略谈《孙子兵法》语言研究的现状

《孙子兵法》是我国古代流传下来的最早、最完整、最著名的军事著作,也是现存中国和世界军事理论史上最早形成体系的军事理论巨著。《孙子兵法》问世以来,对其军事理论价值和其语言文学价值的研究成果很多。但是,相对而言,对其语言研究还是比较薄弱的。从语音、词汇、语法、修辞、篇章结构五个方面进行分析和总结,有助于正确掌握和评价《孙子兵法》语言研究的现状和价值。     

从孙子“静以幽，正以治”谈军校学员领导力培养

坚强的领导力是确保军事行动成功的关键。军校学员领导力不同于普通意义上的领导力。孙子“静以幽,正以治”的论述,揭示了军校学员领导力培养的基本内容、基本标准和各内容之间的辩证关系,对军校学员领导力培养具有重要的启迪意义。军校必须将培养超常的心质作为学员领导力的基础,把提升思维的广度和深度作为学员领导力的保障,将培养强烈的感召力作为学员领导力的核心,将培养坚强的执行力作为学员领导力的支撑。     

How do wars end? A multidisciplinary enquiry

ABSTRACT

The cessation of military confrontations rarely coincides with the end of war. Legal and political matters continue after the last shot has been fired, civilians driven from their homes try to rebuild their houses and their lives, veterans need to adapt to their new role in civil society, and the struggle to define the history and the significance of past events only begins. In recent years, in particular, the changes in the character of contemporary warfare have created uncertainties across different disciplines about how to identify and conceptualise the end of war. It is therefore an opportune moment to examine how wars end from a multidisciplinary perspective that combines enquiries into the politics of war, the laws of war and the military and intellectual history of war. This approach enables both an understanding of how ‘the end’ as a concept informs the understanding of war in international relations, in international law and in history and a reconsideration of the nature of scientific method in the field of war studies as such.     

从孙子兵法角度审视目标中心战的制胜机制

基于体系对抗的战争特点和我军作战实际情况,提出的目标中心战是现代作战思想的一次凝练及升华。它的制胜机制表现为三个层面：通过选择关键作战目标,提升体系对抗效能;通过影响目标系统功能,谋求局部对抗优势;通过融合体系要素,提高整体对抗能力。     

从孙子“将帅五德”看军校素质教育

《孙子兵法》作为我国古代兵学著作中的圭皋,其博大精深的思想内容不仅深刻揭示了战争的一般规律,而且对如何培养优秀的军事人才也有着卓越的见解,对于今天我们培养造就新型军事人才有着宝贵的借鉴作用。     

从三次战役看《孙子兵法》在《三国演义》中的体现

《三国演义》是中国古代军事战争小说的经典之作,它深受《孙子兵法》的影响。文章以赤壁之战、智取荆州、彝陵之战为窗口,以期窥探《三国演义》中所体现的《孙子兵法》的军事思想。     

‘Pounding Their Feet’: Israeli Military Culture as Reflected in Early IDF Combat History

Abstract

How did the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) organisational and military culture shape their understanding of security threats, perceptions of warfare, and instinctive responses to security challenges? Israel's early military history is marked by the stubborn persistence of accepted patterns of thought and action. In the first twenty years of its existence, the IDF habitually came to sacrifice both political and military long-term and medium-term considerations in favour of the superficial, short-term satisfaction of its drive for action. The Israeli Army as an institution separated military actions from their political implications, and all too often, granted itself freedom of action at all levels of command. That myopic pattern led to recurring raids and minor operations during the 1950s, and contributed notably to the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967.     

虚拟现实技术在军事领域的应用及对未来战争的影响

虚拟现实是一种全新的人—机交互环境,它为人类提供了一种全新的认识世界、改造世界的手段。介绍了虚拟现实的基本概念、特性、分类、构成、虚拟现实技术在军事领域的应用及虚拟现实在未来战争中的影响。     

Building the sinews of power: India in the Second World War

ABSTRACT

This article analyses the military transformations that India underwent during the Second World War. It focuses on the institutional dimension of these changes and considers the longer-term changes wrought by the war in the composition of the army, the logistical and support infrastructure and the emergence of an indigenous military industrial base. Taken together, the article argues, these changes positioned India as a potential regional military power that was qualitatively different from the interwar period.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》与竞争智慧

孙子有备无患的军事思想,早已成为现代竞争领域的指导原则之一。每个人都有非常强烈的成功欲望,这样的人生,是一个永不停息的决策过程。从事什么样的工作,怎样做才能使自己在竞争中立于不败之地。《孙子兵法》告诉我们：人生竞争有策略。     

Capturing Contemporary Innovation: Studying IDF Innovation against Hamas and Hizballah

The question of what enables some militaries to innovate effectively is of great interest to both scholars and commanders. However, the traditional models of military innovation fail to capture the complex innovation process. This study develops a new analytical framework that examines the pressures on and incentives for military innovation in the international, civil/military, organizational, and cultural planes and uses it to evaluate Israel Defense Forces (IDF) innovation between 2000 and 2009. Based on interviews with Israeli commanders and extensive research in Israel, this work finds that the IDF struggled to innovate before the 2006 war against Hizballah, but innovated effectively after the conflict once military and civilian leaders understood threats similarly. New models are needed to analyze the contemporary multi-dimensional innovative process.     

The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the atom bomb,the American Military Mind and the end of the Second World War

ABSTRACT

The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.     

在军援装备物资科研订购中引入激励机制探析

军援装备物资的订购筹措是军事援助中较为重要的一项工作.在军援装备科研订购过程中充分利用经济杠杆的调节和行政手段的调控,通过招标竞争、利益诱导、资金保障、实施奖惩等方面的具体措施,通过履行合同、择优订货等环节的激励,最大限度地调动和发挥各方面的积极性,逐步建立适应军援装备发展需要和社会主义市场经济的新型军援装备科研订购体制.     

French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

An informal framework to aid the analysis and design of military posture

The design of military posture is an exercise in confronting potential enemies’ capabilities within the context of geographic, technological, temporal, political and economic constraints. No formal model is capable of encapsulating the essentials of so complex an environment for closed or simulated analysis, but it is useful to have an informal framework within which to reason interactively within these dimensions.

This paper presents such a scaffolding, patterned on the notion of a military posture as the output of an economic process whose structure reflects important determinants of the characteristics and extents of weaponry and expenditures that are appropriate to the environment within the feasibility set determined by the constraints. The analysis remains at an abstract level, but it does highlight the important shifts toward preparation for littoral warfare, greater reliance on reserve rather than active forces, and necessary changes in missions among military departments.     

浅谈《孙子兵法》中的战场造势理论

《孙子兵法》问世两千多年以来,其学术价值受到历代军事家、史学家、哲学家们的广泛重视和一致赞誉。对于战场造势的研究,尤以孙子兵法为最先和最具代表性。其中,先胜后战、因情造势和择人任势等内容,是《孙子兵法》中战场造势理论的核心和精华。     

Determinants of southeast asian military spending in the post-cold war era: a dynamic panel analysis

This study examines the demand of military expenditure among Southeast Asian countries since the end of the Cold War. By using a dynamic panel approach, I find that military spending in the region has been jointly determined by economic, strategic and socio-political factors. In particular, surging foreign debt burdens and the rise of China – two regional issues that gained prominence in the post-Cold War period – show their significance as determinants along with other generalist variables. The results therefore ask for the development of even-handed and region-sensitive approaches to studying military build-up in the region of Southeast Asia.     

Innovation Inhibitors in War: Overcoming Obstacles in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness

What explains the pace at which militaries adopt new technology? We argue that the hierarchical structure and unique expertise requirements of military organizations combine to empower select individuals as ‘gatekeepers’ of innovation. These individuals acquire beliefs throughout their military careers regarding the nature and means of warfare that act to shape their attitudes towards new military innovations. By filtering, sidelining, and ignoring competing sources of advice and information, these officers actively inhibit the adoption of new, often advantageous, innovations. We develop this argument through the analysis of two cases: the delayed acquisition of breech-loading and repeating rifles by the Union Army during the American Civil War, and the failure of the US Army to adopt an adequate heavy-type tank in World War II.     

Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War

This article analyzes why US leaders did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War. To date, there has been no systematic study of US decision-making on nuclear weapons during this war. This article offers an initial analysis, focusing on the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Although US leaders did not come close to using nuclear weapons in the conflict, nuclear options received more attention than has previously been appreciated. Johnson's advisers raised the issue of nuclear weapons and threats on several occasions, and Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security adviser, looked into nuclear options to bring the war to an end. Ultimately, however, both administrations privately rejected such options. The conventional explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War – deterrence – is insufficient to explain the Vietnam case. This article analyzes the role of military, political and normative considerations in restraining US use of nuclear weapons in the Vietnam War. It argues that while military and political considerations, including escalation concerns, are part of the explanation, a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons played a critical role.     

How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the ‘peace shock’ they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the ‘age of uncertainty’ demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional ‘Third World’ adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets.