Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.     

To avert impending disaster: American military plans to use atomic weapons during the Korean War

Though historians continue to argue about the role of American nuclear threats in producing an armistice in the Korean War, by 1953 the United States was moving closer to actually escalating the war with the employment of atomic bombs. While military studies and unsatisfactory exercises during the first two years of the conflict had relegated such weapons to a role just as a last resort to prevent a catastrophe, frustration with stalemated peace talks and the aggressiveness of General Mark Clark combined to produce a set of contingencies envisioning an expanded war involving nuclear air strikes.     

防空导弹的新家族——反精导武器防空导弹

现代精确制导武器对敏感点目标的威胁,主要表现在高的击毁概率和多发协同攻击上,保卫点目标的反精确制导武器防空导弹必须具有多目标通道和高速率全向射击能力;必须具有高的可靠性和对精确制导武器的击爆能力,将构成防空导弹系列中的一个新家族。     

Outflanking missile defences: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,nuclear weapons and terrorism

Ian Bellany, an Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, died in July 2011 at the age of 70, after a long and painful struggle with myelofibrosis, a rare and invariably terminal blood cancer. Between early 2009 and August 2010, under contract to Hurst & Co., he worked intermittently on a book about nuclear terrorism, which he provisionally entitled Before the Storm. The editor and I are grateful to Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. for releasing the draft. What is published here is an edited version of that draft. It may seem presumptuous to speak for Ian, but I am sure he would also have liked to thank the doctors and nurses of the NHS Morecambe Bay Universities Hospital Trust, whose skill, knowledge, and flair for improvisation kept him alive and writing for much longer than anyone expected. Alastair Bellany, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA.

In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists – produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists’ nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.”