Varieties of defection strategies from multinational military coalitions: Insights from operation Iraqi freedom

How do states defect from multinational military coalitions? The question deserves considerable academic scrutiny, as states increasingly rely on coalitions to prosecute military missions. Yet to the extent that coalition defection has been explored, the extant literature tends to see defection as a binary undertaking – states are either in or out. In practice, however, defection is an act of risk minimization in a manner that forces other coalition partners to fill resulting operational gaps. A coalition can therefore appear stable due to a constant number of flags associated with the mission, but in practice be much less coherent and capable. After defining defection as a non-routine abrogation of operational responsibility at other coalition partners’ expense, significantly prior to mission conclusion, this article explores several states’ participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the various manners by which they defected from that coalition. It concludes with implications for future scholarship.     

Conditional commitments: Why states use caveats to reserve their efforts in military coalition operations

Why do states make substantial military contributions to coalition operations, while at the same time apply reservations, or caveats, to how the coalition can use the military contributions? Caveats rose to prominence in defense and policy circles with NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan. In the scholarly security literature, the term remains a buzzword for all types of reserved efforts by states in coalition warfare, but there are few theoretical accounts addressing caveats. This article contributes to the knowledge gap on caveats through a comparative case study of Denmark’s, the Netherlands’, and Norway’s contributions to NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. It demonstrates that caveats can occur through three different causal pathways: compromises from domestic bargaining, handling of alliance commitments, and implementation and civil–military relations. Insights into the complexity that causes caveats are highly relevant for both political and military decision-makers that are trying to coordinate states’ effort in coalition operations.     

Peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation: The unique case of the U.S. Air Force and Battlefield Air Interdiction

ABSTRACT

Military doctrine assures a nation’s survival. Yet even when faced with a security threat that requires change, militaries rarely innovate but instead adhere to old doctrines that enhance autonomy, reduce uncertainty and claim resources. Existing theories cannot explain an important case of peacetime military innovation when the U.S. Air Force adopted Battlefield Air Interdiction to support the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. A revised theory of peacetime military innovation through inter-service cooperation resulting from external and internal threats explains not only why innovation occurred with Battlefield Air Interdiction but also why such successful cases are so rare.     

The politics of multinational military operations

Today, few countries fight alone; most fight as allies or partners in multilateral campaigns. The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for multinational military operations (MMOs). These have seen varying degrees of participation, enthusiasm, and success. This special forum is devoted to the politics of multilateral warfare including their formation, maintenance, and durability. The introduction sketches past research and derives some key questions of continuing relevance. The contributions shed light on the domestic and international politics of MMOs, focusing on the implementation of national restrictions and their repercussions for MMOs, party politics of military intervention, the conditions under which states decide to defect from military operations, and the role of junior partners in MMOs. In sum, this forum offers a fresh look at the politics of MMOs, including conceptual contributions to the study of national restrictions, domestic constraints, and coalition warfare.     

The Kennedy Administration,US Foreign Internal Security Assistance and the Challenge of ‘Subterranean War’, 1961–63

US foreign internal security assistance, that is, support to ‘Free World’ governments threatened by subversion, terrorism, and insurgency, formed a central part of the Kennedy administration's strategy for defeating ‘wars of national liberation’. As part of the administration's counterinsurgency policy, support to police and paramilitary forces abroad was intended to improve the ability of friendly governments to identify and root our perceived threats to the states. Under the tenets of modernization theory embraced by administration officials, strong internal security forces were expected to contribute to nation-building by protecting the fragile development process underway in the developing world. However, in attempting to export the American police model, policymakers failed to consider whether US notions about internal security were appropriate for fractious and unstable regions of the world.     

Transforming the Spanish military

The article analyses the Spanish military transformation. This process started in 2004 as a means to adapt the force structure, organization and capabilities of the Spanish military to meet present and future threats in compliance with NATO’s initiatives, thus ensuring the continuity of the equipment modernization, professionalization and the adjustment of the country’s defence architecture to the post-cold war environment. A decade later, although transformation is still a priority for the Ministry of Defence, limited political will, a lack of strategic guidance, poor resource management and the effects of the economic crisis are compromising its development. This article describes the Spanish military transformation and assesses its value in adapting the country’s armed forces to the current and prospective security environment.     

Conceptualizing caveats for political research: Defining and measuring national reservations on the use of force during multinational military operations

The upsurge in post-Cold War coalition operations has stimulated research on caveats: national reservations on the use of force in multinational military operations. However, because the concept of caveats has no agreed-upon definition, it is used inconsistently. This in turn impedes comparing research findings across academic and policy studies and therefore systematic research. This article is a contribution to the scholarly debate on how the analytical concept of caveats are to be delimited. Crucially, we argue that caveats result from some calculated political decision, and should not be confused with reserved behavior due to financial and technical limitations, or lack of coordination. We suggest that caveats are empirically observed and measured in two ways: First, we argue that coalition rules of engagement should be used as a yardstick for measuring direct reservations on the use of force. Second, we suggest reservations on task-assignment and geographical mobility should be used to register indirect reservations.     

使命任务拓展后海军武器装备体系能力框架构建

新时期海军使命任务拓展对海军装备体系建设提出新的需求,需要突出能力在需求分析中的纽带作用。本文针对海军武器装备体系能力框架的概念和研究原则进行简要分析,对能力框架构成进行详细讨论。试用情况说明,以能力框架支撑装备体系规划发展,可更好地涵盖兵力战争运用和非战争运用,综合应对确定和不确定威胁。     

The cyber conceptual framework for developing military doctrine

Militaries rely on secure communications. Despite the permeation of cyber-systems throughout the operational environment, there is little readily available doctrine on cyber-warfare. Doctrine that does exist has not been coherently integrated. This paper introduces a Cyber Conceptual Framework, consisting of five questions pertinent to the future use of cyberspace. The authors enunciate a definition of cyberspace, expand on existing military doctrine to reject the conceptualisation of cyberspace as a domain, define cyber-conflict, define cyber-attack and describe the four components and five levels of a cyber-attack. This work develops a common framework from available doctrine and a lexicon for future discussion.     

The strategic purpose of individual augmentee officers for junior partners in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT

This article examines the strategic purpose of Individual Augmentee Officers (IAOs) for junior partners in multinational military operations through an exploratory case study of Danish IAOs in Iraq and South Sudan between 2014 and 2017. IAOs are individual officers who are moved from their normal functions to be seconded to other units of the armed forces of their own or another country or an international institution. The study concludes that IAOs function as strategically important, yet not necessarily indispensable, supplements to military contingents in several ways: making tangible contributions to the overall mission (contributing), gaining access to information, knowledge, and experience (learning), and lobbying decision-making processes within mission headquarters (lobbying). The usefulness of IAOs depends on whether the junior partner has specific interests and a significant presence in the theatre and whether the mission is conducted as a UN mission, a NATO mission, or an ad hoc coalition.     

Risk communication within military decision-making: pedagogic considerations

Risk management is a decision-support process and a vital tool for military planning and decision-making. Today, several nations utilize risk-based approaches to analyze the level of security in military operations. There are both strengths and challenges in applying risk-based approaches to support military decisions. In this article, the challenges related to risk communication are investigated with the aim of describing how a military organization should train to create a good environment for effective risk communication. The analysis finds that it is important for the organization to define and consistently use a shared risk understanding. Such a shared risk understanding will need a systematic development process that focuses on the future decision makers’ and analysts’ education and training. To reach understanding, all involved parties must have the chance to identify the problem, reflect on its implications, test different solutions and develop a solution.     

Security in the Americas: Neither Evolution nor Devolution – Impasse

This article begins with a discussion of sovereignty and goes on to discuss the idea of national security threats with reference to two different levels of analysis. First, the traditional-legal versus a more realistic contemporary level of analysis. Second, the operational, strategic, and political levels of analysis. The traditional concept tends to focus attention on the tactical-operational levels of activity, and the more contemporary notion broadens analysis to more strategic-political concerns. The article concludes with the argument that a broadened concept of threat to national security and sovereignty is meaningful and important. This is particularly important for those governments in the Western Hemisphere – and elsewhere – that do not discern any serious security issues, or proverbial clouds, on their peaceful horizons. Ample evidence indicates that non-traditional security problems can lead nation-states to failing or failed state status. That is to say, as examples, dysfunctional states, criminal states, narco-states, rogue states, and new ‘people's democracies'.     

Feeding Bread to the Luddites: The Radical Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Guerrilla Warfare

This study examines the war that the United States has waged since September 2001 as a global counterinsurgency. Placing the war against al-Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency also presents implications for doctrine, interagency coordination and military cultural change. The first part of the article offers a distilled analysis of al-Qaeda and its associated networks. The second section examines the US military in the context of the Western way of war, with the attendant military-cultural impediments to adapting to an enemy who embraces a very different approach to war. The third section aims to define and describe the nature of the war that America and its coalition partners are trying to wage. The concluding section offers the most value as it refines and distills the work of several international security and military thinkers to arrive at some imperatives for successfully prosecuting this type of war to its end.     

TERRORISM AND AFRICA

Since the events of 11 September, regional organisations around the globe have realigned themselves to confront the new security threats posed by terrorism. While these threats can, and do, affect southern Africa in many ways, there has yet to be strong action taken at a regional level, and commitments to dealing with the issue have been varied. This essay attempts to explore why terrorism should demand more attention from southern African states, and reasons why those states should confront the issue through regional apparatuses.

It also examines areas that the SADC region will have to fine-tune in order to successfully implement security measures against terrorism. The essay seeks to take stock of the present capacity within the region as well as learn from what other regions around the world are doing. It highlights how other regions have already taken steps to mitigate their collective vulnerabilities by emphasising coordination, cooperation and harmonization among members. The essay highlights how, by integrating international models with existing regional capacity, southern African states can—and should—begin to confront the threats that terrorism poses to the region.     

More allies,weaker missions? How junior partners contribute to multinational military operations

There is a growing consensus that multinational military operations are often less effective than the theoretical sum of their constitutive parts. Multiple chains of command, restriction on intelligence sharing, and capability aggregation problems can reduce fighting power. However, partners may be necessary to provide legitimacy to an intervention. As such, most studies assume that the state leading a coalition (usually the United States) has to accept a degree of operational ineffectiveness in order to gain political benefits from the participation of junior partners to a multinational military operation. However, such analysis puts all junior partners under the same category, without taking into account the differentiated contributions of those junior partners based on their relative military power and international status. This article explores variation between the junior partners’ contributions and their impact on coalition political and military dynamics. It teases out the implications of adopting a fine-grained analysis of junior partners.     

论刑法一般原则在军事刑法中的实现

军事刑法是普通刑法的特别法,因而,刑法的一般原则对军事刑法具有当然的指导意义,但是这些原则在军事刑法中会有特殊的体现。军事刑法保护的是国防利益、国家军事利益。但是,为了保护国防利益、国家军事利益而不当的牺牲个人权利是罪刑法定原则不允许的。法律面前人人平等原则要求,对任何人犯罪,在适用法律上一律平等。但是,由于军人具有特殊的身分,刑法对军人和非军人加以区别对待。罪刑相适应原则要求,刑罚的轻重,应当与犯罪分子所犯罪行和承担的刑事责任相适应。战时缓刑是刑罚个别化原则在军事刑法中的体现。     

Past as prologue: USMC small wars doctrine

Africa is arguably the most important regional setting for United Nations peacekeeping challenges. In the 1990s, extensive efforts have been made by the United Nations in the fleld of peacekeeping with the speciflc aim of reducing the levels of conflicts on the continent. Another significant development relates to the fact that organisations in Africa have started to feature as important peacekeeping instruments in recent years as it is increasingly being accepted that there is a need for such institutions to take care of their own security requirements. However, a key issue at stake is the need to achieve greater consistency with regard to third-party intervention in African conflicts. A look at the more glaring examples of multinational operations in the name of peace and security gives a sense of the magnitude and difficulties often experienced during such endeavours. In addition, both past and current operations have brought to light certain perspectives and lessons that require careful analysis and study. In this article, an overview is given of some of the perils and challenges associated with multinational operations in the realm of peace and security. Specifically, the focus is on Africa and on key issues and challenges regarding the strategic and operational management of such operations in view of the need to consider a more integrated approach towards multinational operations in support of peace and security in Africa.     

Twittering for talent: Private military and security companies between business and military branding

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) play an increasingly important role in the provision of security-related services. In their attempts to win new clients and find suitable personnel, they take on different identities by presenting themselves as conventional businesses, military actors, and humanitarians. In this article, we examine how PMSCs deploy these identities when they recruit new personnel through social media. Our computer-assisted content analysis of Twitter messages posted by two major United States-based companies—CACI and DynCorp International—shows that while both PMSCs amplify their business and military identities to attract the most talented personnel, they construct and communicate these identities in different ways with CACI branding itself as a sophisticated, modern, and patriotic business and DynCorp as a home-grown, traditional military provider. In addition, our analysis lends force to scholars suggesting that state militaries and the private security sector compete increasingly for prospective employees using similar strategies.     

The sources of the Australian tradition in irregular warfare, 1942–1974

This article had its genesis in a background study for the development of a new Australian Army counter-insurgency doctrine. Archival research showed that the Australian counter-insurgency doctrine employed in such post-1945 conflicts as Burma, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam originated in the jungle campaigns of the South West Pacific Area during World War II. The historical record also showed that the Army's counter-insurgency doctrine, as with its World War II-jungle warfare doctrine, was a pragmatic amalgam of Australian experience and British doctrine. The article traces this process through the development of a series of doctrine manuals. It also considers the contribution of key individuals to both counter-insurgency theory and practice. This distinctively Australian approach to the development of doctrine was responsible for producing a highly successful manual, The Division in Battle: Pamphlet No. 11, Counter-Revolutionary Warfare (DIB 11), which the Army used during its involvement in Vietnam.     

The US NATO and military burden sharing: post-Cold War accomplishments and future prospects

NATO burden sharing has become an especially timely issue in the past several years as a result of a number of factors, including Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014. This article argues that alliance unity among the great democracies of Europe and North America is indispensable to peace and stability on the Eurasian continent. A fractured NATO, and especially, a large divide in purposes or commitments as between the United States and its European security partners, invites aggression and the possibility of inadvertent escalation. Past successes and failures in US-involved multinational peace and stability operations, within and outside of Europe, show that mission accomplishment requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and benefits among the members, in order to achieve peace and security objectives.