Reassessing Military Assistance to the Civil Powers: Are Traditional British Anti-Terrorist Responses Still Effective?

The provision of Military Assistance to the Civil Powers (MACP) encapsulates the traditional approach towards countering terrorism on the British mainland, which emphasises minimum force, proportionality, police primacy and the rule of law, with the military retained as a supporting instrument, being employed only as a measure of last resort. Recent terrorist incidents in major urban centres do, however, question the effectiveness of these established methods. This analysis initially codifies the conceptual issues that underscore the tensions between civil policing and military anti-terrorist approaches in the UK, and proceeds to evaluate and compare a number of operations that indicate the nature of the challenges facing the MACP apparatus. In particular, potential shortcomings in the MACP provisions are identified in the form of threat perception and deployment and enforcement gaps. The assessment finds that there are facets of MACP that are of enduring relevance in the current era, yet a continuing need persists to reconcile police and military imperatives toward serious civil disorder contingencies and conditions of emergency.     

Confronting the “Perpetual Menace to Human Security”

Nuclear weapon states historically have attached great secrecy to their nuclear weapon and fissile material production programs and stockpiles, despite warnings that this would fuel fears, handicap informed debate and decision making, and drive arms races. As evidenced by the “Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament” agreed upon at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, however, the international community now sees greater transparency about nuclear weapon and fissile material stocks as necessary for enabling and monitoring progress toward nuclear disarmament. To support this effort, the International Panel on Fissile Materials has proposed a step-by-step program for weapon states to declare their inventories, production histories, and disposition of nuclear warheads and fissile materials, and to set up joint projects to develop methods for verifying these declarations. This openness initiative is described here, and could be adopted at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, laying a basis for negotiating verifiable deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and their eventual elimination.     

The Nepalese Army: From counterinsurgency to peacekeeping?

Can peacekeeping participation help reform military institutions in democratizing states? Drawing on evidence from Nepal – one of the world's largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations – this essay illustrates that participation in peace missions can sometimes undermine security sector reform and deteriorate civil–military relations. Furthermore, this analysis shows that peacekeeping participation will not necessarily reorient troops away from their conventional internal roles (such as counterinsurgency) or improve civilian control over the armed forces. Hence, civilians can lose control over soldiers just as frequently when they are deployed overseas as when they are at home.     

Britain's Great Security Mirage: The Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian Naval Threat, 1898–1906

This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain's Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany.     

Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security,c. 1919–39

This article examines the role of the Army in India in internal security duties during the inter-war years. It contends that the army's approach was much more pragmatic and nuanced than hitherto assumed. Evidence is presented to show that the army's internal security doctrine underwent far-reaching changes after the massacre in Amritsar in 1919. Thenceforth, minimum force became the central imperative and the other doctrinal principles served to reinforce it. The army also evolved a tactical drill which closely adhered to this doctrine. The article argues that the changing attitudes towards use of force are evident in the role of technology in internal security duties. Lastly, it examines the system of training which played a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the army's evolving approach to internal security.     

United States Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Columbia,Why Now,and What is to be Done?

An evaluation of US policy toward Latin America and Columbia and its implications for the military begins with an understanding of the purposes and patterns of intervention over the years. An evaluation of contemporary security policy in the Western Hemisphere also hinges on an understanding of the broadening view of US national security. In developing these themes, this article (1) analyzes the major tenets of US policy toward Latin America, and the criteria for intervention; (2) examines the concepts of security; (3) explains and clarifies 'Why Columbia, why now, and what is to be done?'; (4) outlines some strategic and high operational-level imperatives for US civil-military involvement in Columbia; (5) puts forward seven additional strategic and operational imperatives for playing in the contemporary security area; (6) addresses the strategic adaption of US military power in the Columbian threat situation; and (7) provides some final conclusions and recommendations. Such an exercise, will, hopefully, stimulate North American, Columbian, and Latin American thinking and action regarding a set of complicated problems that - whether one likes it or not, or is prepared to deal with it or not - is likely to be with us for some time beyond the year 2001.     

Security,structural factors and sovereignty: Analysing reactions to Kenya’s decision to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex

Kenya’s decision to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex highlights structural flaws in the international refugee regime. While much attention has been paid to Kenya’s reasoning, less has been given to the reactions of organisations and states. Given the state’s primacy in the international system and uncertainty about refugees, Kenya’s decision is perhaps unsurprising. It is contended that the stakeholders were unprepared because of path dependence and disbelief that Kenya would repatriate the refugees. While stakeholder reactions arguably demonstrate concern for refugees, the international refugee regime remains unquestioned, sustaining revenue streams that may fuel corruption, encourage lengthy encampment and prolong conflict.     

The Iranian nuclear dilemma: light at the end of the tunnel?

In February 2012, Iran announced its willingness to resume negotiations with the Western powers. This statement followed in the wake of a damning report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and the imposition of additional sanctions by the international community on an Iranian economy already under pressure. Tehran's announcement also coincided with increased speculation regarding an Israeli military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, however, this seemingly positive step appeared to be undermined by Iran's concomitant announcement that “huge” technical progress has been made on Iran's nuclear programme. This article will explore the significance of the recent political, diplomatic and technical developments in the Iranian nuclear affair and situate them in the broader context of Tehran's nuclear strategy. The analysis will assess the potential for this latest phase in the Iranian nuclear crisis to reverse Iran's current trajectory and initiate a rapprochement between Iran and Western powers.     

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

This article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.     

Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse

This article begins with a discussion of sovereignty and goes on to discuss the idea of national security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis. Second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns. The article concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere – and elsewhere – that do not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that non-traditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new ‘people's democracies'.