根除美台军售

<正>2010年1月20日,奥巴马政府公布了新一轮对台军售清单,包括"黑鹰"直升机、"爱国者"-3防空导弹在内的武器装备总额达63.92亿美元。这一损害中方核心利益、中美合作大局的错误决定激起了中方强烈回应,要求美方停止对台军售,并将对参与售     

美国应继续对台军售吗

美国几位有影响力的人士最近呼吁美国政府重新评估其防卫台湾的承诺。他们说这有利于改善中美关系,并消除亚洲一个潜在的冲突引爆点。……鉴于美国与中国的战略互动攸关美国的巨大利益,在一些重新审视当前局势的人士看来,美国对台军售很可能是一种误入歧途的选择。     

“美台商会”为对台军售推波助澜

10月3日,美国政府不顾中方一再严正交涉,通知国会决定向台湾出售“爱国者3”反导系统等武器装备,总价值达64．63亿美元。而就在此决定作出前的9月28日,台“国防部长”陈肇敏率团访问了美国,并参加了于9月29日至30日在佛罗里达州召开的第七届“美台商会年度国防工业会议”。有消息指,台湾代表在此次会议上的四处游说,对推动美国对台军售起到了不可小视的作用。而“美台商会”也因此引起了世人的关注。     

美对台军售变本加厉意欲何为

4月24日,美国总统布什批准了近十年来数额最大的一揽子售台武器清单,其中包括：4艘“基德”级导弹驱逐舰、12架P-3C“猎户座”反潜巡逻机、8艘常规动力潜艇、潜射和舰射“鱼叉”反舰导弹、“复仇者”自行火炮系统、MH-53E型扫雷直升机、AAV7A1型两栖攻击车、MK-48-4型鱼雷等。其中8艘潜艇连同武器系统及后勤训练等费用即达到了40亿美元,仅此一项的开销便是1996年5月至2000年5月美国4年对台军售额的总和。     

美对台军售一览

近20年,美国向台湾出售高性能武器高380多亿美元。仅在1994年到1999年的短短五六占年间,美对台军售就达126.35亿元台湾进口133亿美元的武器装备的95%。     

略论美国军工复合体与对台军售

文章探讨了美国军工复合体的形成历史和发展现状,分析了军工复合体影响美国防务政策的运作方式与作用机理,以及对对台军售问题的影响。     

对台军售当休矣

美国国会众议院日前通过2013年度国防授权法案,其中含有妄议中国军力发展和要求美国向台湾出售F-16C／D战机等涉华内容。5月21日,外交部发言人洪磊在例行记者会上表示,中方坚决反对美国国会众议院鼓吹美国对台军售。     

美对台军售意向清单

<正>(其中绝大部分项目已执行)1986年3月,中国北方工业公司与美国食品机械化学公司签订了联合研制步兵战车的意向书。同年6月19日,两公司正式签订协议联合研制一种新型履带式步兵战车NFV-1。     

对台军售 中美军事关系中的毒瘤

2010年1月29日,美国政府宣布将向台湾出售“黑鹰”直升机、“爱国者-3”反导系统、“鹗”级扫雷艇、“鱼叉”反舰导弹等武器装备,总额达63．92亿美元。外交部副部长何亚非紧急召见美驻华大使,向美方提出严正交涉;国防部外事办公室主任钱利华奉命召见美驻华武官,向美方提出严正抗议。     

我四项措施制裁美对台军售

美国1月29日公布了对台军售计划,军售项目包括60架黑鹰直升机,114枚“爱国者”-3型导弹和3套雷达系统,2艘鹗级猎雷舰、10枚RTM-84L型与2枚ATM-84L型鱼叉导弹、博胜指管系统,总额达6392亿美元．但F-16C／D与柴电潜艇并未包含在内。在之前的美国时间1月6日深夜,美国防部就已宣布,允许洛克希德·马丁公司向台湾出售“爱国者”-3（PAC-3）导弹防御系统。     

Southern Africa Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking

Conclusions from the Institute for Security Studies/Saferworld Conference on Developing Controls on Arms and Illicit Trafficking in Southern Africa, Pretoria, South Africa, 3–6 May 1998     

Arms Racing and the Costs of Arms Imports: A Stochastic Model

The paper draws on the demand for arms imports model of Levine and Smith (1995, 1997) using stochastic processes of the birth-death type in steady state. It assumes two antagonistic regional players engaged in an armaments race satisfying their demand for military hardware through imports from the international market. The paper examines the effects that arms imports have on the military balance between the two recipient countries. It constructs a state space of possible outcomes in terms of the military balance/imbalance between the two countries involved. A new variable is introduced which tries to encapsulate the absolute difference in their respective security functions at any moment in time. This variable affects the transition from one state of affairs to the other.     

The Gravity of Arms

The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of international arms transfers in a gravity model framework. By distinguishing between the decision to export arms (extensive margin) and the value of the arms exported (intensive margin), while also considering its interdependence, is what differentiates this paper from previous research. A theoretically justified gravity model of trade augmented with political and security motives is estimated using a two-stage panel data approach for 104 exporting countries over the period from 1950 to 2007. In addition to the usual gravity variables related to the economic mass of the trading countries and the trade cost factors, the model is extended with political and security factors. The level of democracy in both trading partners, political differences between trading partners and voting similarity with the United States in the UN General Assembly of the countries engaged in trade are the main political factors, whereas the existence of conflicts, military pacts, and embargoes are taken as security motives. The key result indicates that both political and security motives are an important determinant of an arms trade, but their effects on the extensive margin of exports (the decision to order a transfer) differs from their effect on the intensive margin (average value of exports). Moreover, the relative importance of the factors under study has changed since 1989. In the post-cold war period, countries that are less democratic are more likely to export arms, military pacts are less relevant and embargoes play a role.     

单兵种对多兵种作战的最优火力分配

本文利用微分对策方法研究了单兵种对多兵种作战时的最优火力分配原则,指出了应首先集中力量攻击敌方交战强度最大的一类作战单位。本文还说明了多兵种对多兵种作战时类似的问题的重要性和困难所在。     

The Determinants of Arms Production

This study analyzes the determinants of arms production in 15 countries using annual panel data from 1997 to 2002. The results suggest that real GDP per capita, military expenditures, arms exports, and arms imports are positively related to arms production.     

Nicholas John Spykman,the Balance of Power,and International Order

Nicholas John Spykman was probably America’s finest geopolitical theorist of the twentieth century, even though he was an active participant over the course only of five years (1938–43). He is rightly viewed as a worthy intellectual successor to Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain. Spykman originated the (Eurasian) Rimland concept, which is of continuing political and strategic utility today. He was controversial and notably outspoken while his writings make it quite clear that his concern with the acquisition of power was contextualised by serious concerns for world order.