PEACE PROCESSES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Conflict resolution processes must meet certain prerequisites and conditions. Unless the warring parties or the mediators meet, it will be difficult to find lasting and just solutions to the conflicts in the Horn (Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Somalia). Most of these conflicts have ethnic or religious components and also have a lot do with the nature of the government institutions and the power distribution among the communities within these states. Identifying the main causes of the conflict and the issues involved in each country is a very necessary first step toward peace. Secondly, conditions have to be identified that would make the current peace agreements work. This includes identifying the specific problems faced by the parties involved; ascertaining the validity of the mechanisms through which the problems will be overcome; and planning how the agreements will be maintained. The knowledge that mediators have about the conflict is often as important as the actual meeting of parties at the negotiation table. This article also evaluates the peace initiatives underway in the Horn and attempts to identify the apparent reasons that prevented their implementation.     

Whatever Happens to Somalia…Ignoring it is No Longer an Option

The war against terrorism has brought Somalia, a country located in a key strategic region, back onto the radar of US and Western security concerns. Following a vicious civil war, a failed peace support operation and several attempts to start a peace process, lawless Somalia, a country without government, has gained the potential to be exploited as a terrorist base. Although this country in the Horn of Africa does not represent a direct and immediate threat to the US or its Western allies, its potential to destabilize the region is extremely high. This article offers an analysis of Somalia's potential to become a ground for terrorist activities and suggests a two-track approach. On the one hand, US foreign and security policy in Somalia needs to be more assertive; on the other, the only way to prevent Somalia from becoming a fertile ground for international terrorist groups is to help stabilize the country. In order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to adopt any initiative aimed at strengthening Somalia's civil society.     

The Somali Conflict: Root causes,obstacles, and peace-building strategies

Unlike many African populations, the overwhelming majority of the Somalis are part of a single, homogeneous ethnic group. All Somalis are Muslim and share the same language and culture. Nevertheless, one of the most terrible civil wars in Africa has been waged in this country for more than two decades. Somalia has been without a functioning central government since the late dictator General Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted in 1991. This essay examines the root causes of the Somali conflict and analyses some of the obstacles that have plagued peace efforts for the last fourteen years. Finally, it identifies peace-building strategies that could help establish durable peace in Somalia. We argue that competition for resources and power, repression by the military regime and the colonial legacy are the background causes of the conflict. Politicised clan identity, the availability of weapons and the presence of a large number of unemployed youth have exacerbated the problem. With regard to the obstacles to peace, we contend that Ethiopia's hostile policy, the absence of major power interest, lack of resources and the warlords' lack of interest in peace are the major factors that continue to haunt the Somali peace process. Finally, we propose ambitious peace-building strategies that attempt to address the key areas of security, political governance, economic development and justice in order to build a durable peace in Somalia.     

Building peace from the margins in Somalia: The case for political settlement with Al-Shabaab

The prevailing discourse in Mogadishu among the federal government of Somalia and the international community is that Al-Shabaab is no longer relevant in contemporary Somali political landscape. In the language of the government, Al-Shabaab is like a lost crocodile thrown out from the river. In the lexicon of the international community, Al-Shabaab is gradually receding. In fact, Al-Shabaab is actually puissant and potent in terms of social, political and military capabilities; not just in Somalia, but also in the wider East Africa region. Why is Al-Shabaab resilient and resistant? Why is it even more effective than the federal government? To answer these questions, this article reveals how Al-Shabaab is increasingly more legitimate than the federal government. In conclusion, the article proposes that negotiated settlement with the insurgency movement could lead to peace in war-torn southern Somalia.     

HUMAN STABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: PART ONE

Human stability is rare in the Horn of Africa. The history of the countries of the Horn since the end of colonialism in the region has largely been one of violent repression and insurgency. Succession by peaceful election has been the exception. This paper looks at the internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of the balance of power between civil society and the state in the countries comprising the Horn. A relevant feature is the formation and disintegration of centralised states. Centralising states, affected by the lack of human stability which can lead to their fragmentation and demise, also contribute to the escalation of the crisis. The Horn of Africa, consisting of Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is a region of Considerable Strategic importance, even to nations far beyond its borders because of its strategic location, its diverse religious and ethnic groupings and its significant agricultural potential.     

SOMALILAND

This essay outlines recent developments in the Horn of Africa with particular focus on the emerging democratic state of Somaliland. It maps out the key political contours of Somaliland and Somalia. In this respect, the implications of recent developments for the international community and multilateral institutions are analysed. Somaliland has shown extraordinary determination to succeed. Those governing Somaliland have shown respect for democratic principles, begun to develop natural assets which will strengthen the economy, and rebuilt much of the capital city. The union with Somalia has proved difficult to say the least, while relations with Kenya, Djibouti and African multilateral organisations remain complex. Yet despite the advances the citizens of Somaliland have made, recognition of Somaliland as a viable independent entity by the international community remains an uncertain hope.     

South Africa's arsenal of terrorism legislation

After only ten years in existence, the African Union (AU) has already made its mark on the landscape of peace and security in Africa. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the AU's leading collaborative interstate security policy, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and sustainable peace in the Horn of Africa. It examines four countries – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya – and how engaging with the APSA through early warning systems can contribute to developing the elements necessary for sustainable peace, namely regional stability, conflict management, and good governance.     

Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United Nations

When the United Nations (UN) Security Council needs to authorize a peace enforcement operation in Africa, its partner of choice is the African Union (AU). Africa has developed significant peace operations capacity over the past decade. In addition to deploying eight AU operations, Africa now contributes 50% of all UN peacekeepers. African stability operations, like its mission in Somalia, are often described as peace enforcement operations. In this article, I question whether it is accurate to categorize African stability operations as peace enforcement? I answer the question by considering what the criteria are that are used to differentiate between peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations in the UN context. I then use the peace enforcement criteria to assess whether AU stabilization operations would qualify as peace enforcement operations. In conclusion, I consider the implications of the findings for the strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.     

Beyond the state: reconceptualising African security in the 21st century

Confronted with myriad security challenges, African states and the much-vaunted peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) has proven not to be up to the challenge. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged by the AU itself if one considers the creation of such security structures as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which exists outside its peace and security architecture. This paper argues for a radical rethink of security structures on the African continent – one in which state structures of security coexist with newer forms of security actors, including private military companies (PMCs), community movements and the business sector. Whilst this shift in security actors is already happening on the ground, policymakers need to embrace this new reality.     

Amidst the chaos a small force for stability: Somalia's business community

Though parts of Somalia appear mired in intractable conflict, both domestic and foreign trade continues. As a result amidst the conflict, corruption, and chaos Somalia's business community is a small force for peace and stability. Thus, efforts directed at enhancing the business community, possibly via the Transitional Federal Government or its successor, could play a small role in improving the situation in this strategically poised country with a very entrepreneurial population. However, such success is far from certain, and numerous other factors besides a strengthened business community would have to occur for Somalia even to begin the journey on the long road to recovery.     

UN-Consistent: A Comparison of Australia's Military Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda

This article seeks to compare Australia's involvement in two key 1990s peace missions: those to Somalia in 1992–93 and Rwanda in 1994–95. While there are many similarities between the two missions in terms of time, scale and theatre, the differences are more important. Both missions are usually recalled as failures despite the Australian troops having been extremely successful in their roles during both deployments. Moreover the experiences with intervention in Africa seem to have forever blighted Australian participation in peace missions on that continent.     

浅析达尔富尔和平进程及其面临的挑战

达尔富尔危机始于2003年2月。这场危机主要是由北方的游牧民与南方的定居农民之间对生存资源的争夺而引发的国内冲突。在国际社会的斡旋下,苏丹政府已与几个反政府武装签署了和平协议,并同意部署联合国-非盟混合维和行动,达尔富尔地区的和平进程已步入正轨。由于苏丹国内的复杂形势和困难,达尔富尔地区的和平进程仍面临诸多挑战,和平与和解之路仍然漫长。     

Political dynamics in Kenya’s post-electoral violence: Justice without peace or political compromise?

The political upheavals that erupted in Kenya after the release of the 2007–8 election results resulted in the death of approximately 1 200 people, as well as the loss of livestock and other valuable property. While the Kenyan government tried to seek solutions to the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of top government officials. For its part, the African Union (AU) accused the ICC of racism by targeting only African leaders, and maintained that such practices undermine the rule of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The AU is therefore advising African countries, including Kenya, to consider withdrawing from the ICC. Will the ICC's intervention into the situation in Kenya bring justice and peace to the country, or will it add to the existing injuries affecting not just the country but the region as well? Through a critical analysis of contemporary scholarly discourse, this article unravels the dilemma of the ICC's intervention and the likely consequences of this action for the people of Kenya and Africa.     

The challenge and meaning of justice in northern Uganda

Even though the peace talks in northern Uganda have faltered, attempts at negotiations between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army are continuing. The current rapprochement between the two sides is the most significant move towards peace in the twenty-year civil war in northern Uganda. Even though the war has been extreme in its brutality, it is little known of outside the region—with reports on the conflict often portraying a protective government pitted against a crazed rebel group. But the issues are much more complex. The article examines the history of abuses and atrocities committed by both sides; the wider implications of the conflict for the north; why the rest of Uganda are seemingly disinterested in the conflict; and the politics behind why northern civil society have little trust in the Ugandan government or the International Criminal Court (ICC). The current prospect of peace has also stirred up the debate around justice and the forms of justice for victims of both rebel and government atrocities. And this is where the biggest cleft between the northern civil society and officialdom (government and international NGOs) resides. The article further examines the implications of the ICC's work in Uganda, and why there has been such widespread hostility towards it from northern civil society. The article also asks if—beyond the end of fighting and terror—peace will really mean that northern Uganda can finally partake in the prosperity the rest of the country has almost taken for granted.     

No war,no peace

The armed conflict over crude petroleum oil in the Niger Delta has raged for several decades. A host of peace initiatives have been adopted by the Nigerian state to address it, but with minimal impact. The amnesty offer to repentant militias in 2009 by President Umaru Yar'Adua's administration is one of the most recent and broadest peace initiatives by the Nigerian government intended to end the general tendency to warfare and the absence of peace in the Niger Delta. This article, based on secondary sources of data, examines the components of the amnesty, its critical problems and their implications for peacebuilding in the Niger Delta. It finds that though the programme has engendered relative peace, the issues and grievances that occasioned the general tendency to warfare and absence of peace in the region – such as inequitable distribution of oil revenue, environmental degradation, and underdevelopment – are not properly articulated in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration components of the programme. Thus, it holds that the prevailing situation in the region largely approximates a swinging pendulum of no war, no peace.     

A Deal with the Devil: Issues in Offering Joseph Kony Amnesty to Resolve the Conflict in Uganda

Peace talks have commenced between the Ugandan Government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which has committed countless atrocities during the nearly 20 years it has tried to overthrow the government. The head of the LRA, Joseph Kony, has been offered amnesty by the government in the hope that peace will ensue. This raises the question of whether a government should forego the pursuit of justice in order to prevent further bloodshed.     

Israeli counter‐insurgency strategy and the war in South Lebanon 1985–97

Little has been written about attempts to alter the domestic political systems of these countries, even though this was central to the missions. The latter two cases were selected as extremes on a ‘degree of difficulty’ scale. In Somalia there was basically no governing structure; the US had to build one in order to end the starvation caused by civil war. In Panama the US took over a government in place and had an alternative national leader; the problem was to change the existing state system. The cases reveal a stress on short‐run security issues over long‐term political questions.     

Praying for Rain? Water Scarcity and the Duration and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Recent anecdotal evidence from the civil wars in Somalia and Yemen suggest that water scarcity may shape the dynamics of civil wars. While a considerable body of research has examined the connection between water scarcity (such as low rainfall) and the onset of civil war, very little research has examined how water scarcity may shape the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Looking specifically at rainfall, this paper argues that changes in access to water play a key role in the duration of civil wars. As rainfall declines, there is a reduction in resources available to both the government and the rebel group, leading to a stalemate in fighting. Furthermore, this paper argues that declines in rainfall are felt more acutely by rebel groups who seek to challenge the government through conventional warfare. This paper tests these propositions using hazard models. The results provide robust support for the propositions.     

The Imperfect Peace: Explaining Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland

This article examines why paramilitary campaigns in Northern Ireland have continued despite the current peace process. In advancing three instrumental explanations of paramilitary violence, the author provides a useful analytical framework which shows that while organizational interpretations are dominating the public discourse, republicans and loyalists continue to use paramilitary violence as a strategic means of threat and coercion. Furthermore, even though policy implications are not discussed in detail, it will be demonstrated that the dominance of organizational imperatives has resulted in excessive leniency by the state, which - in turn - has contributed to the fragility of the peace process.