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Robert J. Bunker 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):114-121
During the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), France chose to support Biafra, but only on a limited scale, providing mercenaries and obsolete weaponry to Ojukwu's regime. General Charles de Gaulle's assistance to Ojukwu was conditioned by the French military drawdown after 1961, the increased power of French secret services on the continent, and the interventions in Katanga (1960–1963), Gabon (1964) and Chad (1968–1972). France supported Biafra primarily to protect its former colonies from Nigeria, stop Soviet subversion and acquire an economic foothold in the oil-rich Niger Delta. De Gaulle chose a limited strategy for two reasons. If Biafra won the war, France would be Biafra's greatest ally. If Nigeria won the war, France could extricate itself from the situation relatively easily and re-establish relations with the Nigerian government, which is what ultimately occurred. 相似文献
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Thomas Waldman 《Contemporary Security Policy》2018,39(2):181-205
This article examines contemporary modes of American warfare. It posits the concept of “vicarious warfare” as a means of capturing prominent patterns in warfighting approaches. Although rooted in long-standing traditions of military practice, vicarious warfare is sufficiently novel as to be identifiable as a distinct phenomenon. The precise manifestation or combination of vicarious methods vary according to the specific circumstances and political contexts prevailing in different theaters. However, America’s general preference is to fight its wars by delegating tasks to proxies and limiting exposure of its own military to danger. Where U.S. forces are employed directly, this takes place largely in the shadows. Such approaches have clear attractions, offer undoubted tactical advantages, and permit successive administrations to maintain a persistent tempo of operations that evades rigorous democratic scrutiny. Yet, prominent cases and numerous studies suggest that vicarious warfare has a high potential to generate counterproductive effects and significant strategic harm. 相似文献
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John S. Maybee 《海军后勤学研究》1985,32(2):225-237
The mathematical theory necessary to solve combined arms models of military combat is presented here. We show how to apply the theory of positive operators to such models. Most of the results are purely qualitative in character showing that many properties of such systems are independent of the actual numerical values of the coefficients. Finally, we discuss in some detail an example of such a system. 相似文献
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Robert J. Bunker 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):136-149
The philosophies of unconventional warfare philosophers can be divided into four schools. The classicists, or early school, represented by Sun Tzu and his ‘indirect approach’, have existed for thousands of years. Marxist‐Leninist revolutionaries gave new emphasis to unconventional warfare as a vehicle for revolution. The theories of these philosophers of the middle school were opposed by those of counterrevolutionaries. With the end of the Cold War, a new strategic environment is emerging, giving rise to new school philosophers reacting to that challenge. They include both those who seek to undermine the nation‐state and those, who, like the earlier counter‐revolutionaries, seek to defend and promote its interests. 相似文献
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心理战是现代战争的主要作战形式之一,但目前的心理战主要以舆论宣传为主,与其他作战技术结合较少,向专业化作战方向发展缓慢。本文首先从装备心理战发展的必要性入手,提出了装备心理战的基本概念,并分析了其特征内涵;其次,构建了装备心理战的技术体系,梳理了装备心理战技术的应用与发展过程;最后,结合雷达装备心理战技术,举例说明特型干扰技术带来的心理战效果。装备心理战利用心理战原理,瞄准人机交互环节,推动了心理战与装备技术的高度融合。它的发展不仅可以从内驱动角度牵引装备技术发展,还可以深层次提升装备与操作人员的整体作战效能。希冀本研究能够对军队装备技术发展和军事训练提供一定参考。 相似文献
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Thomas Stow Wilkins 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(6):1121-1150
This article sets forth a framework for analysis designed to enhance our understanding of the political management of coalition warfare. The framework, based upon literature appertaining to ‘intra-alliance politics’ and International Relations (IR) theories, is applied to the case study of the Normandy Campaign of 1944. Utilising this framework we are able to consider many of the thorny issues of coalition politics and determine how these can be managed successfully to maintain Allied cohesion. Throughout the analysis the merits of the ‘realist’ and ‘pluralist’ views on maintaining Allied cohesion are appraised. The article concludes that, while both afford convincing explanations for overcoming tensions within the coalition, the pluralist approach proves superior in accounting for Allied unity. Overall, the article demonstrates that the intra-alliance politics framework is a useful device for understanding the political dynamics of the Normandy Campaign in 1944 and that it is also potentially applicable to other instances of coalition warfare; past, present, and future. 相似文献
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