The Gaullists,the French army and Algeria before 1958: Common cause or marriage of convenience?

Though the Gaullists and the officer class shared a common view of France's military, diplomatic and operational weaknesses during the Algerian War they did not always share ideas on solutions to the problem. The Gaullists were fixated on France's declining world status and were prepared to act opportunistically to halt it, thereby making a French Algeria expendable. The military, on the other hand, believed that keeping Algeria French was axiomatic in avoiding further national humiliation. The coming together of Gaullists and the Army in May 1958 was therefore only a shortterm alliance, which quickly crumbled.     

The demand for defense in East Asia: Modeling security alternatives∗

An interactive economic model of military spending is proposed. It is quantified on the basis of cross section data for East Asia. Projections of military spending to the end of the decade suggest that the growth of military spending in the region will decline slightly in the current decade. East Asian military spending can, however, be greatly influenced by the path of Chinese and US military efforts. An expansion of military spending by China could cause neighboring countries to greatly increase their military expenditures.     

The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?

This paper revisits the controversy over the cancellation of the US Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile in 1962. Cancellation provoked an acute crisis in Anglo-US relations, which historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic have generally sought to explain in terms of mis-communication. This approach may be termed the 'muddle' thesis. Other analysts have been more suspicious of British intentions and tactics in the run-up to cancellation - the 'mischief' thesis. In order to assess these interpretations, the paper poses three questions. First, were the British fully informed about what was likely to happen, or just selective listeners to Washington opinion? Second, had the British government really staked its hopes unequivocally on Skybolt, or was it from the outset hedging its bets? And third, how were alternatives to Skybolt evaluated? The flows of information between Washington and London are examined to establish what was known, when, and what other choices were open to the British government.     

The struggle of a Kantian power in a Lockean world – German leadership in security and defence policy

ABSTRACT

German security and defence policy has undergone substantial transformation. This transformation requires an unprecedented level of political leadership, suggesting that Germany needs to solve the dilemma of how to supply leadership to increasingly demanding partners. What are the conditions under which German leadership can unfold in security and defence policy? To what degree do German role-conceptions of international agency and role-expectations of German leadership coincide? What kind of leadership outputs are produced? This study offers a comprehensive analysis of German security and defence policy in terms of supply (role conceptions) and demand (role expectations). We outline three leadership role conceptions present in the German strategic debate, which we then assess in the context of the Wendtian theory of cultures of anarchy. We then analyse Berlin's leadership in terms of outputs via the case study on Anchor Army and the Framework Nations Concept. We conclude that while Germany has tried to match leadership role expectations both rhetorically and in action, Berlin's leadership inputs have so far been insufficient. This has led to an imbalance in terms of role conceptions and expectations hampering effective German leadership in security and defence policy.     

NATO and the broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The history and lessons of controversial encounters

The engagement of the Atlantic Alliance in the Middle East dates back to the founding of the Alliance. With one eye on this history and one eye on current controversies, this article investigates the preconditions for and nature of the allies' engagement in the region in order to assess whether the Middle East today is causing a rupture within the Alliance. The article finds that the Alliance was never likely to engage as one in the region. The Alliance instead guarded its cohesion by either letting the Alliance leader, the United States, take a lead role or by acting as a coalition enabling framework. This latter option has prevailed since the early 1980s. Today, NATO can preserve its cohesion and simultaneously engage in the region if it continues this legacy of coalition-making from within the allied framework. Conversely, an effort to engage collectively in the region will likely set of internal tensions to the extent that the Alliance itself will be at risk.     

The African Renaissance: Myth,Vital Lie,or Mobilising Tool?

“From Somalia to Angola to the streets of Hillbrow, Africa is on the moue creating its own models. It is this Africa that Clinton and his policy-makers should be looking at and seeking to understand, rather than condemning the continent to being a deoiant example of a Western model whose only hope lies in falling victim to globalisation.”     

All or nothing? The EU Global Strategy and defence policy after the Brexit

The public expects European governments and the European Union (EU) to deal with the security challenges in and around Europe. So does the US, whose strategic focus has pivoted to the Pacific. Washington, DC has made it clear that it will not, and cannot, solve all of Europe’s problems. The call for ‘strategic autonomy’ in the new EU Global Strategy of June 2016 does not come a moment too soon. But should the aim be EU strategic autonomy, without the UK, or can the aspiration still be European strategic autonomy, with the UK? Can nothing be achieved unless all are fully involved? Or are intermediate solutions possible? How EU Member States and the UK answer these questions will determine which degree of strategic autonomy the EU can achieve. With which degree of British involvement. And whether the UK itself will be left with any measure of strategic autonomy.     

The Central Asian Militants: Cannon Fodder of Global Jihadism or Revolutionary Vanguard?

Central Asians have long been present within the ranks of organisations linked to the global jihad movement, but has there been an acceleration in their recruitment in recent years? There is growing evidence of substantial numbers of Central Asians (mostly Uzbeks and Tajiks) present in Syria in the ranks of the Islamic State and of a number of organisations linked to Al-Qaida. There is also growing evidence of recruitment inside Kyrgizstan and Tajikistan at least (as opposed as among Central Asian emigrants). The authors argue that distrust towards information provided by the Central Asian regimes should not blind analysts towards an emerging trend, which has substantial destabilising potential. The factors driving this recruitment also seem to be much more complex than a rejection of the authoritarianism of the ruling elites.     

Cutting,Running, or Otherwise? The US Decision to withdraw from Somalia

Although President Bill Clinton made the decision to withdraw U.S. combat troops from Somalia within three days of the disastrous Mogadishu raid that resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen, casualties were not the only consideration. Many other factors were at play. Waning Congressional and public enthusiasm for a new “nation-building” mandate, the strategic insignificance of Somalia in the post-Cold War era, and a host of other foreign policy issues had been eroding U.S. support for the mission in Somalia for months. The “Black Hawk Down” incident merely accelerated the final rupture in public and Congressional support, forcing the president to bring the troops home. It was not a simple case of casualty aversion.     

Pronblems In Pronunciation——The Educational College of Xingjiang Production and Construction Corps

<正>One must have a good pronunciation in order to be able to ubderstand other people easily whenthey speak or read aIoud, This is proved by the well-known fact that the better we pronounce aforeign language ,the easier we understand it when we hear it．