On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997     

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) as an information duel

Blue strike aircraft enter region ? to attack Red targets. In Case 1, Blue conducts (preplanned) SEAD to establish air superiority. In the (reactive) SEAD scenario, which is Case 2, such superiority is already in place, but is jeopardized by prohibitive interference from Red, which threatens Blue's ability to conduct missions. We utilize both deterministic and stochastic models to explore optimal tactics for Red in such engagements. Policies are developed which will guide both Red's determination of the modes of operation of his engagement radar, and his choice of Blue opponent to target next. An index in the form of a simple transaction kill ratio plays a major role throughout. Published 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 49: 723–742, 2002; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/nav.10046     

Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002–2006

Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army.     

Lanchester attrition of interpenetrating forces

To approximate the solutions of detailed simulations of interpenetrating forces (or possibly to assist in curtailing Monte Carlo calculations), this article provides solutions to a simple problem assuming that the speed of advance is constant; the only interactions are local; Lanchester's linear or square law applies; force distributions are continuous if not initially uniform in depth. The resultant partial differential equations are solvable (1) in closed form if attrition is minimal or (2) with pain when attrition is sufficient to annihilate the leading edge of a force. This is exemplified only for the square law, where one must solve an integrodifferential equation for an ancillary function. A general solution is given for either law, and for the latter case a more complete one, assuming that initial force distributions are uniform. Useful properties of an unusual class of Bessel functions needed for this analysis are given in an appendix. Copies of computer programs are available.     

Revisiting the Naga conflict: what can India do to resolve this conflict?

Soon after India attained its independence from British colonial administration in 1947 the Nagas started waging an armed conflict against India to establish a sovereign independent state in Nagaland in the country's Northeast region. The conflict is today one of the world's longer running and little known armed conflicts. India's central government has tried unsuccessfully to tackle the problem through political reconciliation, use of force, and several development measures. Over the years, it has also undergone several changes in which the situation of conflict deepened whenever India's central government intervened. And yet, the road ahead also faces severe challenges because the demand for bringing the Nagas of India together into a single political entity will not go unchallenged from other ethnic groups. Moreover, a bitter leadership battle divides the Naga rebels and hence any future agreement is likely to be difficult due to factional politics as have happened in the past. Thus one way to satisfy the aspirations of different ethnic groups while protecting the boundaries of the existing states in India is to explore the option of cultural autonomy. This idea is not entirely new, but has lost significance over the years.     

Civil–military relations in France: is there a gap?

Since President Jacques Chirac's 1996 decision to professionalise the armed forces, many political and military leader expressed concerns about its potential consequences on civil–military relations. Will the shift to an all-volunteer force create a gap in civil–military relations? The goal of the article is to provide a preliminary assessment of civil–military relations in France before the full professionalisation of the armed forces. Using the results of existing polls conducted annually, I lay out a basis of comparison to evaluate the future evolution of civil–military relations on several dimensions: image of the military, perception of civil–military relations, social and political values, and the legitimacy of the use of force. Although civil–military relations in France have never been as harmonious since the Second World War as they are today, the article argues that these relations are not as rosy as they may seem.     

A stochastic air combat logistics decision model for Blue versus Red opposition

Technologically advanced aircraft rely on robust and responsive logistics systems to ensure a high state of operational readiness. This paper fills a critical gap in the literature for combat models by closely relating effectiveness of the logistics system to determinants of success in combat. We present a stochastic diffusion model of an aerial battle between Blue and Red forces. The number of aircraft of Blue forces aloft and ready to be aloft on combat missions is limited by the maximum number of assigned aircraft, the reliability of aircraft subsystems, and the logistic system's ability to repair and replenish those subsystems. Our parsimonious model can illustrate important trade‐offs between logistics decision variables and operational success.     

About the contributors

From the beginning of history, war has been an almost exclusively male affair and those who took part in it were often extolled as the most manliest of men. The recent feminization of the armed forces of many developed countries does not prove that women's liberation is making progress, as most people believe. Rather, it is part symptom, part cause, of the decline of those forces. Other things being equal, the fewer and less important the wars fought by any armed force the more women it has; the more women it has, the less likely it is to undertake serious wars.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.     

Landmines in Burma: Forgotten Weapons in a Forgotten War

Since the signing of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa, considerable attention has been given to the problem of uncleared landmines around the world and the thousands of casualties they cause each year. Yet, in all the literature produced on this subject to date, and discussions of the problem in various international fora, mention is rarely made of Burma. This is despite the fact that anti-personnel (AP) landmines have been, and still are, being manufactured and laid in large numbers in that country, with serious consequences for both combatants and non-combatants alike. Neither the Burmese armed forces (known as the Tatmadaw), nor the country's numerous armed insurgent groups, have shown any sign of restricting their use of these weapons. To the contrary, in recent years the use of AP landmines by both sides has significantly increased, making them a major feature of armed conflict in Burma and exacerbating a problem which threatens to haunt that country and its neighbours for years to come.     

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH A NUCLEAR IRAN

Claims that China is the only nuclear power currently expanding its arsenal fail to take into account the technical, historical, and bureaucratic realities that shaped China's nuclear posture and drive its ongoing modernization. China's strategic modernization is largely a process of deploying new delivery systems, not designing new nuclear warheads; the majority of its new missiles are conventionally armed. Today, China maintains the smallest operationally deployed nuclear force of any of the legally recognized nuclear weapon states, operates under a no-first-use pledge, and keeps its warheads off alert. The modernization of China's delivery systems is the culmination of a decades-long plan to acquire the same capabilities deployed by the other nuclear powers. U.S. concerns about this modernization focus too much on deterring a deliberate Chinese attack and ignore the risk that modernized U.S. and Chinese forces could interact in unexpected ways during a crisis, creating uncontrollable escalatory pressures. To manage this risk, Washington should assure Chinese leaders that it does not seek to deny China's deterrent, in exchange for some understanding that China will not seek numerical parity with U.S. nuclear forces.     

From Blitzkrieg To Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power

This article challenges the myth that Israel cannot afford to become involved in a draining war of attrition, arguing instead that Israeli society has repeatedly demonstrated a relatively high staying power. The article opens with a theoretical discussion that focuses on the difference between attrition and blitzkrieg and on the dilemmas Western democracies (WDs) face when coping with attrition. Following sections present Israeli aversion to attrition and the circumstances under which Israel eventually adopted an explicit attrition strategy, and analyse Israeli society's success in demonstrating a high cost tolerance during eight cases of attrition from the 1950s to the present.     

Human security in Burundi: The view from below (by youth)

Firearms have played a significant role in exacerbating invidious forms of violence in Papua New Guinea. Victimisation rates in the National Capital District (NCD) are amongst the highest in the world. Port Moresby, the country's largest and fastest growing urban centre, accounts for some 34 per cent of all nationally reported crimes, despite accounting for only 5 per cent of the country's population. The Southern Highlands Province (SHP) is also rife with violent armed conflict. This feature reports on the findings from an armed violence assessment administered in NCD and SHP by the Small Arms Survey with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This assessment yields a number of critical and counter-intuitive findings that take issue with the conventional wisdom concerning armed violence in Papua New Guinea and should influence prospective interventions to mitigate insecurity and reduce arms availability and demand.     

Optimal force mix in heterogeneous combat

This article presents models for determining the optimum number of Red weapons required to win a heterogeneous combat in which m(m> 1) types of Red weapons face a single type of Blue weapon under a newly defined termination policy. Red aims at either minimizing the total cost or maximizing the aggregated remaining force strength. Kuhn-Tucker and simulated annealing techniques are used for obtaining the optimal solution. The methodology is illustrated by analysing heterogeneous combat to determine (i) the feasibility of introducing new types of weapons and (ii) the number of weapons required to win if a specific type of weapon, say infantry, dominates. © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

《突发事件应对法》第14条分析——兼论国家武装力量应对突发事件的行为规范

国家武装力量依法应对突发事件应当依据《突发事件应对法》进行。但是,该法仅在第14条中对武装力量应对突发事件作了概括性的规定。本文从三个方面对《突发事件应对法》第14条进行了解读,企望比较全面地论述国家武装力量依法应对突发事件的行为规范。     

武警院校特色学报建设的困境与解决方略

特色学报建设是武警院校在建设现代化武警中培养高素质学术人才的必然选择。在特色办刊理念指导下,找准特色学报方向,构建特色学报梯队,开设特色栏目,培育特色学术人才,是武警院校特色学报建设的主要内容和途径。在追求武警院校人才建设,着力为建设现代化武警服务的同时,又注重追求学报建设的内在价值,发挥特色学报栏目建设的整体功能,是提升武警学术研究核心竞争力和办刊水平的基本路向。     

Similar Strategies,Dissimilar Outcomes: an Appraisal of the Efficacy of Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy with Syria and in Northern Iraq

Several countries have used coercive diplomacy to dissuade sponsor-states from supporting non-state armed groups. This study argues that when a sponsor-state and a non-state armed group's common identity creates common aspirations and motives, coercive diplomacy towards the sponsor-state is unlikely to succeed in the long-term. To assess its efficacy, this research examines Turkey's strategy towards Syria in 1998 and in northern Iraq from 2007 onwards. Under the abovementioned conditions, it concludes that there has been no conclusive evidence for Turkey's assumption that its approach would succeed; therefore, it should utilise alternative strategies to coercive diplomacy.     

Target selection in lanchester combat: Heterogeneous forces and time-dependent attrition-rate coefficients

We develop solutions to two fire distribution problems for a homogeneous force in Lanchester combat against heterogeneous enemy forces. The combat continues over a period of time with a choice of tactics available to the homogeneous force and subject to change with time. In these idealized combat situations the lethality of each force's fire (as expressed by the Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient) depends upon time. Optimal fire distribution rules are developed through the combination of Lanchester-type equations for combat attrition and deterministic optimal control theory (Pontryagin maximum principle). Additionally, the theory of state variable inequality constraints is used to treat the nonnegativity of force levels. The synthesis of optimal fire distribution policies was facilitated by exploiting special mathematical structures in these problems.     

ARMING THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

On 7 July 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lomé Peace Agreement to end the civil war. A central component of this agreement called for the RUF to disarm. A year later, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was in custody and the future of the peace accord in grave doubt. Far from disarming, all parties have been rearming at an alarming rate, in contravention of a 1997 UN arms embargo and despite a regional moratorium on the production, procurement and sale of small arms and light weapons. The political and security situation remains extremely fragile. This article explores the ease with which small arms and light weapons can be obtained, and questions the efficacy of existing armament and disarmament policies. Given the availability of arms, the weakness of the current government, the relative strength of the RUF, and the fluidity of alliances among the country's armed groups, the likelihood of continued conflict in Sierra Leone is great.