech arms deal in September 1955 triggered the countdown to a new war in the region. London and Washington urgently drew up contingency plans for intervention, both with economic sanctions and armed force. Joint staff talks were held in Washington from March to August 1956. They were halted just two months before the United Kingdom decided to collude with France and Israel to attack Egypt.     

Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare

What organisational attributes enhance a military’s ability to effectively adapt on the battlefield? Upon the outbreak of war in July 2014 between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) encountered an expansive network of tunnels from which Hamas was launching large-scale assaults into Israel. This article illustrates that the IDF’s ability to successfully adapt ‘under fire’ to this battlefield surprise was facilitated by several important attributes related to its organisational learning capacity: a dynamic, action-oriented organisational culture, a flexible leadership and command style, specialised commando units which acted as ‘incubators’ for learning and innovation, and a formal system to institutionalise and disseminate lessons learned.     

NEW TERRORISM

New or contemporary international terrorism associated with Islamic fundamentalism and the struggle against Zionism and American interests is a recent phenomenon in Kenya, different to that experienced during the struggle against colonialism. Many explanations have been offered as to why Kenya is being targeted, but have not sufficiently explored its close relationship with the West—especially Britain and the United States, the perceived connection between Israel and the former Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi, domestic forces and government policy. Externally the most important explanations for the increase in regional terrorism are the three waves of global terrorism since 1967, the most recent and significant of which is associated with Osama bin Laden and the Palestinian Intifada. These events reverberated in the region, Sudan and Somalia in particular, but also internally. Both internal and external attribution factors explain the resurgence of new terrorism in Africa. In the case of Kenya, terrorist attacks are associated with the country's internal domestic processes and a naïve approach to broader international issues.     

FROM PROLIFERATION TO PEACE

Despite both regional and international efforts to establish a weapons of mass destruction–free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, regional support beyond mere rhetoric seems unattainable. The lack of commitment to WMD disarmament results from the complexity of regional security dynamics, which are characterized by a high level of weaponization and crosscutting conflicts. This article examines a strategy for WMD disarmament in the Middle East. First, such a strategy must reflect the motives underlying a state's WMD aspirations. Security and prestige may be identified as two motives that affect the acquisition, and thus also the abandonment, of WMD. Second, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Syria are important actors because their reasons for desiring WMD cannot be considered apart from each other, and progress will consequently depend on the inclusion of all these actors. In this regard, we recommend the establishment of a parallel process between efforts to establish a WMDFZ and peaceful relations in the Middle East. Solving central problems, like the lack of political determination and security cooperation, is vital to create consensus on the final framework of a zone. This study suggests a way forward by analyzing the central causes of conflict in the region and recommending ways to resolve them in order to establish a WMDFZ.     

Explaining the security paradigm shift: strategic culture,epistemic communities,and Israel’s changing national security policy

The paper’s main argument is that Israel’s security policy, which traditionally focused on defending its territorial integrity against regular Arab armed forces, was, by the 2010s, transformed into one that focuses on facing a variety of state- and non-state-based threats. Neo-realist explanations could neither account for the contested nature of the security debate during this period, nor the inconsistent evolution of the policy. The present study aims to solve this conundrum by introducing an alternative approach known as 4th generation strategic culture research. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the origins and evolution of strategic culture are reviewed, with emphasis placed on the commonly accepted weaknesses that, to date, have prevented it from being used as a testable theoretical concept, and subsequently as an explanatory factor for security policy changes. The second part presents the “modernist constructivism” approach that bridges the gap between traditional constructivism and hypothesis-driven research design. Next, the paper introduces the emerging fourth generation in strategic culture literature, followed by a conceptual framework designed to resolve the inherent weaknesses of the more traditional approaches. Finally, this conceptual framework is applied to analyse the transformation of Israel’s security policy between 1982 and 2014.     

以色列边界观的演变

以色列的边界观不仅是其对于边界的态度与看法,而且还浓缩着以色列与阿拉伯国家之间的恩恩怨怨．以色列边界观的演变实际上是以阿关系的另一种写照。对以色列边界观的演变进行论述,以从另一侧面解读以阿关系。     

Israel's Northern eyes and shield: The strategic value of the Golan Heights revisited

According to common wisdom, the Golan provides Israel with an ideal platform for its warning stations as well as the best available defense line against a massive Syrian ground attack. Challenging this belief, this article compares the present situation with an alternative defined by (a) a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan, (b) a complete demilitarization of the evacuated territory, and (c) considerable limitations on Syrian military presence in the area between the Golan and Damascus. The article reaches two conclusions. First, that a combination of means, primarily airborne and space‐based platforms, can effectively answer Israel's northern intelligence needs. Second, the security arrangements set above, combined with recent revolutionary military technologies and its relative advantage in this domain, offer Israel an effective ‐ in some respects even a better ‐ alternative, to the present defense line.