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1.
Currently, sophisticated multiechelon models compute stockage quantities for spares and repair parts that will minimize total inventory investment while achieving a target level of weapon system operational availability. The maintenance policies to be followed are input to the stockage models. The Optimum Allocation of Test Equipment/Manpower Evaluated Against Logistics (OATMEAL) model will determine optimum maintenance as well as stockage policies for a weapon system. Specifically, it will determine at which echelon each maintenance function should be performed, including an option for component or module throwaway. Test equipment requirements to handle work load at each echelon are simultaneously optimized. Mixed-integer programming (MIP) combined with a Lagrangian approach are used to do the constrained cost minimization, that is, to minimize all costs dependent on maintenance and stockage policies while achieving a target weapons system operational availability. Real-life test cases are included.  相似文献   

2.
A rule that constrains decision‐makers is enforced by an inspector who is supplied with a fixed level of inspection resources—inspection personnel, equipment, or time. How should the inspector distribute its inspection resources over several independent inspectees? What minimum level of resources is required to deter all violations? Optimal enforcement problems occur in many contexts; the motivating application for this study is the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Using game‐theoretic models, the resource level adequate for deterrence is characterized in a two‐inspectee problem with inspections that are imperfect in the sense that violations can be missed. Detection functions, or probabilities of detecting a violation, are assumed to be increasing in inspection resources, permitting optimal allocations over inspectees to be described both in general and in special cases. When detection functions are convex, inspection effort should be concentrated on one inspectee chosen at random, but when they are concave it should be spread deterministicly over the inspectees. Our analysis provides guidance for the design of arms‐control verification operations, and implies that a priori constraints on the distribution of inspection effort can result in significant inefficiencies. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.  相似文献   

3.
通过各类球赛对大学生球迷竞争意识的积极影响研究与分析,球赛对不同大学生球迷的影响具差异性。大学生球迷对竞争意识认识不足,争取优胜的信念还有待提高,对外界事物的判断、认识不够准确,参与社会活动内容贫乏,形式单一,选择性少。随着年龄和学龄的增长,在生活与实践中的竞争意识得到进一步强化。球赛本身激烈性和内容丰富性的特点,可以有效地激发和培养大学生球迷的竞争意识,同时也强化了大学生球迷的竞争意识。  相似文献   

4.
Plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), upon market penetration, will create additional recharging loads to the electric power systems. This article considers different recharging scenarios and uses game theoretic models to study the potential impact of the recharging loads on locational marginal prices (wholesale electricity prices). Computational results from a Pennsylvania‐New Jersey‐Maryland Interconnection case study show that, under the existing recharging infrastructures, even a small magnitude of load increase caused by PHEV recharging could have a significant undesirable impact on locational marginal prices. The impact could be mitigated to a varying extent by the availability of possible future recharging infrastructures, including realtime pricing recharging meters, battery stations, or vehicle‐to‐grid technology.© 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010  相似文献   

5.
We introduce and develop models for a physical goods storage system based on the 15‐puzzle, a classic children's game in which 15 numbered tiles slide within a 4 × 4 grid. The objective of the game is to arrange the tiles in numerical sequence, starting from a random arrangement. For our purposes, the tiles represent totes, pallets, or even containers that must be stored very densely, and the objective is to maneuver items to an input–output point for retrieval or processing. We develop analytical results for storage configurations having a single empty location (as in the game) and experimental results for configurations with multiple empty locations. Designs with many empty locations can be made to form aisles, allowing us to compare puzzle‐based designs with traditional aisle‐based designs found in warehousing systems. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   

6.
In the past several decades, many ranking‐and‐selection (R&S) procedures have been developed to select the best simulated system with the largest (or smallest) mean performance measure from a finite number of alternatives. A major issue to address in these R&S problems is to balance the trade‐off between the effectiveness (ie, making a correct selection with a high probability) and the efficiency (ie, using a small total number of observations). In this paper, we take a frequentist's point of view by setting a predetermined probability of correct selection while trying to reduce the total sample size, that is, to improve the efficiency but also maintain the effectiveness. In particular, in order to achieve this goal, we investigate combining various variance reduction techniques into the fully sequential framework, resulting in different R&S procedures with either finite‐time or asymptotic statistical validity. Extensive numerical experiments show great improvement in the efficiency of our proposed procedures as compared with several existing procedures.  相似文献   

7.
We state a balancing problem for mixed model assembly lines with a paced moving conveyor as: Given the daily assembling sequence of the models, the tasks of each model, the precedence relations among the tasks, and the operations parameters of the assembly line, assign the tasks of the models to the workstations so as to minimize the total overload time. Several characteristics of the problem are investigated. A line‐balancing heuristic is proposed based on a lower bound of the total overload time. A practical procedure is provided for estimating the deviation of any given line‐balance solution from the theoretical optimum. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the methodology. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.  相似文献   

8.
Ranking is a common task for selecting and evaluating alternatives. In the past few decades, combining rankings results from various sources into a consensus ranking has become an increasingly active research topic. In this study, we focus on the evaluation of rank aggregation methods. We first develop an experimental data generation method, which can provide ground truth ranking for alternatives based on their “inherent ability.” This experimental data generation method can generate the required individual synthetic rankings with adjustable accuracy and length. We propose characterizing the effectiveness of rank aggregation methods by calculating the Kendall tau distance between the aggregated ranking and the ground truth ranking. We then compare four classical rank aggregation methods and present some useful findings on the relative performances of the four methods. The results reveal that both the accuracy and length of individual rankings have a remarkable effect on the comparison results between rank aggregation methods. Our methods and results may be helpful to both researchers and decision‐makers.  相似文献   

9.
To meet customer demand, delivery companies are offering an increasing number of time‐definite services. In this article, we examine the strategic design of delivery networks which can efficiently provide these services. Because of the high cost of direct connections, we focus on tree‐structured networks. As it may not be possible to identify a tree‐structured network that satisfies all of the delivery guarantees, we allow these guarantees to be violated but seek to minimize the sum of the violations. We establish the complexity of the problem and exploit an empirically identified solution structure to create new neighborhoods which improve solution values over more general neighborhood structures. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008  相似文献   

10.
We develop models that lend insight into how to design systems that enjoy economies of scale in their operating costs, when those systems will subsequently face disruptions from accidents, acts of nature, or an intentional attack from a well‐informed attacker. The systems are modeled as parallel M/M/1 queues, and the key question is how to allocate service capacity among the queues to make the system resilient to worst‐case disruptions. We formulate this problem as a three‐level sequential game of perfect information between a defender and a hypothetical attacker. The optimal allocation of service capacity to queues depends on the type of attack one is facing. We distinguish between deterministic incremental attacks, where some, but not all, of the capacity of each attacked queue is knocked out, and zero‐one random‐outcome (ZORO) attacks, where the outcome is random and either all capacity at an attacked queue is knocked out or none is. There are differences in the way one should design systems in the face of incremental or ZORO attacks. For incremental attacks it is best to concentrate capacity. For ZORO attacks the optimal allocation is more complex, typically, but not always, involving spreading the service capacity out somewhat among the servers. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011  相似文献   

11.
This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006  相似文献   

12.
We present methods for optimizing generation and storage decisions in an electricity network with multiple unreliable generators, each colocated with one energy storage unit (e.g., battery), and multiple loads under power flow constraints. Our model chooses the amount of energy produced by each generator and the amount of energy stored in each battery in every time period in order to minimize power generation and storage costs when each generator faces stochastic Markovian supply disruptions. This problem cannot be optimized easily using stochastic programming and/or dynamic programming approaches. Therefore, in this study, we present several heuristic methods to find an approximate optimal solution for this system. Each heuristic involves decomposing the network into several single‐generator, single‐battery, multiload systems and solving them optimally using dynamic programming, then obtaining a solution for the original problem by recombining. We discuss the computational performance of the proposed heuristics as well as insights gained from the models. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 493–511, 2015  相似文献   

13.
This paper deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game, where a searcher and a target participate, taking account of false contacts. The searcher distributes his search effort in a search space in order to detect the target. On the other hand, the target moves to avoid the searcher. As a payoff of the game, we take the cumulative amount of search effort weighted by the target distribution, which can be derived as an approximation of the detection probability of the target. The searcher's strategy is a plan of distributing search effort and the target's is a movement represented by a path or transition probability across the search space. In the search, there are false contacts caused by environmental noises, signal processing noises, or real objects resembling true targets. If they happen, the searcher must take some time for their investigation, which interrupts the search for a while. There have been few researches dealing with search games with false contacts. In this paper, we formulate the game into a mathematical programming problem to obtain its equilibrium point. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007  相似文献   

14.
The inspection game is a two-player noncooperative game that models a situation where an inspector verifies whether the inspectee complies with the rules (on the assumption that the inspectee has the tendency to violate at least one of the rules). The usual approach in the analysis of this game seeks to find an optimal strategic inspection scheme for each of the two players yielding favorable payoffs. Recently, there have been some developments in the study of such games that use a mathematical structure known as reaction network involving a set of molecular species and the existing reactions among these species. In this paper, we use a reaction network to analyze the inspection game giving an alternative way of modeling the social situation. The molecular species play the role of the players' decision moves and their resulting gain or loss, while the reactions are the encounters of the decisions of the players which, as expected, yield payoffs. We reexamine the dynamics of the inspection game through the lens of reaction network theory and consider various situations that call for more detailed analyses such as equal or unequal reaction rates and inspection leadership. Conditions concerning reaction rates, initial population of decision species, benefits, and costs are determined in order to identify strategies that yield better payoffs both for the inspector and inspectee. These results illustrate practical insights rooted from the formulated simple game models.  相似文献   

15.
This paper investigates the two-person zero-sum multiple payoff game in which the objective is to minimize a player's total underachievement from a fixed set of goals. It is demonstrated that a previous formulation of this problem can be substantially simplified.  相似文献   

16.
为了提高目标轨迹预测的精度以及预测模型的泛化能力,提出基于改进蝙蝠算法优化的核极限学习机(Kernel Extreme Learning Machine,KELM)和集成学习理论目标机动轨迹预测模型。构建KELM模型,并采用改进的蝙蝠算法对KELM的参数进行优化;以优化后的KELM神经网络为弱预测器,结合集成学习算法生成强预测器,通过训练不断优化强预测的结构和参数,得到一种基于集成学习理论的目标机动轨迹预测模型;基于不同规模的样本,将所得预测模型与逆传播神经网络、支持向量机和极限学习机等模型进行对比分析。仿真结果表明:所提目标机动轨迹预测模型具有较好的预测精度和泛化能力。  相似文献   

17.
There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.  相似文献   

18.
Collaborative procurement emerged as one of the many initiatives for achieving improved inter‐firm coordination and collaboration. In this article, we adopt a game‐theoretical approach to study the interaction between two firms who procure jointly, but produce independently and remain competitors in a product market characterized by price‐sensitive demand. We study the underlying economics behind collaborative procurement, examine the effects of collaboration on buyer and supplier profitability, and derive conditions under which collaboration is beneficial to each participant. We find that a necessary and sufficient condition for a buyer to collaborate is to increase its sales. We identify the conditions that lead equal size buyers (i.e., consortia consisting of only large buyers or only small buyers) versus different size buyers to collaborate. We also determine the conditions that make collaboration profitable for the supplier, and show that rather than selling a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier prefers to sell to multiple buyers in smaller quantities. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008  相似文献   

19.
We consider an expansion planning problem for Waste‐to‐Energy (WtE) systems facing uncertainty in future waste supplies. The WtE expansion plans are regarded as strategic, long term decisions, while the waste distribution and treatment are medium to short term operational decisions which can adapt to the actual waste collected. We propose a prediction set uncertainty model which integrates a set of waste generation forecasts and is constructed based on user‐specified levels of forecasting errors. Next, we use the prediction sets for WtE expansion scenario analysis. More specifically, for a given WtE expansion plan, the guaranteed net present value (NPV) is evaluated by computing an extreme value forecast trajectory of future waste generation from the prediction set that minimizes the maximum NPV of the WtE project. This problem is essentially a multiple stage min‐max dynamic optimization problem. By exploiting the structure of the WtE problem, we show this is equivalent to a simpler min‐max optimization problem, which can be further transformed into a single mixed‐integer linear program. Furthermore, we extend the model to optimize the guaranteed NPV by searching over the set of all feasible expansion scenarios, and show that this can be solved by an exact cutting plane approach. We also propose a heuristic based on a constant proportion distribution rule for the WtE expansion optimization model, which reduces the problem into a moderate size mixed‐integer program. Finally, our computational studies demonstrate that our proposed expansion model solutions are very stable and competitive in performance compared to scenario tree approaches. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 47–70, 2016  相似文献   

20.
针对资源受限情形下的两阶段攻防资源分配问题,提出一种基于多属性决策的资源分配对策模型。防守者首先将有限的防护资源分配到不同的目标上,继而进攻者选择一种威胁组合方式对目标实施打击。基于博弈论相关知识,模型的求解结果可以使防守者最小化自身损失,使进攻者最大化进攻收益。同时,针对模型的特点,给出了一些推论和证明。通过一个示例验证了模型的合理性以及相关推论的准确性,能够为攻、防双方规划决策提供辅助支持。  相似文献   

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