装备采购合同优化问题分析

文章采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,对装备采办过程中招投标合同的优化进行了分析,并探讨了计算优化激励合同系数的办法。     

基于性能的装备采购概念解析

基于性能的装备采购是融合了采购和保障两个过程的＂大采购＂,它将研制、生产、维修等多个环节进行衔接,以装备最终的性能为标准签署采购合同,通过长期协议来规定军方对装备的性能需求,并通过激励使性能目标与产品（服务）所获利益相关联,以在给定的资源和约束条件下优化装备战备完好性。基于性能的装备采购与传统装备采购相比,它在需求和保障、风险承担、合同激励等方面更具优势。     

基于博弈论的装备采办成本控制问题研究

从武器装备采办的理论需求出发,以博弈论为理论工具,对武器装备采办过程中的生产成本控制问题进行了分析;建立了基于激励的生产成本控制模型,并对成本控制模型的特点进行了分析和解释;针对军方在激励合同执行过程中有可能出现的2类错误,对成本控制模型进行了优化。在非对称信息条件下,优化后的成本控制模型不但能有效减少2类错误的发生,而且可提高军方装备采办效用,减少代理方合同风险。     

道德风险模型在导弹武器装备采办合同最优选择中的应用

根据导弹武器装备采办合同的不完全性特点,利用道德风险模型分析导弹武器装备采办过程,揭示合同双方行为的特征及后果,有利于选择能够实现军企双方利益最佳结合的装备采办合同。可供选择的采办合同包括固定价格合同、成本补偿合同和成本分摊合同。道德风险模型分析表明,在导弹武器装备采办过程中,早期研究与发展阶段应采用成本偿还合同;开发阶段到生产初期应采用成本分摊合同;生产初期之后,应采用固定价格合同。     

军品采购合同定价中的激励与风险

文章运用激励理论分析了军品采购中如何通过制订激励合同督促承包商尽量降低总研制成本的问题,并探讨了承包商的风险态度、控制成本的代价及成本不确定性等对激励强度的影响,提出了成本控制努力水平的概念,计算了军方的最终期望支付以及由于努力水平不可观测即信息不对称导致的总代理成本,分析了激励与风险的平衡。为军品订货合同定价提供了参考。     

装备采办合同的博弈模型与方法

文章分析了"竞争、评价、监督、激励"四个机制的引入对装备采办合同中的委托方与代理方策略与效用的影响。在建立基于效用值的博弈分析模型的基础上,提出了应用于优化装备采办合同管理的多阶段动态博弈模型与方法。最后,进行了实例的计算。     

基于成本显示的成本加激励金合同优化模型

成本加激励金合同在装备采办领域广泛应用,但存在供应商虚报成本以增加利润的弊端。为了使供应商提供其真实成本,对合同进行优化设计,提出由供应商制定目标成本而不是由客户制定,并根据目标成本确定目标利润和成本激励系数。模型给出了目标利润、成本激励系数关于目标成本的具体函数,并通过设置利润率上限以及最可能成本时的利润率控制了利润范围。从理论上和案例上论证了供应商在提出其真实预期成本时模型可达到最优激励效果。     

武器装备采办中的道德风险问题及其博弈规制

目前国内对于武器装备采办中的委托代理关系和信息不对称问题的研究尚处于起步阶段,且大多是定性分析与描述,定量化、模型化的应用与研究鲜见。本文对武器装备采办中存在的信息不对称现象进行解析,对其中典型的道德风险问题进行博弈规制设计,以期为装备采办中的承包商激励与约束问题提供定量化的参考。一、武器装备采办中的道德风险问题解析武器装备采办是武器装备采办部门支付采办经费,委托承包商从事武器装备研制、生产、维修和保障的经济行为,是建立在合同契约基础上军方(委托方)与军工企业(承制单位)之间典型的委托-代理关系,其突出特点…     

基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计模型

针对风险管理中的装备供应链正向（供应）网络设计问题,在对装备供应链风险和成本进行量化分析的基础上,综合考虑风险和成本2方面因素,建立了基于风险控制的装备供应链网络设计优化模型。并设计了遗传算法对模型进行求解,给出在指定风险水平下最优设计方案与总成本。最后通过实例分析和计算,结果表明,该优化模型合理、有效、可行。     

基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈的装备采办最优合同设计

市场经济条件下,合同成为贯穿装备采办全过程的核心问题。文章认为,军品合同的不完全性更为显著,且不完全合同是装备采办的最佳选择。为此,要结合装备采办市场的特殊性,在军方主导的视角下,基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈设计装备采办最优合同。同时,交易双方可通过重新谈判,有效防止合同不完全、信息不对称所引发的逆向选择、道德风险等问题。     

“Government contracting options: A model and application“∗

This paper models and simulates a government‐contractor principal‐agent weapon system repair model. Insights are derived as to how government repair contracts should be constructed so as to induce optimal contractor behavior. The paper's general conclusion is that the best contracting approach combines a lump‐sum payment that does not vary with the number of units repaired, expensive item cost‐sharing, and a contractor‐provided availability guarantee. Provided there is intercontractor competition, this type of contract performs well even if the government is poorly informed about weapon system break patterns or repair costs.     

美军装备采办合同管理及其标准化

在我军武器装备建设逐渐"以计划为主要管理方式和手段"向"以合同为主要管理方式和手段"转变的背景下,装备采购合同管理的研究日趋深入。而装备采购合同"行政合同"的性质及合同标的物复杂性的特点,进一步凸显了标准化在保证装备采购合同规范性、降低不确定性、减少交易成本和提高工作效率中的重要作用。文章在对美军装备采办合同管理标准化特点与经验详细分析和提炼的基础上,对比我军装备采购合同管理体制及标准化现状,有针对性的提出了装备采购合同管理标准化建议,梳理了标准化重点,并为日后时机成熟时制定适用于装备采购合同管理的相关标准或指南,奠定了一定的研究基础。     

我军装备采购合同管理存在问题及对策

论述了装备采购合同的重要作用,分析了合同管理中存在的问题,就加强装备采购管理所应采取的措施提出了一系列建议,包括创新装备采购合同管理体制,完善装备采购合同管理的法治环境,提高装备采购合同管理队伍的专业化水平,变革装备采购合同管理模式和方法和落实军事代表质量监督职责等。     

基于模拟谈判的装备采购合同知识产权条款拟制研究

装备采购是我国国防能力建设最重要的手段之一,对加强我国军事能力建设、提高国际影响力至关重要.为了对装备采购合同各方知识产权的归属、利益分配等核心要素进行明确,对涉及的关键、领先国防知识产权进行保护,本文针对军队装备采购合同中知识产权相关条款较少的问题,开展了装备采购合同知识产权条款拟制研究.研究首先分析了装备采购的特点...     

Contracts and coordination: Supply chains with uncertain demand and supply

Considering a supply chain with a supplier subject to yield uncertainty selling to a retailer facing stochastic demand, we find that commonly studied classical coordination contracts fail to coordinate both the supplier's production and the retailer's procurement decisions and achieve efficient performance. First, we study the vendor managed inventory (VMI) partnership. We find that a consignment VMI partnership coupled with a production cost subsidy achieves perfect coordination and a win‐win outcome; it is simple to implement and arbitrarily allocates total channel profit. The production cost subsidy optimally chosen through Nash bargaining analysis depends on the bargaining power of the supplier and the retailer. Further, motivated by the practice that sometimes the retailer and the supplier can arrange a “late order,” we also analyze the behavior of an advance‐purchase discount (APD) contract. We find that an APD with a revenue sharing contract can efficiently coordinate the supply chain as well as achieve flexible profit allocation. Finally, we explore which coordination contract works better for the supplier vs. the retailer. It is interesting to observe that Nash bargaining solutions for the two coordination contracts are equivalent. We further provide recommendations on the applications of these contracts. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 305–319, 2016     

Offset Contracts as an Insurance Device in Building the National Security

A dynamic multi-stage decision-theoretic approach is introduced to establish the optimal offset and its incidence, the contract price arising from bargaining, and the scale of the acquisition. A new rationale is suggested for offsets in terms of their role as an insurance devise. Results are derived for the pricing of delivery contracts subject to offset claims and their national security implications. It is shown that the national security is strictly convex in the offset transaction. As to the incidence of the offset, the offset claim is shown to be capitalised in the delivery price. The bargaining price is shown to depend on the value of the product to be delivered for the national security, the relative negotiation power of the contracting partners and the social cost of public funds. The analysis highlights the expectation effects of offsets on the bargaining price and the scale of delivery. The results aid in explaining why offsets are widely used in procurement contracts for defence materiel. As they contribute to the national security, they should be allowed to survive and not be denied under competition laws.     

Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain

We study a supply chain in which a manufacturer relies on a salesperson to sell the products to the consumers. The sales outcome is determined by a random market condition and the salesperson's service level, both of which are privately observed by the salesperson. Apart from them, there are two types of resellers: a knowledgeable reseller observes the market condition, whereas a diligent reseller can monitor the service level. While delegating to a reseller enhances information acquisition, it may also result in double marginalization and inefficiency. We identify several operating regimes in which double marginalization can be eliminated via simple contracts and establish the benefit of monitoring the salesperson over monitoring the market. Our dominance result is not prone to our model characteristics regarding the complementarity of market condition and sales effort, the relative importance of adverse selection and moral hazard, and the contract form. We then generalize our model and re‐establish the dominance result in the presence of reseller's risk aversion or private monitoring expertise. We also quantify the performance gaps among different selling schemes under various scenarios. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

An evaluation of incentive contracting experience

Incentive contracts are intended to motivate defense contractors to perform more efficiently and control costs more closely. By increasing the total profit as actual costs are reduced below a predetermined cost target, they encourage contractors to achieve cost under runs. Consequently, the principal advantage claimed for these contracts is that they make the financial incentives to reduce costs more effective. This study examines the effectiveness of incentive contracts as a means for controlling defense procurement costs. The study considers the various effects that incentive contracts may have on both contractors' performance and contract costs, and presents empirical evidence suggesting that these contracts may not have accomplished their intended goal of increased efficiency and lower procurement costs.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

CORRUPTION,PERCEPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Bribery undermines human development and a transition to stable democratic rule. It props up illegitimate regimes as corporations bid for contracts by bribing, in a seeming race to the bottom. The world's wealthy are slowly waking up to this and criminalising this scandalous practice of bribing foreign public officials. However, such measures, if enforced, need to be combined with domestic anti-corruption strategies in the South. If this opportunity is missed, the risk of investing private capital in marginalised economies perceived to be highly corrupt is further upped, making investment-driven economic growth possibly even less unattainable.