Game theoretic analysis of the substitutable product inventory problem with random demands

This article uses game theoretic concepts to analyze the inventory problem with two substitutable products having random demands. It is assumed that the two decision makers (players) who make ordering decisions know the substitution rates and the demand densities for both products. Since each player's decision affects the other's single-period expected profit, game theory is used to find the order quantities when the players use a Nash strategy (i.e., they act rationally). We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash solution. It is also shown that when one of the players acts irrationally for the sole purpose of inflicting maximum damage on the other, the maximin strategy for the latter reduces to using the solution for the classical single-period inventory problem. We also discuss the cooperative game and prove that the players always gain if they cooperate and maximize a joint objective function.     

Coordination of pricing and inventory control across products

We consider the joint pricing and inventory‐control problem for a retailer who orders, stocks, and sells two products. Cross‐price effects exist between the two products, which means that the demand of each product depends on the prices of both products. We derive the optimal pricing and inventory‐control policy and show that this policy differs from the base‐stock list‐price policy, which is optimal for the one‐product problem. We find that the retailer can significantly improve profits by managing the two products jointly as opposed to independently, especially when the cross‐price demand elasticity is high. We also find that the retailer can considerably improve profits by using dynamic pricing as opposed to static pricing, especially when the demand is nonstationary. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Fixed‐interval joint‐replenishment policies for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand

We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013     

Inventory transshipment game with limited supply: Trap or treat

Inventory transshipment is generally shown to be beneficial to retailers by matching their excess demand with surplus inventory. We investigate an inventory transshipment game with two newsvendor-type retailers under limited total supply and check whether the retailers are better off than the case without transshipment. We derive the ordering strategies for the retailers and show that unlike the unlimited supply case, a pure Nash equilibrium only exists under certain conditions. Furthermore, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that inventory transshipment may not always benefit both retailers. Although one of the retailers is guaranteed to be better off, the other could be worse off. The decision criteria are then provided for the retailers to determine if they will benefit from the exercise of inventory transshipment. Numerical study indicates that the carefully chosen transshipment prices play an important role in keeping inventory transshipment beneficial to both retailers. Subsequently, a coordinating mechanism is designed for the retailers to negotiate transshipment prices that maximize the total profit of the two retailers while keeping each of them in a beneficial position.     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017     

Purchase and retrieval competition for seasonal produce

We study the competition problem of purchase and multiretrieval of perishable seasonal produce, where wholesalers purchase and stock their products in the first period, and then retrieve and sell them in subsequent periods. We first consider the duopoly case and assume that the prices are exogenous and fluctuate. In each period, after the price realization, the wholesalers retrieve some stock from their warehouses to satisfy their demands. One wholesaler's unsatisfied customers can switch to another and be satisfied by its left retrieved products. Any unsold retrieved stock has no salvage value and any unsatisfied demand is lost. The unretrieved stock is carried to the next period at a perishable rate. The wholesalers compete for the substitute demand by determining their own purchase and retrieval quantities. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and that the Nash equilibrium strategy has the simple “sell-down-to” structure. We also consider the general N-person game and show the existence of the Nash equilibrium, and characterize the structure of the equilibrium strategy for the symmetric case. In addition, we consider the case with endogenous prices, and show that the problem reduces to a repeated newsvendor game with price and inventory competition. We derive the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium strategy. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to examine the impacts of the model parameters on the equilibrium outcomes and to generate managerial insights.     

Optimal FCFS allocation rules for periodic‐review assemble‐to‐order systems

In Assemble‐To‐Order (ATO) systems, situations may arise in which customer demand must be backlogged due to a shortage of some components, leaving available stock of other components unused. Such unused component stock is called remnant stock. Remnant stock is a consequence of both component ordering decisions and decisions regarding allocation of components to end‐product demand. In this article, we examine periodic‐review ATO systems under linear holding and backlogging costs with a component installation stock policy and a First‐Come‐First‐Served (FCFS) allocation policy. We show that the FCFS allocation policy decouples the problem of optimal component allocation over time into deterministic period‐by‐period optimal component allocation problems. We denote the optimal allocation of components to end‐product demand as multimatching. We solve the multi‐matching problem by an iterative algorithm. In addition, an approximation scheme for the joint replenishment and allocation optimization problem with both upper and lower bounds is proposed. Numerical experiments for base‐stock component replenishment policies show that under optimal base‐stock policies and optimal allocation, remnant stock holding costs must be taken into account. Finally, joint optimization incorporating optimal FCFS component allocation is valuable because it provides a benchmark against which heuristic methods can be compared. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 158–169, 2015     

Optimal pricing and inventory control policy in periodic‐review systems with fixed ordering cost and lost sales

This paper studies a periodic‐review pricing and inventory control problem for a retailer, which faces stochastic price‐sensitive demand, under quite general modeling assumptions. Any unsatisfied demand is lost, and any leftover inventory at the end of the finite selling horizon has a salvage value. The cost component for the retailer includes holding, shortage, and both variable and fixed ordering costs. The retailer's objective is to maximize its discounted expected profit over the selling horizon by dynamically deciding on the optimal pricing and replenishment policy for each period. We show that, under a mild assumption on the additive demand function, at the beginning of each period an (s,S) policy is optimal for replenishment, and the value of the optimal price depends on the inventory level after the replenishment decision has been done. Our numerical study also suggests that for a sufficiently long selling horizon, the optimal policy is almost stationary. Furthermore, the fixed ordering cost (K) plays a significant role in our modeling framework. Specifically, any increase in K results in lower s and higher S. On the other hand, the profit impact of dynamically changing the retail price, contrasted with a single fixed price throughout the selling horizon, also increases with K. We demonstrate that using the optimal policy values from a model with backordering of unmet demands as approximations in our model might result in significant profit penalty. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Capacity allocation with traditional and Internet channels

In this paper we study a capacity allocation problem for two firms, each of which has a local store and an online store. Customers may shift among the stores upon encountering a stockout. One question facing each firm is how to allocate its finite capacity (i.e., inventory) between its local and online stores. One firm's allocation affects the decision of the rival, thereby creating a strategic interaction. We consider two scenarios of a single‐product single‐period model and derive corresponding existence and stability conditions for a Nash equilibrium. We then conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium solution with respect to price and cost parameters. We also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalized model in which each firm has multiple local stores and a single online store. Finally, we extend the results to a multi‐period model in which each firm decides its total capacity and allocates this capacity between its local and online stores. A myopic solution is derived and shown to be a Nash equilibrium solution of a corresponding “sequential game.” © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Simultaneous production of market‐specific and global products: A two‐stage stochastic program with additional demand after recourse

This paper analyzes the simultaneous production of market‐specific products tailored to the needs of individual regions and a global product that could be sold in many regions. We assume that the global product costs more to manufacture, but allows the decision concerning the allocation of products to regions to be delayed until after the manufacturing process has been completed. We further assume that there is additional demand after the region allocation but prior to delivery, extending the two‐stage stochastic program with recourse to include additional stochastic demand after the recourse. This scenario arises, for example, when there is additional uncertainty during a delivery delay which might occur with transoceanic shipments. We develop conditions for optimality assuming a single build‐allocate‐deliver cycle and stochastic demand during both the build and deliver periods. The optimal policy calls for the simultaneous production of market‐specific and global products, even when the global product is substantially more costly than the market‐specific product. In addition, we develop bounds on the performance of the optimal policy for the multicycle problem. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 438–461, 2003     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Dynamic coordination of production planning and sales admission control in the presence of a spot market

We consider the decision‐making problem of dynamically scheduling the production of a single make‐to stock (MTS) product in connection with the product's concurrent sales in a spot market and a long‐term supply channel. The spot market is run by a business to business (B2B) online exchange, whereas the long‐term channel is established by a structured contract. The product's price in the spot market is exogenous, evolves as a continuous time Markov chain, and affects demand, which arrives sequentially as a Markov‐modulated Poisson process (MMPP). The manufacturer is obliged to fulfill demand in the long‐term channel, but is able to rein in sales in the spot market. This is a significant strategic decision for a manufacturer in entering a favorable contract. The profitability of the contract must be evaluated by optimal performance. The current problem, therefore, arises as a prerequisite to exploring contracting strategies. We reveal that the optimal strategy of coordinating production and sales is structured by the spot price dependent on the base stock and sell‐down thresholds. Moreover, we can exploit the structural properties of the optimal strategy to conceive an efficient algorithm. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Joint pricing and ordering policy for exponentially decaying inventory with known demand

This paper is concerned with the problem of simultaneously setting price and production levels for an exponentially decaying product. Such products suffer a loss in utility which is proportional to the total quantity of stock on hand. A continuous review, deterministic demand model is considered. The optimal ordering decision quantity is derived and its sensitivity to changes in perishability and product price is considered. The joint ordering pricing decision is also computed and consideration of parametric changes of these decisions indicates a non-monotonic response for optimal price to changes in product decay. Issues of market entry and extensions to a model with shortages are also analyzed.     

Capacity games for partially complementary products under multivariate random demands

In this study, we consider n firms, each of which produces and sells a different product. The n firms face a common demand stream which requests all their products as a complete set. In addition to the common demand stream, each firm also faces a dedicated demand stream which requires only its own product. The common and dedicated demands are uncertain and follow a general, joint, continuous distribution. Before the demands are realized, each firm needs to determine its capacity or production quantity to maximize its own expected profit. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game. The sales price per unit for the common demand could be higher or lower than the unit price for the dedicated demand, which affects the firm's inventory rationing policy. Hence, the outcome of the game varies. All of the prices are first assumed to be exogenous. We characterize Nash equilibrium(s) of the game. At the end of the article, we also provide some results for the endogenous pricing. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 59: 146–159, 2012     

Quantity discount pricing policies for heterogeneous retailers with price sensitive demand

Although quantity discount policies have been extensively analyzed, they are not well understood when there are many different buyers. This is especially the case when buyers face price‐sensitive demand. In this paper we study a supplier's optimal quantity discount policy for a group of independent and heterogeneous retailers, when each retailer faces a demand that is a decreasing function of its retail price. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg game whereby the supplier acts as the leader and buyers act as followers. We show that a common quantity discount policy that is designed according to buyers' individual cost and demand structures and their rational economic behavior is able to significantly stimulate demand, improve channel efficiency, and substantially increase profits for both the supplier and buyers. Furthermore, we show that the selection of all‐units or incremental quantity discount policies has no effect on the benefits that can be obtained from quantity discounts. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Inventory management with advance capacity information

An important aspect of supply chain management is dealing with demand and supply uncertainty. The uncertainty of future supply can be reduced if a company is able to obtain advance capacity information (ACI) about future supply/production capacity availability from its supplier. We address a periodic‐review inventory system under stochastic demand and stochastic limited supply, for which ACI is available. We show that the optimal ordering policy is a state‐dependent base‐stock policy characterized by a base‐stock level that is a function of ACI. We establish a link with inventory models that use advance demand information (ADI) by developing a capacitated inventory system with ADI, and we show that equivalence can only be set under a very specific and restrictive assumption, implying that ADI insights will not necessarily hold in the ACI environment. Our numerical results reveal several managerial insights. In particular, we show that ACI is most beneficial when there is sufficient flexibility to react to anticipated demand and supply capacity mismatches. Further, most of the benefits can be achieved with only limited future visibility. We also show that the system parameters affecting the value of ACI interact in a complex way and therefore need to be considered in an integrated manner. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Single‐warehouse multi‐retailer inventory systems with full truckload shipments

We consider a multi‐stage inventory system composed of a single warehouse that receives a single product from a single supplier and replenishes the inventory of n retailers through direct shipments. Fixed costs are incurred for each truck dispatched and all trucks have the same capacity limit. Costs are stationary, or more generally monotone as in Lippman (Management Sci 16, 1969, 118–138). Demands for the n retailers over a planning horizon of T periods are given. The objective is to find the shipment quantities over the planning horizon to satisfy all demands at minimum system‐wide inventory and transportation costs without backlogging. Using the structural properties of optimal solutions, we develop (1) an O(T²) algorithm for the single‐stage dynamic lot sizing problem; (2) an O(T³) algorithm for the case of a single‐warehouse single‐retailer system; and (3) a nested shortest‐path algorithm for the single‐warehouse multi‐retailer problem that runs in polynomial time for a given number of retailers. To overcome the computational burden when the number of retailers is large, we propose aggregated and disaggregated Lagrangian decomposition methods that make use of the structural properties and the efficient single‐stage algorithm. Computational experiments show the effectiveness of these algorithms and the gains associated with coordinated versus decentralized systems. Finally, we show that the decentralized solution is asymptotically optimal. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

An exact analysis of a joint production‐inventory problem in two‐echelon inventory systems

We consider a two‐echelon inventory system with a manufacturer operating from a warehouse supplying multiple distribution centers (DCs) that satisfy the demand originating from multiple sources. The manufacturer has a finite production capacity and production times are stochastic. Demand from each source follows an independent Poisson process. We assume that the transportation times between the warehouse and DCs may be positive which may require keeping inventory at both the warehouse and DCs. Inventory in both echelons is managed using the base‐stock policy. Each demand source can procure the product from one or more DCs, each incurring a different fulfilment cost. The objective is to determine the optimal base‐stock levels at the warehouse and DCs as well as the assignment of the demand sources to the DCs so that the sum of inventory holding, backlog, and transportation costs is minimized. We obtain a simple equation for finding the optimal base‐stock level at each DC and an upper bound for the optimal base‐stock level at the warehouse. We demonstrate several managerial insights including that the demand from each source is optimally fulfilled entirely from a single distribution center, and as the system's utilization approaches 1, the optimal base‐stock level increases in the transportation time at a rate equal to the demand rate arriving at the DC. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011