Combating nuclear smuggling? Exploring drivers and challenges to detecting nuclear and radiological materials at maritime facilities

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

Iran's nuclear programme: civil and/or military goals?

The ultimate goal of Iran's nuclear programme remains uncertain. While the nuclear reactor of Bushehr has finally been connected to the power grid, the nuclear fuel enrichment activities and their location cause concern to the international community. Thirty years of nuclear investments demonstrate a negative cost–benefit analysis: technical constraints and economic and infrastructural requirements constitute a burden on the implementation of a nuclear programme. This article analyses the economic, legal, technical and political aspects of the Iranian programme in order to uncover its civil and/or military finality.     

North Korea's ‘first’ nuclear diplomacy, 1993–94

North Korea's nuclear diplomacy in 1993–94 was its first long, complex, and sophisticated military–diplomatic compaign, in which it sought to obtain both displomatic and economic benefits. Although North Korea could not achieve all of its goals, its endeavour was quite successful overall. North Korea's nuclear development, deterrent capabilities, the limits of the international nuclear regime, and the lack of transparency in the North Korean system played important roles in this.     

Eisenhower,science and the nuclear test Ban Debate 1953–56

Though historians debate whether Eisenhower seriously pursued a nuclear test ban agreement at the close of his presidency, few have closely examined his consideration of the issue during his first term in office. Publicly, his administration ridiculed Democratic presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson's highly publicized test ban proposal in 1956. In fact, Eisenhower's private inclination to ban testing antedated Stevenson's campaign proposal by two years. A review of the administration's techniques of countering Stevenson's test ban proposal reveals the use of heated rhetoric, clever deception, and outright lies to manipulate public understanding of the test issue and to conceal the depth of Eisenhower's own sincere desire to limit, or even cease, tests.     

India nuclear weapons: No first use or no full disclosure?

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time.     

Bargaining with nuclear weapons: Thomas Schelling's ‘general’ concept of stability

This article identifies a consistent approach to stability across a wide range of conflict situations at the heart of Thomas Schelling's strategic theory. It finds that there are two main aspects of this ‘general’ concept of stability. The first is the ability to strike a bargain at a mutually acceptable resting place as seen in the Korean War stalemate. The second is the ability to maintain a strategic bargain over the long term as in the stability of the balance of terror. This article finds that crucial assumptions which underpin Schelling's general concept, such as the existence of restraints on the degree of competition and the idea that nuclear weapons assist the bargaining process, hold up better in some cases than in others. Stability consequently seems more possible in a conventional conflict or crisis when nuclear weapons are a background influence than in a war where the nuclear threshold has already been crossed.