Robustness of preallocated preferential defense with assumed attack size and perfect attacking and defending weapons

The problem is to protect a set of t targets by n perfect interceptors against an attack by m perfect weapons. If the defender solves for an optimal preallocated preferential defense and associated game value assuming m₁ attackers, and the attacker knows the assumption of the defender and utilizes m₂ attackers, he may be able to achieve significantly more damage than had the defender assumed that there would be m₂ attackers. The article treats the robustness of preallocated preferential defense to assumptions about the size of the attack and presents results of an alternative approach.     

Optimal strategies for problems of simultaneous attack against an area defense without impact-point prediction

An area to be defended consists of separated point targets. These targets are subject to an attack in which the offensive weapons are assumed to arrive simultaneously. The defense has area defenders, each of which is capable of intercepting any attacker. The defense has no impact-point prediction; that is, it has no knowledge of any attacker's destination prior to allocation of area interceptors. For a given attack, the defense wishes to allocate its interceptors to maximize the total expected survival value of the targets. For a given attack size, the offense seeks a strategy to minimize total expected surviving value against best defense. We determine an optimal defensive strategy directly and develop an algorithm to determine an optimal attack and the optimal value of the min-max problem. A dynamic programming technique is used to obtain integer solutions, and illustrative computational results are provided.     

Minimum-cost mixtures of area and point defenses assuming simultaneous attack

It is desired to select numbers of area and point interceptors that minimize the cost of such defensive missiles under the condition that the maximum total expected damage produced by an unknown number of attacking missiles A be bounded above by a given function of A. Area coverages may overlap. The attacker is assumed to know the numbers of area and point interceptors and to launch a simultaneous attack (of arbitrary size A) against all targets, which is optimal against the given defenses. The defender is assumed to observe the attack and then allocate his area and point interceptors against attacking missiles so as to minimize the total expected damage. Upper and lower bounds on the minimal cost are obtained by solving integer programming problems.     

A duel complicated by false targets and uncertainty as to opponent type

An attacker, being one of two types, initiates an attack at some time in the interval [-T, 0]. The a priori probabilities of each type are known. As time elapses the defender encounters false targets which occur according to a known Poisson process and which can be properly classified with known probability. The detection and classification probabilities for each type attacker are given. If the defender responds with a weapon at the time of attack, he survives with a probability which depends on the number of weapons in his possession and on attacker type. If he does not respond, his survival probability is smaller. These probabilities are known, as well as the current number of weapons in the defender's possession. They decrease as the number of weapons decreases. The payoff is the defender's survival probability. An iterative system of first-order differential equations is derived whose unique solution V₁(t),V₂(t),…,V_k(t) is shown to be the value of the game at time t, when the defender has 1, 2,…, k,… weapons, respectively. The optimal strategies are determined. Limiting results are obtained as t→-∞, while the ratio of the number of weapons to the expected number of false targets remaining is held constant.     

Attack and defense of ICBMs deceptively based in a number of identical areas

On-site verification of ICBMs in the context of an arms control agreement might involve a situation where an inspector would choose one or more of a number of identical areas to inspect and would have confidence that the other areas had the same characteristics. This article considers optimal attack and defense of missiles deceptively based in a number of identical areas. The attacker may allocate warheads across areas as he desires and uniformly within areas. The defender may allocate interceptors across areas as he desires and either uniformly or preferentially within areas. The effect of restricting the defender to uniform allocation across areas is explored for various assumptions. Robustness of surviving missiles with respect to the number of attacking warheads is studied. Results are presented for a wide range of cases.     

Optimization of strategic defenses to provide specified post-attack production capacities

This paper presents a model for choosing a minimum-cost mix of strategic defenses to assure that specified production capacities for several economic sectors survive after a nuclear attack. The defender selects a mix of strategic defenses for each of several geographic regions. The attacker chooses an allocation of attacking weapons to geographic regions, within specified weapon inventories. The attack is optimized against any economic sector. This formulation allows the defense planner the capability to assess the results of the optimal defense structure for a “worst case” attack. The model is a mathematical program with nonlinear programming problems in the constraints; an example of its application is given and is solved using recently developed optimization techniques.     

Optimal strategies for problems of simultaneous attack against an area defense with impact-point prediction

An area to be defended consists of separated point targets. These targets are subject to an attack in which the offensive weapons are assumed to arrive simultaneously. The defense has area defenders, each of which is capable of intercepting any attacker'. Furthermore, the defense has impact-point prediction, i.e., it has knowledge of each attacker's intended target prior to allocation of the area interceptors. For a given attack, the defense wishes to allocate its interceptors against attackers so as to maximize the expected total survival value of the targets. In its first move, the offense seeks an attack allocation which will minimize expected total surviving value against best defense. We develop an algorithm to determine optimal attack and defense strategies and the optimal value of this sequential min-max problem. Branch-and-bound techniques are used to obtain integer solutions, and illustrative computational results are provided.     

军事攻防中的多属性资源分配对策模型

针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。     

A proportional defense model

This paper considers the problem of defending a set of point targets of differing values. The defense is proportional in that it forces the offense to pay a price, in terms of reentry vehicles expended, that is proportional to the value of the target. The objective of the defense is to balance its resources so that no matter what attack is launched, the offense will have to pay a price greater than or equal to some fixed value for every unit of damage inflicted. The analysis determines which targets should be defended and determines the optimal firing doctrine for interceptors at defended targets. A numerical example is included showing the relationship between the total target damage and the size of the interceptor force for different values of p, the interceptor single shot kill probability. Some generalizations are discussed.     

基于三方动态博弈模型的网络生存防御策略优化配置

针对网络攻防环境中防御方以提高系统生存能力为目的所进行的最优生存防御策略的选取问题,提出了一种基于完全信息动态博弈理论的生存防御策略优化配置算法。将恶意攻击方、故障意外事件及防御方作为博弈的参与人,提出了一种混合战略模式下的三方动态博弈模型,对博弈的主要信息要素进行了说明,以混合战略纳什均衡理论为基础,将原纳什均衡条件式的表达式转化为可计算数值结果的表达式,并据此增加了近似的概念,最后,将提出的模型和近似纳什均衡求解算法应用到一个网络实例中,结果证明了模型和算法的可行性和有效性。     

Layered defense of deceptively based ICBMs

The basing of ICBMs is a fundamental problem of defense analysis. Deceptive basing and antiballistic missile defense are two of the methods available to attempt to insure that there are ICBMs surviving after undergoing an attack. This article treats tradeoffs among missiles, silos or shelters, exoatmospheric interceptors, and endoatmospheric interceptors. Most of the analysis deals with 200 missiles, the number of MX missiles which were recommended to be moved among the 4600 shelters of the Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) deployment, though some variants in the number of missiles (from 115 to 400) are also treated here. The basic reference point of the analysis is the provision of 1000 ICBM warheads delivered in a second strike. The combination of exoatmospheric interceptors and endoatmospheric interceptors is referred to as “layered defense.” Warheads are destroyed by interceptors after the warheads separate from the missile which carries them. Exoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve a non-nuclear kill, while endoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to achieve either a non-nuclear or nuclear kill, depending on the technology available to both sides. Exoatmospheric interceptors may be capable of protecting value targets against the warheads of a second strike. To the extent that this can be achieved, they facilitate a first strike with relative impunity and hence are destabilizing. This article explores various layered defense topics.     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.     

Allocating capacity in parallel queues to improve their resilience to deliberate attack

We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs, when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well‐informed attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the queues to make the system resilient to worst‐case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three‐level sequential game of perfect information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero‐one random‐outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Optimal patrol to uncover threats in time when detection is imperfect

Consider a patrol problem, where a patroller traverses a graph through edges to detect potential attacks at nodes. An attack takes a random amount of time to complete. The patroller takes one time unit to move to and inspect an adjacent node, and will detect an ongoing attack with some probability. If an attack completes before it is detected, a cost is incurred. The attack time distribution, the cost due to a successful attack, and the detection probability all depend on the attack node. The patroller seeks a patrol policy that minimizes the expected cost incurred when, and if, an attack eventually happens. We consider two cases. A random attacker chooses where to attack according to predetermined probabilities, while a strategic attacker chooses where to attack to incur the maximal expected cost. In each case, computing the optimal solution, although possible, quickly becomes intractable for problems of practical sizes. Our main contribution is to develop efficient index policies—based on Lagrangian relaxation methodology, and also on approximate dynamic programming—which typically achieve within 1% of optimality with computation time orders of magnitude less than what is required to compute the optimal policy for problems of practical sizes. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 557–576, 2014     

基于攻防下的无人侦察机突防效能评估

高技术局部战争中,无人侦察机面临复杂、严峻的空防体系的考验,合理、有效地评估无人侦察机突防能力是提高其作战效能的重要保证。针对多样化的无人侦察机突防环境,综合考虑攻击方的无人机本身性能指标,电子干扰以及防御方的雷达探测能力和拦截武器性能,建立了攻防条件下无人侦察机突防效能评价指标体系。通过对指标的公度化处理,统一的量化指标,并利用灰色层次评估法,全面地评估无人侦察机的突防效能,提高了评估的科学、合理性,并为改善无人侦察机性能提供了参考。     

同类防空武器多层防御部署分析

在现代防空中,经常是防空武器多层部署进行防空,故需要对防空武器多层防御部署进行分析.针对同类防空武器多层防御部署的问题,运用排队论,建立了防御体系射击效能的数学模型.按照模型,通过实验仿真,对计算得到的实验数据进行分析,推测出同类防空武器的部署规律,并对防御体系应部署的适宜层数进行了一定的讨论.通过理论推导,证明了部署规律的正确性.最后建立了需求分析模型,运用部署规律对模型进行求解,通过对实例进行计算,给出了求解的基本步骤.     

A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.     

防空导弹对目标拦截的模糊二元对比排序

确定对空袭兵器的拦截次序是防空导弹火力分配的重要内容.定性分析和定量计算相结合,利用模糊数学中的模糊二元对比排序法确定防空导弹对多个目标拦截的优先次序,先对模型进行描述,给出模糊相似关系矩阵及相应的计算方法,再以4种空袭兵器为作战对象,运用模型进行计算,得出直观的目标拦截排序结果,变模糊的、复杂的问题为直观的结论.为指挥员科学分配防空火力,最大限度地发挥防空导弹的制空效能奠定基础.     

对地攻击机攻击阶段的作战效能分析模型

讨论了机载空对地武器可攻击区、攻击机首攻概率及最大发现目标概率的确定方法,建立了在目标区存在敌防空系统时攻击机作战效能分析的顶层数学模型.     

Optimal weapons allocation against layered defenses

We solve the problem of optimal allocation of weapons to targets in the presence of layered regional defenses. The general solution technique is an integer program transformable to a minimum-cost network flow. This model assumes the defense has perfect weapons. Results of a small sample scenario are included. Additionally, a representative attrition algorithm is described and the two models combined to form a hybrid algorithm. The hybrid algorithm allows for less-than-perfect weapons while maintaining optimality.