How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT A FIRST STRIKE

This article critiques recent articles in Foreign Affairs and International Security that argue that in the foreseeable future the United States could acquire an assured first-strike capability vis-à-vis Russia and China thanks to technological improvements in U.S. nuclear delivery systems and a general decline in the numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces. Notwithstanding these articles, this analysis finds that mutual deterrence will persist regardless of the scale of possible future imbalances because deterrence is a highly flexible phenomenon. The pertinent question is not whether the United States will be able, in a surprise first strike, to cripple severely Russian response capabilities, but whether political stakes in any foreseeable conflict could justify the risk of even a small retaliatory strike on the United States. This article also assesses whether the Foreign Affairs and International Security articles could inadvertently exacerbate an already highly charged anti-American sentiment in Russia, possibly laying the foundation for a revitalization and expansion of the Russian nuclear arsenal.     

Samudra: India’s convoluted path to undersea nuclear weapons

ABSTRACT

India is advancing slowly toward operationalizing its nuclear triad. Its first nuclear-propelled ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), the INS Arihant, conducted its maiden deterrent patrol in November 2018. However, doubts exist around the capability of India’s SSBN, the effectiveness of its command and control, and its effects on regional stability in South Asia. This article examines the history and future trajectory of India’s sea-based nuclear forces and describes how India seeks to maintain robust command and control over its undersea nuclear weapons.     

Book review

Russian strategic nuclear forces, edited by Pavel Podvig (MIT Press, 2001)     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

EDITOR'S NOTE

The Nonproliferation Review (NPR) recently interviewed Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil, who presided over the 2005 Seventh Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Ambassador Duarte discussed his views on the outcome of the conference and the future of the treaty. He provided NPR with valuable insights into the outcome of the conference and also shared his thoughts on some of the most pressing issues confronting the NPT today, including the Middle East, nuclear terrorism, elimination of the threat of highly enriched uranium in the civilian nuclear sector, proposals to limit access to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. Blaming the failed conference on a general lack of political commitment among states parties and their unwillingness to negotiate common solutions, Ambassador Duarte stressed that “the conference should face squarely its own failure without my attempting to disguise or sugarcoat the deep differences of view, which must be resolved with courage and determination by the states parties if they want the treaty to remain effective.”?He emphasized that if states fail to act on their overriding interest in upholding the NPT, especially if states parties continue to ignore or disregard their nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations, some states might come to believe that their security interests are no longer served by the treaty. The future prospects of the NPT would then “look dire indeed.”     

Stopping Nuclear Traffic

The exploits of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network have received significant attention in the last three years. Gordon Corera's recent book, Shopping for Bombs, is an important addition to the existing literature. In this book, the author explores how Khan became a nuclear supplier and why his network was able to flourish for so many years. In his analysis, Corera examines relevant domestic and international political circumstances that affected Khan's rise and ultimate fall. The author also gives a compelling account of the international investigation that shut down this network in 2004 and warns that Khan's network will not be the last to challenge international nonproliferation regimes. Despite a few gaps in the book's narrative and analysis, Shopping for Bombs is an important source of insight into the activities of Khan and his network.     

Outflanking missile defences: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty,nuclear weapons and terrorism

Ian Bellany, an Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, died in July 2011 at the age of 70, after a long and painful struggle with myelofibrosis, a rare and invariably terminal blood cancer. Between early 2009 and August 2010, under contract to Hurst & Co., he worked intermittently on a book about nuclear terrorism, which he provisionally entitled Before the Storm. The editor and I are grateful to Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. for releasing the draft. What is published here is an edited version of that draft. It may seem presumptuous to speak for Ian, but I am sure he would also have liked to thank the doctors and nurses of the NHS Morecambe Bay Universities Hospital Trust, whose skill, knowledge, and flair for improvisation kept him alive and writing for much longer than anyone expected. Alastair Bellany, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA.

In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists – produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists’ nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.”     

The Indo–French strategic dialogue: bilateralism and world perceptions

Shared willingness to develop a stronger relationship, articulated by President Chirac during his visit to India in 1998, was not weakened by India's ensuing nuclear tests. Looking for enhanced power and global recognition, India and France share a common approach to realpolitik, and India's foreign policy is still searching for fresh opportunities to maximize influence in a new global order.     

Colonizing military history: A millennial view on the economics of war

We briefly illustrate the application of fundamental principles of economics to three episodes of military history for the second millennium AD. The periods, principles, and cases examined are, first, the European Middle Ages (1000-1300; opportunity cost; siege warfare); second, the Enlightenment and the Age of Battle (1618-1814; expected marginal costs/benefits; the decision to engage in battle); and third, the Cold War (1945-1989; substitution; France's nuclear force de frappe).     

Ambassador Abdallah Baali on the 2000 NPT review conference

On November 8, 2002, the Nonproliferation Review interviewed Ambassador Linton Brooks, Acting Administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Ambassador Brooks principal responsibilities include maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and implement’ ing a wide range of nonproliferation initiatives, in particular cooperative nonproliferation programs with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), conducted the interview, with the research and editorial assistance of CNS Research Associate Kristin Thompson.     

Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘We don't know how to do this’

The Cold War at sea expanded in many realms, including the frigid and treacherous waters of the Arctic Ocean. The US Navy pioneered these efforts with the visit of USS Nautilus to the North Pole in 1958. During the latter stages of the Cold War, however, Soviet naval strategists began to conceptualize the polar ice cap as a strategic asset for cloaking the operations of its nuclear missile submarines. As under-ice operations afforded the Soviet submarine fleet advantages of stealth, proximity to target and tighter lines of communications, both navies were forced to try to develop tactics for combat under these extremely complex and arduous conditions.     

A Novel Framework for Safeguarding Naval Nuclear Material

ABSTRACT

The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.     

Securing a border under asymmetric information

We study a stochastic interdiction model of Morton et al. IIE Transactions, 39 (2007):3–14 that locates radiation sensors at border crossings to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear material. In this model, an interdictor places sensors at customs checkpoints to minimize a potential smuggler's maximum probability of crossing a border undetected. We focus on a model variant in which the interdictor has different, and likely more accurate, perceptions of the system's parameters than the smuggler does. We introduce a model that is tighter and uses fewer constraints than that of Morton et al. We also develop a class of valid inequalities along with a corresponding separation procedure that can be used within a cutting‐plane approach to reduce computational effort. Computational results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.Copyright © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 91–100, 2014     

India's Evolving Nuclear Posture

This article analyzes India's nuclear doctrine, finding it to be critically flawed and inimical to strategic stability in South Asia. In pursuing an ambitious triad of nuclear forces, India is straying from the sensible course it charted after going overtly nuclear in 1998. In doing so, it is exacerbating the triangular nuclear dilemma stemming from India's simultaneous rivalries with China and Pakistan. Strategic instability is compounded by India's pursuit of conventional “proactive strategy options,” which have the potential to lead to uncontrollable nuclear escalation on the subcontinent. New Delhi should reaffirm and redefine its doctrine of minimum credible nuclear deterrence, based on small nuclear forces with sufficient redundancy and diversity to deter a first strike by either China or Pakistan. It should also reinvigorate its nuclear diplomacy and assume a leadership role in the evolving global nuclear weapon regime.     

French Nuclear Diplomacy

“French nuclear diplomacy” is the French government's use of civilian nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs) to advance specific commercial and strategic interests. During the heart of the so-called nuclear renaissance, the Élysée Palace aggressively peddled France's nuclear expertise and technology abroad, signing over a dozen new NCAs in an effort to bring in business for the French industry, forge diplomatic relationships, and promote global nonproliferation norms. Several years later, however, the outcomes of France's aggressive global nuclear power push appear nominal at best. This article explores the mixed results of this nuclear campaign, and through three case studies, illustrates how many of France's commercial and political disappointments stem from unrealistic expectations and the disorganization of the French nuclear complex.     

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.     

CONTRIBUTORS

ABSTRACT

Narratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.     

TURKEY'S NUCLEAR COMEBACK

As worries have grown about global warming and the sustainability and price of fossil fuels, the demand for nuclear energy has increased, and nuclear power is increasingly viewed as a reliable and clean resource. However, the so-called nuclear renaissance coincides with an international security environment in which the norms of nuclear nonproliferation seem to be eroding. Turkey, a non-nuclear weapon state, plans to generate nuclear power to meet future energy demands, but it is aware of and concerned with regional proliferation trends. Questions have also been raised regarding Ankara's rationale for using nuclear energy, as well as its potential motivations and capabilities regarding future proliferation. This article will provide an overview of Turkey's nuclear energy history and plans, as well as the proliferation-related questions that could arise; it will also look at the domestic debate on nuclear energy and Turkey's status as a non-nuclear weapon state.     

Why Culture Matters: Revisiting the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962

This article examines the nuclear command and control (C²) system implemented in Pakistan since 1998, and discusses its potential consequences for the risk of inadvertent or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. I argue that troubled civil-military relations and Pakistan's doctrine of ‘asymmetric escalation’ account for the creation of a command and control system with different characteristics during peacetime and military crises. Although the key characteristics of Pakistan's nuclear C² system allow relatively safe nuclear operations during peacetime, operational deployment of nuclear weapons during military standoffs is likely to include only rudimentary protections against inadvertent or unauthorised nuclear release. The implication of this study is that any shift from peacetime to wartime command and control procedures is likely to further destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations during the early stages of a diplomatic or military standoff, and introduce a non-trivial risk of accidental escalation to the nuclear level.