Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: what's new,what's true,what's arguable

Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian–American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama “reset” in Russian–American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.     

“This program will not be a threat to them”: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China

Although the Obama Administration has differed from its predecessor in a number of respects, on the specific issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), there is a striking continuity. The Obama Administration has remained committed to the BMD project, even as it has modified the schedule of deployments and prioritized different systems from the Bush Administration. Significantly, this has led to Chinese and Russian balancing in the nuclear sphere. As a result, there is evidence of a security dilemma-type dynamics in US relations with China and Russia. At present, there is no study that analyzes Russian and Chinese hard internal balancing against the USA in the sphere of missile defense during the Obama Administration. This article fills this gap.     

The Chinese and Asian impact on Russian nuclear policy

Asia, where nuclear powers already interact (including North Korea), exerts a growing influence on the thinking and policy underlying Russia's current and future nuclear (and overall defense) posture. China's rise is forcing Russia into a greater reliance on strategic offensive weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. These in turn will reinforce its opposition to US missile defenses, not only in Europe but also in Asia. Russia must now entertain the possibility of nuclear use in regional conflicts that would otherwise remain purely conventional. It cannot be postulated blindly that nuclear weapons serve no discernible purpose other than to deter nuclear attacks by other nuclear powers. The strategic equation in Asia and in the Russian Far East convincingly demonstrates the falsity of this approach. Nuclear weapons will be the essential component of Russia's regional defense policy if not of its overall policies – and this also includes contingencies in Europe.     

NUCLEAR STABILITY AT LOW NUMBERS

Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a “race to parity,” there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing's own increasingly secure second-strike forces.     

US–Russia relations and the future of arms control: how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could restore engagement on nuclear issues

ABSTRACT

Relations between the United States and Russia are in a prolonged downward spiral. Under these circumstances, cooperation on nuclear issues—once a reliable area of engagement even in difficult political environments—has all but completely halted. There are urgent reasons to find a way out of this situation, particularly the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2021. However, seemingly intractable disagreements about noncompliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and US ballistic-missile defense, compounded by the Ukraine crisis, the conflict in Syria, and the accusations of Russian interference in the US election of 2016, threaten the future of arms control. Against this backdrop, policy makers and practitioners should identify ways to re-engage on nuclear issues now so they can be ready to implement them as soon as feasible. This article considers how the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) could serve as a platform for US–Russia cooperation on nuclear issues when circumstances permit. Taking into account the challenges posed by ongoing US non-ratification, it identifies a menu of CTBT-related activities short of ratification that the two countries could undertake together. It explores how joint work on this issue would advance shared US and Russian interests while helping to create the circumstances necessary for further arms-control work.     

舰载防空导弹系统的防御能力评估

反舰导弹是当今舰艇及编队面临的主要威胁。为评估反舰导弹攻防能力,以目前世界上防御能力最强的美国航母战斗群为背景,研究采用分层火力配置的航母舰队防御体系对付反舰导弹的有效性。首先分析反舰导弹飞行高度、雷达散射截面及综合效应对防御系统中雷达探测能力的影响,之后应用简化公式,对各类典型舰载对空防御武器的最大拦截距离、拦截次数和拦截效率进行量化分析,对防御反舰导弹能力做出评估。     

美国导弹防御系统发展动向及对策思考

随着奥巴马政府各项安全政策主张的陆续出台,美国导弹防御系统建设进入一个新的发展时期.分析了美国导弹防御系统发展的最新动向,剖析了美导弹防御系统发展对我国国家安全的影响,提出了应对美导弹防御系统发展的对策思考.     

俄海军舰空导弹系统综合集成新方法

俄罗斯重视海上战场环境的基础研究,主张舰空导弹武器系列化发展,在舰空导弹系统研制领域,处于世界先进水平。介绍了俄罗斯单舰平台上舰空导弹装备研制的经验,举例说明了基于现有舰空导弹系统综合集成,构建单一舰艇及其编队分层对空防御体系的方法。     

Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.     

弹道导弹防御中多目标拦截的策略

多目标拦截是弹道导弹防御的重大难题,也是目前美国导弹防御系统所遇到的最大的技术难点。在将多目标问题分为单弹头攻击和多弹头攻击2类问题的基础上,结合美国的相关研究计划,分别针对核爆炸防御、助推段防御、先进的目标识别器和多拦截器防御等多目标拦截策略进行了分析研究。     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.     

Between a rock and a hard place: Europe in a post-INF world

The end of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has the potential to plunge Europe and NATO into deep crisis. Russia’s continued violation coupled with the Donald J. Trump administration’s desire to balance against Moscow and Beijing could force a new missile debate on Europeans. Even though Washington is trying to assuage its allies, the specter of another round of INF missile deployments to Europe is not unrealistic. Meanwhile, NATO’s European members face a dilemma. Some want NATO to resolutely push back against Russia. Others want to avoid a new deployment debate, at almost all costs. The Kremlin will use these cleavages to weaken NATO. If not carefully handled, NATO’s response to the Russian missile buildup could lead to domestic turmoil in a number of European states and render the alliance ineffective for a prolonged period. Europeans need to act now and voice their preferences in the military and diplomatic domains. A number of different military options are available, below the level of deploying new INF missiles in Europe. However, Europeans need to consider trade-offs regarding crisis and arms-race stability. At the same time, it will be up to European capitals to conceptualize a new arms-control framework for the post-INF world, one that takes into account today’s geopolitical realities and the entanglement of modern conventional and nuclear forces. Given the Trump administration’s loathing of arms control, concepts of mutual restraint may well have to wait for the next US administration. In any case, that should not stop Europeans from taking on more responsibility for their own security.     

靶弹系统发展的某些新特点

靶弹系统建设对于防空兵器试验和部队作战训练具有重要的作用。介绍了靶弹的组成,美、俄等国靶弹系统研发现状以及主要型号靶弹的技术战术性能,详细分析了外军靶弹研发的特点和发展趋势,对我国防空兵器靶标体系建设有一定的参考借鉴作用。     

全球信息栅格及其对美军导弹防御系统的作用

导弹防御系统是美军重点发展的战略武器系统。C4ISR作为导弹防御系统体系中重要的通信指挥自动化系统,由于其自身存在着信息网闭塞与狭窄的缺点,制约着导弹防御系统的功能发挥。美军目前正在全力建设全球信息栅格,通过整合各种信息资源,构成一个可以共享"陆、海、空、天"多维信息的互连互通互操作网络,提升导弹防御系统的一体化信息交互,建成一个多层次、全方位、覆盖全球的导弹拦截系统。     

Gorshkov's Gambit

This article is a portrait of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet Navy for almost three decades, from 1956–85. The author, a retired US Navy admiral with a Harvard PhD in Russian studies who served as both defense and naval attaché in Moscow, draws on numerous face-to-face interactions with Gorshkov. He also explores Gorshkov's memoirs that were published recently in Russia but have not appeared in an English translation. The paper is not only a first-hand account of an important historical figure, but also a window into the world of military-to-military diplomacy and intelligence during the Cold War.     

‘Calmly critical’: Evolving Russian views of US hegemony

Russia has consistently opposed US hegemony since the early 1990s. Moscow has sought to create a world overseen by the UN Security Council and several power centres supporting an anti-hegemonic axis. Until recently, Russia's resources have been very limited. Russian opposition therefore was largely conceptual or a work in progress. Russian policy was largely reactive – and non-confrontational. However, the failure of the Russia-US relationship to develop practically has highlighted negative views of US hegemony, and the greater wealth generated through high energy prices is supporting an increasingly active Russian policy.     

The Scope of Foreign Assistance to North Korea’s Missile Program

There is evidence that North Korea’s ballistic missile program benefited from support from the Soviet Union until its collapse and from Russia thereafter. Along with transfers of missile systems and rocket components, it appears that Russian engineers directly supported the program in North Korea. Analysis of missile launches, imagery, design solutions, and technology suggest that Pyongyang’s recent missile program may have continued to have external support despite a pause in the 2000s. This assistance may have enabled the progress in North Korea’s missile program leading to tests of an intercontinental range ballistic missile in 2017.     

The elephant in the room: US ballistic missile defence under Barack Obama

Conventional wisdom seems to hold that under Barack Obama, the US ballistic missile defence programme has been pushed aside to allow for a refreshed domestic and international agenda. Proponents point to Obama's campaign thinking and rhetoric, the ballistic missile defence (BMD) budget cuts, the decision to end the Third Site in Europe, and the reset relations with Russia through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as evidence that the programme has undergone a significant period of change, retraction and rationalisation. This article argues instead that BMD has not fallen from prominence and that there is a change in focus rather than retraction of its strategic goal. Consequently, BMD continues to grow in importance as a component of US national security strategy.     

ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.     

NATO Territorial Ballistic Missile Defense and its Implications for Arms Control

ABSTRACT

Since 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures.