The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: conceptual breakthrough or anti-imperialist phantom?

The creation of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) is a sign of Africa's willingness to take its destiny into its own hands. Presented as a reaction to the slowness of the development of the African Standby Force (ASF), it is also a response to some of the ASF's conceptual weaknesses. This decision reflects a wish to establish an instrument better equipped to deal with the challenges Africa is facing. Departing from the (sub)regional logic of the ASF results from a desire to take into account the transnational nature of threats, while its enlarged mandate is meant to offer Africa the capacity to intervene in all kinds of conflicts, including by undertaking peace enforcement activities. But the obstacles on the road towards the actual creation and mobilisation of this capacity should not be underestimated. These include material difficulties, but also political tensions, between ‘small’ and ‘big’ states as well as between the African Union and subregional organisations. The risk then is high that the ACIRC, whose announcement came as a reaction to France's intervention in Mali, ends up joining the ranks of the many ‘anti-imperialist’ phantoms haunting the history of the Organization of African Unity/African Union (OAU/AU). Confronted by events considered ‘neocolonial’ initiatives, African actors have indeed traditionally reacted by launching grand projects that never got off the ground. However, by actually establishing this new instrument, they may also demonstrate that times have definitively changed.     

EU Global Strategy in a changing world: Brussels’ approach to the emerging powers

The world is entering a period of power transition, at the outcome of which some new form of global order (or disorder) is likely to emerge. Critical to this process is the interaction between the established powers, the USA and the European Union (EU), and the emerging powers, particularly China, Brazil, India and Russia. Many analysts have classified the EU as a declining power, a perception that has been enhanced with the triple crises of sovereignty that have rocked the Union since the mid-2000s (money, borders and defence). In this context, the publication of the EU Global Strategy was an opportunity for the EU to state clearly the nature of its ongoing and future relations with the rest of the world. This article argues that, in reality, Europe as a bloc (as opposed to its member states severally) has very limited purchase with the other major powers, and an ambivalent or ill-defined grasp of how to engage with them. They, for their part, have difficulty in knowing how to understand the EU as an actor and prefer to deal bilaterally with its key member states.     

THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.     

The European Union: Just an alliance or a military alliance?

Over centuries there have been different definitions and criteria for alliances. Within this, however, there are categories entitled ‘military alliances’. The article arrives at 11 different criteria for categorisation of alliances and applies them to the different facets of the European Union. It concludes that, on the broadest terms, the EU does meet the criteria for an alliance but that the jury is still out on some aspect of the European Union being a military alliance. This conclusion has consequences for the foreign, security and defence policies of several member states and, indeed, for the future of the European Union itself.     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit

The public expects European governments and the European Union (EU) to deal with the security challenges in and around Europe. So does the US, whose strategic focus has pivoted to the Pacific. Washington, DC has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the new EU Global Strategy of June 2016 does not come a moment too soon. But should the aim be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be European strategic autonomy, with the UK? Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve. With which degree of British involvement. And whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic autonomy.     

African maritime security and the Lomé Charter: Reality or dream?

ABSTRACT

Traditionally the African concept of security concept has been dominated by land-based conflicts with little attention being paid to maritime threats and the protection of the maritime environment. With the rapid escalation of piracy on the East Coast, the African Union (AU) was compelled to develop a joint strategy to address its changing African Maritime Domain (AMD). This was achieved by the AU’s Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS 2050) in 2014, culminating in the adoption of a binding maritime security and safety charter in Lomé in 2016. The Lomé Charter should ideally focus the general provisions of AIMS 2050 so that Africa, as a continent, can take responsibility for security and economic empowerment of the AMD. This article considers various maritime security documents against the backdrop of an African context for understanding maritime security, in order to evaluate whether the Lomé Charter, as a manifestation of AIMS 2050, will realise its aspirations. Focussing on security is not sufficient and too much emphasis is placed in the Lomé Charter on restriction rather than development. Strong political will and leadership is required to facilitate implementation, identifying common security concerns to ensure better cooperative and collective strategies in a diverse implementation environment.     

Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: the EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS; so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU’s strategic priority must involve stabilizing its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU’s own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.     

PART I: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF “THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”

Several years ago, Ward Wilson presented in this journal a wide-ranging challenge to what every generation of national security scholars and practitioners since the end of World War II has been taught about nuclear weapons. He asserted that nuclear deterrence amounts to far less than its proponents have claimed and provocatively suggested that nuclear deterrence is a myth. Relying upon both empirical and theoretical objections to nuclear deterrence, he concluded that its failures were clear-cut and indisputable, whereas its successes were speculative. Yet in spite of a flourishing trade in scholarly articles, think tank reports, blog posts, and opinion pieces concerning nuclear deterrence, nobody—including nuclear weapons scholars—has ventured more than a limited critique of Wilson's essay. There are, however, serious shortcomings in Wilson's arguments—deficiencies that make his essay an unpersuasive brief against nuclear deterrence. Wilson's thesis could be correct. His arguments, however, are unlikely to persuade any skeptical members of Congress, upon whom future progress in arms control depends, to reconsider the value they attach to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

     

Minimum deterrence and missile defenses: what's new,what's true,what's arguable

Minimum deterrence is a compromise, or halfway house, between nuclear abolition or nearly zero and assured destruction, the dominant paradigm for strategic nuclear arms control during and after the cold war. Minimum deterrence as applied to the current relationship between the United States and Russia would require downsizing the numbers of operationally deployed long-range nuclear weapons to 1000, or fewer, on each side. More drastic bilateral Russian–American reductions would require the cooperation of other nuclear weapons states in making proportional reductions in their own arsenals. In addition, US plans for European-based and global missile defenses cause considerable angst in Russia and threaten to derail the Obama “reset” in Russian–American relations, despite the uncertainties about current and plausible future performances of missile defense technologies.     

Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: pragmatic,problematic or promising?

A striking difference between the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy and its 2003 predecessor is the ubiquity of resilience as a new leitmotif, understood as the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crisis. Resilience provides a middle ground between over-ambitious liberal peace-building and under-ambitious stability, (re)directs attention to local resources and practices, and is ambiguous enough to be acceptable to everyone. The Global Strategy’s leitmotif is an example of the rise and spread of resilience in international discourses about crisis management and humanitarian emergencies. Although there are risks inherent to the way in which resilience reframes risks and crises, its added value lies in its power as convening concept, opening up international organizations to new ways of thinking and working, and providing a common ground for engagement.